WIP: Go: CORS Bypass due to incorrect checks

go/ql/src/experimental/CWE-639/urlCheck.ql

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+/**
+ * @name Incorrect check on url
+ * @description If a CORS policy is configured to accept an origin value obtained from the request data, it can lead to a policy bypass.
+ * @kind path-problem
+ * @problem.severity warning
+ * @id go/cors-bypass
+ * @tags security
+ *       experimental
+ *       external/cwe/cwe-942
+ *       external/cwe/cwe-346
+ */
+
+import go
+
+bindingset[s]
+private predicate mayBeCors(string s) { s.toLowerCase().matches(["%origin%", "%cors%"]) }
+
+/**
+ * An argument to a Gorilla's OriginValidator Function taken as a source
+ */
+class GorillaOriginFuncSource extends RemoteFlowSource::Range {
+  GorillaOriginFuncSource() {
+    exists(FuncDef f, DataFlow::CallNode c |
+      // Find a func passed to `AllowedOriginValdiator` as a validator.
+      // The string parameter supplied to the validator is a remote controlled string supplied in the origin header.
+      // `gh.AllowedOriginValidator(func(origin string) bool{})`
+      f.getParameter(0).getType() instanceof StringType and
+      f.getNumParameter() = 1 and
+      c.getTarget().hasQualifiedName("github.com/gorilla/handlers", "AllowedOriginValidator") and
+      c.getArgument(0).asExpr() = f
+    |
+      DataFlow::localFlow(DataFlow::parameterNode(f.getParameter(0)), this)
+    )
+  }
+}
+
+private class MaybeOrigin extends DataFlow::Node {
+  MaybeOrigin() {
+    exists(RemoteFlowSource r |
+      // Any write where the variables name could suggest it has something to do with cors.
+      exists(Write w |
+        // Take `origin` in `origin := r.Header.Get(header)` as a source.
+        mayBeCors(w.getLhs().getName()) and
+        TaintTracking::localTaint(r, w.getRhs())
+      |
+        this = r //or this.asInstruction() = w
+      )
+      or
+      // Take the receiver, call or call arguments as source when any of their names match `maybeCors`
+      exists(DataFlow::CallNode c, DataFlow::ArgumentNode a |
+        TaintTracking::localTaint(r, a) and
+        a.argumentOf(c.asExpr(), _) and
+        mayBeCors([a.getStringValue(), c.getTarget().getName()])
+      |
+        // When argument or receiver is `maybeCors` take them as origin source.
+        // When the call name is `maybeCors` take the result as origin source
+        // (this = c.getResult(_) or this = a)
+        this = r
+      )
+    )
+  }
+}
+
+private module UrlFlow implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node node) {
+    node instanceof MaybeOrigin or node instanceof GorillaOriginFuncSource
+  }
+
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node node) {
+    exists(DataFlow::CallNode mc, DataFlow::ArgumentNode a |
+      // Get a call to `strings.HasSuffix(origin, allowedDomain)`
+      mc.getTarget().hasQualifiedName("strings", "HasSuffix") and
+      a = mc.getArgument(1) and
+      // should not match ".domain.com"
+      not (
+        a.asExpr().(StringLit).getExactValue().matches(".%")
+        or
+        exists(AddExpr w | w.getLeftOperand().getStringValue().matches(".%") |
+          DataFlow::localFlow(DataFlow::exprNode(w), a)
+        )
+      )
+    |
+      mc.getArgument(0) = node
+    )
+  }
+}
+
+private module Flow = TaintTracking::Global<UrlFlow>;
+
+private import Flow::PathGraph
+
+from Flow::PathNode source, Flow::PathNode sink
+where Flow::flowPath(source, sink)
+select sink.getNode(), source, sink,
+  "This can lead to a Cross Origin Resource Sharing(CORS) policy bypass"