Merge branch 'main' of https://github.com/pluralitybook/plurality

.github/workflows/main.yml

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ on:
 
 jobs:
   build:
+    if: github.repository_owner == 'pluralitybook'
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     permissions:
       contents: write
@@ -19,15 +20,6 @@ jobs:
     - name: Generate book files (zh-tw)
       run: |
         perl scripts/make-book-zh-tw.pl
-    - name: Upload artifacts
-      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v2
-      with:
-        name: book-files
-        path: |
-          Plurality-english.pdf
-          Plurality-english.epub
-          Plurality-traditional-mandarin.pdf
-          Plurality-traditional-mandarin.epub
     - uses: ncipollo/release-action@v1
       with:
         artifacts: "*.pdf,*.epub"

contents/english/02-00-information-technology-and-democracy-a-widening-gulf.md

@@ -116,7 +116,9 @@ This reflects, with an extensive lag, the shift in investments made by public se
 
 ### Geopolitics and the Evolution of Technology and Democracy
 
-There is a definite geopolitical context to the disposition of democracies to technology. Research on the evolution of innovation over history and time suggests that the changing attitudes of Western democracies to public technology investment have been moderated by geopolitical competitive pressures from eastward autocratic rivals[^NavigatingtheGeopoliticsofInnovation]. In the United States, for instance, the first and second phases of the innovation age (Industry 1.0 and Industry 2.0 respectively) which featured the emergence of such technologies as the steam engine, rail transport, the telegraph, and the assembly line were driven by the private sector in a relatively less intense geopolitical context in the pre-War era, an era of relative American isolation from global politics. However, the third phase (Industry 3.0), enabled by such technologies as semiconductors and the Internet, occurred in the context of intense geopolitics – the Cold War. Thus, driven by geopolitical exigencies, the 20th-century innovations were led by the government through such national institutional frameworks as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) as well as regional alliances of democracies such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of an autocratic adversary, the geopolitical drivers of innovation waned in intensity, leading to a reduction in incentives for public investments in technology. About three decades later, the rise of China as a formidable challenger to the West’s innovation leadership and the resurgence of an empire-seeking Russia have reawakened the United States and other Western democracies to the urgency of innovation leadership in an era of exponential technologies loosely described as the fourth industrial revolution or Industry 4.0. Hence, we see such recent, somewhat corrective, public spending by the United States government through such institutional mechanisms as the National Science Foundation to bolster America's leadership in emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence [^WhiteHouse2024Budget]. This geopolitically driven attitude of the United States towards technology investment - an attitude that is reactive or proactive to the presence or otherwise of a rising or formidable adversary - leans towards what was described by Robert Atkinson as “digital realpolitik”[[^RobertAtkinson]]([url](https://www2.itif.org/2021-us-grand-strategy-global-digital-economy.pdf)). 
+There is a definite geopolitical context to the disposition of democracies to technology. Research on the evolution of innovation over history and time suggests that the changing attitudes of Western democracies to public technology investment have been moderated by geopolitical competitive pressures from eastward autocratic rivals[^NavigatingtheGeopoliticsofInnovation]. In the United States, for instance, the first and second phases of the innovation age (Industry 1.0 and Industry 2.0 respectively) which featured the emergence of such technologies as the steam engine, rail transport, the telegraph, and the assembly line were driven by the private sector in a relatively less intense geopolitical context in the pre-War era, an era of relative American isolation from global politics. However, the third phase (Industry 3.0), enabled by such technologies as semiconductors and the Internet, occurred in the context of intense geopolitics – the Cold War. Thus, driven by geopolitical exigencies, the 20th-century innovations were led by the government through such national institutional frameworks as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) as well as regional alliances of democracies such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of an autocratic adversary, the geopolitical drivers of innovation waned in intensity, leading to a reduction in incentives for public investments in technology. About three decades later, the rise of China as a formidable challenger to the West’s innovation leadership and the resurgence of an empire-seeking Russia have reawakened the United States and other Western democracies to the urgency of innovation leadership in an era of exponential technologies loosely described as the fourth industrial revolution or Industry 4.0. Hence, we see such recent, somewhat corrective, public spending by the United States government through such institutional mechanisms as the National Science Foundation to bolster America's leadership in emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence [^WhiteHouse2024Budget]. This geopolitically driven attitude of the United States towards technology investment - an attitude that is reactive or proactive to the presence or otherwise of a rising or formidable adversary - leans towards what was described by Robert Atkinson as “digital realpolitik”[^RobertAtkinson].
+
+[^RobertAtkinson]: [url](https://www2.itif.org/2021-us-grand-strategy-global-digital-economy.pdf).
 
 ### Ideologies of the Twenty-First Century
 
@@ -237,7 +239,6 @@ OECD. “OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators,” March 2022. https://web
 [^LickliderReflection]:  Dertouzos, Michael L, and Joel Moses. The Computer Age: A Twenty-Year View. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980.
 [^NavigatingtheGeopoliticsofInnovation]: Omoakhalen, Omoaholo. “Navigating the Geopolitics of Innovation: Policy and Strategy Imperatives for the 21st Century Africa.” Remake Africa Consulting, 2023. https://remakeafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Navigating_the_Geopolitics_of_Innovation.pdf.
 [^WhiteHouse2024Budget]: The White House. “Fact Sheet: President Biden’s 2024 Budget Invests in American Science, Technology, and Innovation to Achieve Our Nation’s Greatest Aspirations.” OSTP, March 13, 2023. https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/news-updates/2023/03/13/fy24-budget-fact-sheet-rd-innovation/.
-
 Robert Atkinson. “A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Global Digital Economy.” Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, 2021, as cited in Omoakhalen, Omoaholo. “Navigating the Geopolitics of Innovation: Policy and Strategy Imperatives for the 21st Century Africa.” Remake Africa Consulting, 2023. https://remakeafrica.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Navigating_the_Geopolitics_of_Innovation.pdf.
 [^AcemogluRestrepoStudy]: Acemoglu, Daron, and Pascual Restrepo. “Automation and New Tasks: How Technology Displaces and Reinstates Labor.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 33, no. 2 (May 2019): 3–30. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.33.2.3.  Note that the precise Golden Age-Digital Stagnation cutoff differs across these studies, but it is always somewhere during the 1970s or 1980s.
 [^PosnerWeylBook]: Posner, Eric A, E  Glen Weyl, and Vitalik Buterin. Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019.