Merge branch 'main' into jmw-plurality_typos

ReadMe.md

@@ -14,13 +14,15 @@ All materials in this repo and in all other parts of this project (unless explic
 
 To cite this text, you can use this bibtex as a sample
 
+```bibtex
 @online{plurality2023,
   title={Plurality: The Future of Collaborative Technology and Democracy},
   author={Weyl, E. Glen and Tang, Audrey and {the Plurality Community}},
   year={2023},
   url={https://github.com/pluralitybook/plurality/blob/main/contents/english},
   publisher={GitHub},
 }
+```
 
 # Identity and credit
 
@@ -82,7 +84,7 @@ Active translation communities and repositories
 - Ukrainian: https://github.com/vlree-alt/plurality-ukrainian
 - Japanese: https://github.com/nishio/plurality-japanese
 - German: https://github.com/GermanPluralityBook/pluralitaet 
-- Korean: https://github.com/hopelee327/plurality-korean
+- Korean: https://github.com/parkhaewon0617/plurality
 - French: https://github.com/xitobal/radicalxchangeparis.github.io/tree/main/public/Plurality%2C%20le%20livre%20-%20G%20Weil
 
 # Summary and next steps

contents/english/0-0-endorsements.md

@@ -25,8 +25,7 @@
 <br></br>
 
 > *Plurality* reads like optimistic sci-fi, already happening in real life! Can democracies around the world follow in Taiwan’s footsteps to upgrade free society for the digital age? Fingers crossed for a happy ending. <br></br>
-— [Joseph Gordon-Levitt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Gordon-Levitt), E
-mmy-winning artist and founder of [HITRECORD](https://hitrecord.org/)
+— [Joseph Gordon-Levitt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Gordon-Levitt), Emmy-winning artist and founder of [HITRECORD](https://hitrecord.org/)
 
 <br></br>
 

contents/english/0-1-About-the-authors.md

@@ -5,4 +5,4 @@
 
 ![](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pluralitybook/plurality/main/figs/author-Community.png)
 
-This book is open-source and its contents may be freely copied, with or without attribution.  In addition to the primary named authors, dozens of members of the ⿻ community around the world contributed to the book, doing most of the total work.  These contributors are listed on the next page and represented in this machine-generated blending of their faces, tiled by their individual faces.  The free online version of this book at [https://www.plurality.net/](https://www.plurality.net/) will continue to evolve, governed according to the principles described in this book by this community.
+This book is open-source and its contents may be freely copied, with or without attribution.  In addition to the primary named authors, dozens of members of the <span aria-label="Plurality">⿻</span> community around the world contributed to the book, doing most of the total work.  These contributors are listed on the next page and represented in this machine-generated blending of their faces, tiled by their individual faces.  The free online version of this book at [https://www.plurality.net/](https://www.plurality.net/) will continue to evolve, governed according to the principles described in this book by this community.

contents/english/2-0-information-technology-and-democracy-a-widening-gulf.md

@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ More central to the heart of governmental responsibility in democracies, however
 
 [^EGDI]:_United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs_. E-Government Knowledge Database, 2022 available at https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/Data-Center
 
-Digitization of conventional public services is perhaps the least ambitious dimension along which one might expect democracies to advance in adopting technology.  Technology has redefined what services are relevant and in these novel areas, democratic governments have almost entirely failed to keep up with changing times.  Where once government-provided postal services and public libraries were the backbone of democratic communication and knowledge circulation, today most communication flows through social media and search engines.  Where once most public gatherings took place in parks and literal public squares, today it is almost a cliché that the public square has moved online.  Yet democratic countries have almost entirely ignored the need to provide and support digital public services.  While privately-owned Twitter is the target of constant abuse by public figures, its most important competitor, the non-profits [Mastodon](https://joinmastodon.org/)  and the open [Activity Pub](https://www.w3.org/TR/activitypub/) standard on which it runs have received a paltry few hundreds of thousands of dollars in public support, running instead on Patreon donations.[^Mastodonsupport]  More broadly, open source software and other commons-based public goods like Wikipedia have become critical public resources in the digital age; yet governments have consistently failed to support them and have even discriminated against them relative to other charities (for example, open source software providers generally cannot be tax-exempt charities).  While authoritarian regimes [plow ahead](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/cbdctracker/) with plans for Central Bank Digital Currencies, most democratic countries are only beginning explorations.
+Digitization of conventional public services is perhaps the least ambitious dimension along which one might expect democracies to advance in adopting technology.  Technology has redefined what services are relevant and in these novel areas, democratic governments have almost entirely failed to keep up with changing times.  Where once government-provided postal services and public libraries were the backbone of democratic communication and knowledge circulation, today most communication flows through social media and search engines.  Where once most public gatherings took place in parks and literal public squares, today it is almost a cliché that the public square has moved online.  Yet democratic countries have almost entirely ignored the need to provide and support digital public services.  While privately-owned X (formerly Twitter) is the target of constant abuse by public figures, its most important competitor, the non-profits [Mastodon](https://joinmastodon.org/)  and the open [Activity Pub](https://www.w3.org/TR/activitypub/) standard on which it runs have received a paltry few hundreds of thousands of dollars in public support, running instead on Patreon donations.[^Mastodonsupport]  More broadly, open source software and other commons-based public goods like Wikipedia have become critical public resources in the digital age; yet governments have consistently failed to support them and have even discriminated against them relative to other charities (for example, open source software providers generally cannot be tax-exempt charities).  While authoritarian regimes [plow ahead](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/cbdctracker/) with plans for Central Bank Digital Currencies, most democratic countries are only beginning explorations.
 
 [^Mastodonsupport]: Sara Perez, "Amid Twitter chaos, Mastodon grew donations 488% in 2022, reached 1.8M monthly active users", *Tech Crunch*, October 2, 2023 at https://techcrunch.com/2023/10/02/amid-twitter-chaos-mastodon-grew-donations-488-in-2022-reached-1-8m-monthly-active-users/)
 
@@ -231,12 +231,12 @@ The radical promises of these visions led many to anticipate dramatic economic a
 
 Instead of the promised explosion of economic possibility, the last half-century has seen a dramatic deceleration of economic and especially productivity growth.  Figure F shows the growth in the United States of “Total Factor Productivity (TFP)”, economists’ most inclusive measure of the improvement in technology, averaged by decades from the beginning of the 20th century to today.  Rates during the mid-century “Golden Age” roughly doubled their levels both before and after during the period we dub the “Digital Stagnation”.  The pattern is even more dramatic in other liberal democratic countries in Europe and in most of democratic Asia, with South Korea and Taiwan notable exceptions.  
 
-To make matters worse, this period of stagnation has also been one of dramatically rising inequality, especially in the United States.  Figure G shows average income growth in the US by income percentile during the Golden Age and Great Stagnation respectively.  During the Golden Age, income growth was roughly constant across the distribution, but trailed off for top-income earners.  During the Digital Stagnation, income growth was higher for higher earners and only exceeded the average level during the Golden Age for those in the top 1%, with even smaller groups earning the great majority of the overall much lower income gains.
+To make matters worse, this period of stagnation has also been one of dramatically rising inequality, especially in the United States.  Figure G shows average income growth in the US by income percentile during the Golden Age and Digital Stagnation respectively.  During the Golden Age, income growth was roughly constant across the distribution, but trailed off for top-income earners.  During the Digital Stagnation, income growth was higher for higher earners and only exceeded the average level during the Golden Age for those in the top 1%, with even smaller groups earning the great majority of the overall much lower income gains.
 
 <figure>
-<img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pluralitybook/plurality/main/figs/data/income_and_wealth_inequality/income.png" width="100%" alt="Shows that during the Golden Age, income growth was even across the income distribution, but lower at the very top, while duing the Great Stagnation it was lower over all but high at the very top.">
+<img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pluralitybook/plurality/main/figs/data/income_and_wealth_inequality/income.png" width="100%" alt="Shows that during the Golden Age, income growth was even across the income distribution, but lower at the very top, while duing the Digital Stagnation it was lower over all but high at the very top.">
 
-**<figcaption>Figure 2-0-G. Average income growth in the US by income percentile during the Golden Age and Great Stagnation. Source: Saez and Zucman, "The Rise of Income and Wealth Inequality"[^inequality] </figcaption>**
+**<figcaption>Figure 2-0-G. Average income growth in the US by income percentile during the Golden Age and Digital Stagnation. Source: Saez and Zucman, "The Rise of Income and Wealth Inequality"[^inequality] </figcaption>**
 </figure>
 <br></br>
 
@@ -247,9 +247,9 @@ What has gone so wrong in the last half-century compared to the one before?  Eco
 On the first point, in a series of recent papers, Acemoglu, Pascual Restrepo, and collaborators have documented the shift in the direction of technical progress from the Golden Age to the Digital Stagnation.  Figure H summarizes their results, plotting cumulative changes in productivity over time from labor automation (what they call “displacement”) and labor augmentation (what they call “reinstatement”)[^AcemogluRestrepoStudy].   During the Golden Age, reinstatement roughly balanced displacement, leaving the share of income going to workers essentially constant.  During the Digital Stagnation, however, displacement has slightly accelerated while reinstatement has dramatically fallen, leading to slower overall productivity growth and a significant reduction in the share of income going to workers.  Furthermore, their analysis shows that the inegalitarian effects of this imbalance have been exacerbated by the concentration of displacement among low-skilled workers.
 
 <figure>
-<img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pluralitybook/plurality/main/figs/displace.png" width="100%" alt="Figure shows the cumulative overtime changes in productivity attributable to labor displacement v. reinstatement during the Golden Age and the Great Stagnation, illustrating how much stronger displacement was during the Great Stagnation.">
+<img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pluralitybook/plurality/main/figs/displace.png" width="100%" alt="Figure shows the cumulative overtime changes in productivity attributable to labor displacement v. reinstatement during the Golden Age and the Digital Stagnation, illustrating how much stronger displacement was during the Digital Stagnation.">
 
-**<figcaption>Figure 2-0-H. Cumulative changes in productivity over time from Displacement (labor automation) and Reinstatement (labor augmentation) during the Golden Age and Great Stagnation. Source: Acemoglu and Restrepo, "Automation and New Tasks: How Technology Displaces and Reinstates Labor"[^AcemogluRestrepo]</figcaption>**
+**<figcaption>Figure 2-0-H. Cumulative changes in productivity over time from Displacement (labor automation) and Reinstatement (labor augmentation) during the Golden Age and Digital Stagnation. Source: Acemoglu and Restrepo, "Automation and New Tasks: How Technology Displaces and Reinstates Labor"[^AcemogluRestrepo]</figcaption>**
 </figure>
 <br></br>
 

contents/english/2-2-the-life-of-a-digital-democracy.md

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ Many Sunflower participants devoted themselves to the open government movement;
 
 #### vTaiwan and Join
 
-During this process of institutionalization of g0v, there was growing demand to apply the methods that had allowed for these dispute resolutions to a broader range of policy issues.  This led to the establishment of [vTaiwan](https://vtaiwan.tw/intro/), a platform and project developed by g0v for facilitating deliberation on public policy controversies.  The process involved many steps (proposal, opinion expression, reflection and legislation) each harnessing a range of open source software tools, but has become best known for its use of the at-the-time(2015)-novel machine learning based open-source "wikisurvey"/social media tool Polis, which we discuss further in our chapter on [Augmented Deliberation](https://www.plurality.net/v/chapters/5-4/eng/?mode=dark) below.  In short, Polis functions similarly to conventional microblogging services like Twitter/X, except that it employs dimension reduction techniques to cluster opinions as shown in Figure B. Instead of displaying content that maximizes engagement, Polis shows the clusters of opinion that exist and highlights statements that bridge them. This approach facilitates both consensus formation and a better understanding of the lines of division.
+During this process of institutionalization of g0v, there was growing demand to apply the methods that had allowed for these dispute resolutions to a broader range of policy issues.  This led to the establishment of [vTaiwan](https://vtaiwan.tw/intro/), a platform and project developed by g0v for facilitating deliberation on public policy controversies.  The process involved many steps (proposal, opinion expression, reflection and legislation) each harnessing a range of open source software tools, but has become best known for its use of the at-the-time(2015)-novel machine learning based open-source "wikisurvey"/social media tool Polis, which we discuss further in our chapter on [Augmented Deliberation](https://www.plurality.net/v/chapters/5-4/eng/?mode=dark) below.  In short, Polis functions similarly to conventional microblogging services like X (formerly Twitter), except that it employs dimension reduction techniques to cluster opinions as shown in Figure B. Instead of displaying content that maximizes engagement, Polis shows the clusters of opinion that exist and highlights statements that bridge them. This approach facilitates both consensus formation and a better understanding of the lines of division.
 
 <figure>
 <img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pluralitybook/plurality/main/figs/vtaiwan-polis-ai.png" width="70%" alt="Diagram of an opinion displayed by polis on vtaiwan, with similar views clustered.">

contents/english/3-1-living-in-a-⿻-world.md

@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ Thus, even in understanding the very practice of science, a ⿻ perspective, gro
 **A future ⿻?**
 
 
-Yet the assumptions on which the Technocratic and Libertarian visions of the future discussed above diverge sharply from such ⿻ foundations.  
+Yet the assumptions on which the Technocratic and Libertarian visions of the future discussed above are founded diverge sharply from such ⿻ foundations.  
 
 In the Technocratic vision we discussed in the previous chapter, the “messiness” of existing administrative systems is to be replaced by a massive-scale, unified, rational, scientific, artificially intelligent planning system.  Transcending locality and social diversity, this unified agent is imagined to give “unbiased” answers to any economic and social problem, transcending social cleavages and differences.  As such, it seeks to at best paper over and at worst erase, rather than fostering and harnessing, the social diversity and heterogeneity that ⿻ social science sees as defining the very objects of interest, engagement, and value.