Provide recommendation to counter xz utils style attack #560
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The malicious attack on the xz utils slipped through many defenses because the "source" package included pre-generated malicious code. This meant that review of the source code (e.g., as seen by git) couldn't find the problem. This proposes a best practices to counter it. The text is longer than I'd like, but it's hard to make it short, and this was a worrying attack so I think it's reasonable to say this. We'll probably need to renumber this proposal if we also add the proposed text to counter attacks like polyfill.io: #559 ... but I think that's okay! Signed-off-by: David A. Wheeler <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David A. Wheeler <[email protected]>
ljharb
reviewed
Jul 5, 2024
| @@ -33,5 +33,6 @@ Here is a concise guide for all software developers for secure software developm | |||
| 24. **Continuously improve**. Improve scores, look for tips, & apply as appropriate. | |||
| 25. **Manage succession**. Have clear governance & work to add active, trustworthy maintainer(s). | |||
| 26. **Prefer memory-safe languages**. Many vulnerabilities involve memory safety. Where practical, use memory-safe programming languages (most are) and keep memory safety enabled. Otherwise, use mechanisms like extra tools and peer review to reduce risk. | |||
| 27. **Ensure source packages have only version-controlled source, and rebuild all source to create production package(s)**. E.g., if you use autotools, don't include a generated `configure` file in a source package, but instead ask recipients to build it (e.g., with `autoreconf`). This eliminates a malware-hiding mechanism, as illustrated by an attack on [xz utils](https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-3094). | |||
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This seems like good advice, but is a subcategory of the general best practice of never committing generated output.
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The malicious attack on the xz utils slipped through many defenses because the "source" package included pre-generated malicious code. This meant that review of the source code (e.g., as seen by git) couldn't find the problem.
This proposes a best practices to counter it. The text is longer than I'd like, but it's hard to make it short, and this was a worrying attack so I think it's reasonable to say this.
We'll probably need to renumber this proposal if we also add the proposed text to counter attacks like polyfill.io: #559 ... but I think that's okay!