Merge branch 'master' into sccp-2138

content/sccp/sccp-103.md

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Setting the minting fee at 2% will effectively raise the cost of minting new sUS
 
 <!--The motivation is critical for SCCPs that want to update variables within Synthetix. It should clearly explain why the existing variable is not incentive aligned. SCCP submissions without sufficient motivation may be rejected outright.-->
 
-The primary motivation is to control the supply of synths in expectation of ramping up the cap of the wrappr and a significant reduction on `mintFeeRate`. Increasing minting fee on ETH backed loans will allow us to implement [SCCP-99](https://sips.synthetix.io/SCCP/sccp-99) and allow participants to continue to open up new short positions without opening up a gap that allows arbitragers to front-run the wrapper paramater update.
+The primary motivation is to control the supply of synths in expectation of ramping up the cap of the wrappr and a significant reduction on `mintFeeRate`. Increasing minting fee on ETH backed loans will allow us to implement [SCCP-99](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-99) and allow participants to continue to open up new short positions without opening up a gap that allows arbitragers to front-run the wrapper paramater update.
 That said, the minting fee on ETH backed loans will be reduced back to the original fee of 10 bp, once wrappr is fully deployed.
 
 ## Copyright

content/sccp/sccp-128.md

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Given the state of the peg, this sccp proposes to decrease the target collateral
 
 <!--The motivation is critical for SCCPs that want to update variables within Synthetix. It should clearly explain why the existing variable is not incentive aligned. SCCP submissions without sufficient motivation may be rejected outright.-->
 
-The peg continues to be pressured as can be seen [here](https://www.curve.fi/trade/susdv2/SUSD-USDC/4h), this is mostly due to the reasons mentioned in [SCCP-127](https://sips.synthetix.io/SCCP/sccp-127). As can be seen on [stats](https://stats.synthetix.io/), the active c-ratio is 310%, the sUSD APY is above 10% and the SNX Staking APY at 40%, this means that a large proportion of minters are foregoing claiming all together.
+The peg continues to be pressured as can be seen [here](https://www.curve.fi/trade/susdv2/SUSD-USDC/4h), this is mostly due to the reasons mentioned in [SCCP-127](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-127). As can be seen on [stats](https://stats.synthetix.io/), the active c-ratio is 310%, the sUSD APY is above 10% and the SNX Staking APY at 40%, this means that a large proportion of minters are foregoing claiming all together.
 This SCCP proposes to provide minters with some relief, by allowing them to acquire synths more cheaply and have them need to burn less sUSD in order to get their accounts in order.
 
 ## Copyright

content/sccp/sccp-33.md

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ This is the template for SCCPs.
 
 If no bids have been placed yet the market creator should be able to undo the market and take back the sUSD he put into it.
 
-Superceded by [SIP-71](../SIPS/sip-71.md).
+Superceded by [SIP-71](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-71/).
 
 ## Abstract
 

content/sccp/sccp-5.md

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ type: Governance
 
 <!--"If you can't explain it simply, you don't understand it well enough." Provide a simplified and layman-accessible explanation of the SCCP.-->
 
-The [sETH arb pool](0xA6B5E74466eDc95D0b6e65c5CBFcA0a676d893a4) has been drained very quickly over the last few weeks. There are several reasons for this, the first is that some of the front-running bots are using it as a way of clearing out excess sETH profits they are holding. On the face of it this might seem like a less than ideal situation. But the reality is that the arb pool is absorbing excess supply directly that would otherwise be absorbed into the sETH pool itself impacting the peg. By increasing the supply to the arb contract we can more quickly absorb this excess supply of sETH and tighten the peg, in combination with proposal 1 to change the window where users can be undercollateralised without being penalised this should exert upward pressure on the peg.
+The sETH arb pool, 0xA6B5E74466eDc95D0b6e65c5CBFcA0a676d893a4, has been drained very quickly over the last few weeks. There are several reasons for this, the first is that some of the front-running bots are using it as a way of clearing out excess sETH profits they are holding. On the face of it this might seem like a less than ideal situation. But the reality is that the arb pool is absorbing excess supply directly that would otherwise be absorbed into the sETH pool itself impacting the peg. By increasing the supply to the arb contract we can more quickly absorb this excess supply of sETH and tighten the peg, in combination with proposal 1 to change the window where users can be undercollateralised without being penalised this should exert upward pressure on the peg.
 
 ## Abstract
 

content/sccp/sccp-55.md

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ This SCCP proposes changing the debt snapshot stale time to 12 hours.
 
 <!--A short (~200 word) description of the variable change proposed.-->
 
-Following on from [SCCP-52](sccp-52.md), the pDAO will call [`SystemSettings.setDebtSnapshotStaleTime(43800)`](https://etherscan.io/address/0x703D37fb776A4C905e28f7Ff23C73102ce36E08B#writeContract).
+Following on from [SCCP-52](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-52/), the pDAO will call [`SystemSettings.setDebtSnapshotStaleTime(43800)`](https://etherscan.io/address/0x703D37fb776A4C905e28f7Ff23C73102ce36E08B#writeContract).
 Note that the argument corresponds to 12 hours and 10 minutes, allows the keeper bot 10 minutes of leeway
 to mine transactions while maintaining a 12 hour snapshot frequency.
 The keeper bot will still take snapshots earlier than 12 hours if the deviation exceeds its configured

content/sccp/sccp-57.md

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ The changes proposed are listed below:
 
 The monitoring of Chainlink oracles shows that it would be sufficient to mitigate frontrunning opportunities with a fee reclamation window of 3 minutes. The Chainlink team has worked to ensure that price deviations are updated within the reclamation window.
 
-The current fee reclamation window was set to 5 minutes in [SCCP-43](.sccp-43.md) to monitor the Chainlink oracles and was intended at the time to eventually reduce the window back to 3 minutes as soon as possible.
+The current fee reclamation window was set to 5 minutes in [SCCP-43](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-43/) to monitor the Chainlink oracles and was intended at the time to eventually reduce the window back to 3 minutes as soon as possible.
 
 A lower fee reclamation window improves the UX for traders trading on Synthetix exchange and other synth exchange products on L1.
 

content/sccp/sccp-84.md

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ The fee can be decrease to 40 bp without exposing inefficiencies in the oracle p
 
 The fee were originally levied this high in order to counter a front-running gap. However with the price-adjustment waiting period increase to 6 minutes, the fees can be lowered safely without exposing minters to the risk of front-running.
 However, incoming data will be reviewed, and action will be taken by the council if front-running pockets were found.
-Note that this sccp supercedes [sccp-80](https://sips.synthetix.io/SCCP/sccp-80) on the iETH rate.
+Note that this sccp supercedes [sccp-80](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-80) on the iETH rate.
 
 ## Copyright
 

content/sccp/sccp-87.md

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ type: Governance
 
 <!--"If you can't explain it simply, you don't understand it well enough." Provide a simplified and layman-accessible explanation of the SCCP.-->
 
-The current cap was configured to sUSD 30 million in [SCCP-85](https://sips.synthetix.io/SCCP/sccp-85) of which sUSD 28 million is currently utilized in shorts and borrows, so there is not much room for new users to take loans or shorts.
+The current cap was configured to sUSD 30 million in [SCCP-85](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-85) of which sUSD 28 million is currently utilized in shorts and borrows, so there is not much room for new users to take loans or shorts.
 
 ## Abstract
 

content/sccp/sccp-88.md

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ type: Governance
 
 <!--"If you can't explain it simply, you don't understand it well enough." Provide a simplified and layman-accessible explanation of the SCCP.-->
 
-The current cap was configured to sUSD 40 million in [SCCP-87](https://sips.synthetix.io/SCCP/sccp-87) of which sUSD 39 million is currently utilized in shorts and borrows, so there is not much room for new users to take loans or shorts.
+The current cap was configured to sUSD 40 million in [SCCP-87](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-87) of which sUSD 39 million is currently utilized in shorts and borrows, so there is not much room for new users to take loans or shorts.
 
 ## Abstract
 

content/sccp/sccp-91.md

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ type: Governance
 
 <!--"If you can't explain it simply, you don't understand it well enough." Provide a simplified and layman-accessible explanation of the SCCP.-->
 
-The current `maxDebt` was configured to be sUSD 50 million in [SCCP-88](https://sips.synthetix.io/SCCP/sccp-88) but has long been surpassed, this sccp proposed to increase it to sUSD 65 million given the increased demand for shorts, following the recent temporary increase in snx rewards.
+The current `maxDebt` was configured to be sUSD 50 million in [SCCP-88](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-88) but has long been surpassed, this sccp proposed to increase it to sUSD 65 million given the increased demand for shorts, following the recent temporary increase in snx rewards.
 
 ## Abstract
 
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Due to the recent increase in snx rewards paid on sETH shorts, total debt had in
 | sETH                  |     27     |
 | **Total**             |   **54**   |
 
-Rewards on sETH shorts now amount to 24k SNX per week, due to the transition from sDAO funding to inflationary supply funding as per [SCCP-89](https://sips.synthetix.io/SCCP/sccp-89). With the current cap being reached, users are not able to open shorts on sBTC or sETH, resulting in the APY on shorts surging to 100%, while it was 50% pre-reward boost. Therefore this SCCP suggests to increase `maxDebt` to sUSD 65 million and to revise it gradually lower in future if excess capacity isn't fully utilized, as rewards are decreased back down.
+Rewards on sETH shorts now amount to 24k SNX per week, due to the transition from sDAO funding to inflationary supply funding as per [SCCP-89](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-89). With the current cap being reached, users are not able to open shorts on sBTC or sETH, resulting in the APY on shorts surging to 100%, while it was 50% pre-reward boost. Therefore this SCCP suggests to increase `maxDebt` to sUSD 65 million and to revise it gradually lower in future if excess capacity isn't fully utilized, as rewards are decreased back down.
 
 ## Copyright
 

content/sccp/sccp-94.md

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ type: Governance
 
 <!--"If you can't explain it simply, you don't understand it well enough." Provide a simplified and layman-accessible explanation of the SCCP.-->
 
-The current `maxDebt` was configured to be sUSD 65 million in [SCCP-91](https://sips.synthetix.io/SCCP/sccp-91) but has been surpassed, this sccp proposed to increase it to sUSD 75 million given the increased demand for shorts.
+The current `maxDebt` was configured to be sUSD 65 million in [SCCP-91](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-91) but has been surpassed, this sccp proposed to increase it to sUSD 75 million given the increased demand for shorts.
 
 ## Abstract
 

content/sccp/sccp-95.md

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ type: Governance
 
 <!--"If you can't explain it simply, you don't understand it well enough." Provide a simplified and layman-accessible explanation of the SCCP.-->
 
-The current `maxDebt` was configured to be sUSD 75 million in [SCCP-94](https://sips.synthetix.io/SCCP/sccp-94) but has almost been reached, this sccp proposes to increase it to sUSD 90 million given the increased demand for shorts.
+The current `maxDebt` was configured to be sUSD 75 million in [SCCP-94](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-94) but has almost been reached, this sccp proposes to increase it to sUSD 90 million given the increased demand for shorts.
 
 ## Abstract
 

content/sccp/sccp-99.md

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ type: Governance
 
 <!--"If you can't explain it simply, you don't understand it well enough." Provide a simplified and layman-accessible explanation of the SCCP.-->
 
-The current `maxDebt` was configured to be sUSD 90 million in [SCCP-95](https://sips.synthetix.io/SCCP/sccp-95) has been reached, this sccp proposes to increase it to sUSD 110 million given the increased demand for shorts.
+The current `maxDebt` was configured to be sUSD 90 million in [SCCP-95](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-95) has been reached, this sccp proposes to increase it to sUSD 110 million given the increased demand for shorts.
 
 ## Abstract
 

content/sips/sip-142.md

@@ -12,13 +12,13 @@ type: Governance
 
 ## Simple Summary
 
-Deprecate the [skinny Ethercollateral](./sip-35.md) and [EtherCollateral sUSD](./sip-85.md) loans and remove them from the Synthetix system.
+Deprecate the [skinny Ethercollateral](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-35/) and [EtherCollateral sUSD](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-85/) loans and remove them from the Synthetix system.
 
 ## Abstract
 
 The EtherCollateral loans were scheduled to be deprecated once Multi-collateral loans system has been fully deployed. The current functions of the skinny ether collateral and Ethercollateral sUSD loans can be both done via the Multi-collateral loans and also the Ether Wrapper contracts.
 
-After the one month notice period ending **00:00 UTC on June 25th, 2021**, the pDAO would enable liquidations on the Ethercollateral loans as per [SCCP 112](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccps/sccp-112) which allows any unclosed loans to be liquidated. Outstanding loans can be repaid by repaying the sUSD or sETH borrowed and the ETH collateral redeemed.
+After the one month notice period ending **00:00 UTC on June 25th, 2021**, the pDAO would enable liquidations on the Ethercollateral loans as per [SCCP 112](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-112) which allows any unclosed loans to be liquidated. Outstanding loans can be repaid by repaying the sUSD or sETH borrowed and the ETH collateral redeemed.
 
 The EtherCollateral contracts can then be deprecated and removed from the Synthetix protocol by detaching these contracts from the protocol.
 
@@ -106,4 +106,4 @@ N/A
 
 ## Copyright
 
-Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
+Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).

content/sips/sip-166.md

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ In order to support the rebalancing of `sCEX` and introduction of new non-exchan
 
 <!--This is the problem statement. This is the *why* of the SIP. It should clearly explain *why* the current state of the protocol is inadequate.  It is critical that you explain *why* the change is needed, if the SIP proposes changing how something is calculated, you must address *why* the current calculation is innaccurate or wrong. This is not the place to describe how the SIP will address the issue!-->
 
-[SCCP-124](../SCCP/sccp-124.md) proposed the rebalancing of the `sCEX` index with two new centralized finance tokens - `NEXO` and `CEL` - and a rename into `sCEFI` which more correctly depicts the index. A rename in this instance is not valid due to the 150k of open interest currently held in the sCEX synth, as those holders did not buy into a `sCEFI` token. In order to correctly handle this rebalance, we either needed to a) keep `sCEX` around and create a new `sCEFI` token or b) deprecate `sCEX` and create the new `sCEFI` synth allowing them to trade into it. Thus the council opted for option b, and once `sCEX` is deprecated in [SIP-169](./sip-169.md) this SIP can proceed.
+[SCCP-124](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-124/) proposed the rebalancing of the `sCEX` index with two new centralized finance tokens - `NEXO` and `CEL` - and a rename into `sCEFI` which more correctly depicts the index. A rename in this instance is not valid due to the 150k of open interest currently held in the sCEX synth, as those holders did not buy into a `sCEFI` token. In order to correctly handle this rebalance, we either needed to a) keep `sCEX` around and create a new `sCEFI` token or b) deprecate `sCEX` and create the new `sCEFI` synth allowing them to trade into it. Thus the council opted for option b, and once `sCEX` is deprecated in [SIP-169](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-169/) this SIP can proceed.
 
 ## Specification
 
@@ -60,4 +60,4 @@ N/A
 
 ## Copyright
 
-Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
+Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).

content/sips/sip-202.md

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ Each epoch the staking ratio for the previous epoch will be measured at the befo
 
 #### Staking and 7 days debt burn lock
 
-To ensure that the staking ratio is accurate when the staking ratio snapshot is taken each week and that the ratio is not gamed, [SCCP-164](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccps/sccp-164/) proposes to increase the burn lock to 7 days from the current 24 hours. Also with the increase in weekly SNX rewards, there are concerns that snapshotting of the fee periods for the rewards will be an issue again. The proposal to increase the burn lock to 7 days will increase the incentives and alignment of stakers to support the system for a minimum of 7 days after the mint.     
+To ensure that the staking ratio is accurate when the staking ratio snapshot is taken each week and that the ratio is not gamed, [SCCP-164](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-164/) proposes to increase the burn lock to 7 days from the current 24 hours. Also with the increase in weekly SNX rewards, there are concerns that snapshotting of the fee periods for the rewards will be an issue again. The proposal to increase the burn lock to 7 days will increase the incentives and alignment of stakers to support the system for a minimum of 7 days after the mint.     
 
 ### Rationale
 

content/sips/sip-212.md

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Listing commodity synths on Optimism will benefit the Synthetix "ecosystem" by a
 
 The need for commodity synths was expressed clearly by various community members in the Synthetix discord channel #new-synth-additions. Adding commodities makes sense given their "safe haven" nature and popularity among traders during market turmoil.
 
-Commodity synths were phased out during the Wezen release [https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-169/](SIP-169)) on L1 with the intent to re-add these synths later on Optimism. Front running risks and high trading fees were important reasons for phasing out commodity synths on Ethereum mainnet; however these issues have been mitigated sufficiently on Optimism.
+Commodity synths were phased out during the Wezen release [https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-169/](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-169/) on L1 with the intent to re-add these synths later on Optimism. Front running risks and high trading fees were important reasons for phasing out commodity synths on Ethereum mainnet; however these issues have been mitigated sufficiently on Optimism.
 
 **Depth and volume**
 The market depth and volume for silver (eg. XAG) and gold (eg. XAU) reasonably pose no risk with regards to price manipulation given the market's size.

content/sips/sip-317.md

@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ Each market that allows this type of order can configure an array of _settlement
 
 #### Wrapping
 
-Markets which are able to [provide collateral directly to Synthetix](../sip-308) can issue synths of equivalent value after applying fees. Users can set a "minimum amount received" to protect against slippage. A fixed fee (positive or negative) can be set seperately for wrapping and unwrapping.
+Markets which are able to [provide collateral directly to Synthetix](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-308) can issue synths of equivalent value after applying fees. Users can set a "minimum amount received" to protect against slippage. A fixed fee (positive or negative) can be set seperately for wrapping and unwrapping.
 
 #### Utilization Rate Fee