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Verifiable outsourced computation: designing protocols where it is impossible for a provider to cheat.
Incentive-based verifiable computation: cheating is possible, but the provider would have no rational motivation to do so. Rational adversaries motivation is to maximize their utility function. In other words, it would be irrational for the user to behave incorrectly.
probabilistic checkable proof, PCP: prover writes a long proof of correctness, verifier checks randomly selected positions. This assumes both have access to trusted memory storage, so that prover is committed to the proof before verifier queries it
Example
Input is n boolean inputs, output is 1 if at least k are 1
Prover announces m bits are equal to 1
Verifier runs G(b) and select a random bit and rewards the prover
show that compositional property of rational proofs does not work: in time T, prover can either do more problems incorrectly or fewer correctly, they show rational proofs incentivize fast incorrect proofs
new scheme: reward of honest prover > reward of a prover that invest less computation cost; or, the cost for any prover is negligibly the same
Background
Definition
Example
Pre Rational Proofs
Rational Proofs t=0
Rational Proofs now
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