diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h index 24213a99cc79d..aa4d19d0bc94b 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h @@ -301,6 +301,17 @@ struct bpf_func_state { struct tnum callback_ret_range; bool in_async_callback_fn; bool in_exception_callback_fn; + /* For callback calling functions that limit number of possible + * callback executions (e.g. bpf_loop) keeps track of current + * simulated iteration number. + * Value in frame N refers to number of times callback with frame + * N+1 was simulated, e.g. for the following call: + * + * bpf_loop(..., fn, ...); | suppose current frame is N + * | fn would be simulated in frame N+1 + * | number of simulations is tracked in frame N + */ + u32 callback_depth; /* The following fields should be last. See copy_func_state() */ int acquired_refs; @@ -400,6 +411,7 @@ struct bpf_verifier_state { struct bpf_idx_pair *jmp_history; u32 jmp_history_cnt; u32 dfs_depth; + u32 callback_unroll_depth; }; #define bpf_get_spilled_reg(slot, frame, mask) \ @@ -511,6 +523,10 @@ struct bpf_insn_aux_data { * this instruction, regardless of any heuristics */ bool force_checkpoint; + /* true if instruction is a call to a helper function that + * accepts callback function as a parameter. + */ + bool calls_callback; }; #define MAX_USED_MAPS 64 /* max number of maps accessed by one eBPF program */ diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 6da370a047feb..af2819d5c8ee7 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -547,13 +547,12 @@ static bool is_dynptr_ref_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) return func_id == BPF_FUNC_dynptr_data; } -static bool is_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id); +static bool is_sync_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id); static bool is_bpf_throw_kfunc(struct bpf_insn *insn); -static bool is_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) +static bool is_sync_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) { return func_id == BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem || - func_id == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback || func_id == BPF_FUNC_find_vma || func_id == BPF_FUNC_loop || func_id == BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain; @@ -564,6 +563,18 @@ static bool is_async_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) return func_id == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback; } +static bool is_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) +{ + return is_sync_callback_calling_function(func_id) || + is_async_callback_calling_function(func_id); +} + +static bool is_sync_callback_calling_insn(struct bpf_insn *insn) +{ + return (bpf_helper_call(insn) && is_sync_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) || + (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && is_sync_callback_calling_kfunc(insn->imm)); +} + static bool is_storage_get_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id) { return func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get || @@ -1808,6 +1819,7 @@ static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state, dst_state->first_insn_idx = src->first_insn_idx; dst_state->last_insn_idx = src->last_insn_idx; dst_state->dfs_depth = src->dfs_depth; + dst_state->callback_unroll_depth = src->callback_unroll_depth; dst_state->used_as_loop_entry = src->used_as_loop_entry; for (i = 0; i <= src->curframe; i++) { dst = dst_state->frame[i]; @@ -3439,13 +3451,11 @@ static void mark_insn_zext(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; } -static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, - enum reg_arg_type t) +static int __check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, + enum reg_arg_type t) { - struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; - struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + env->insn_idx; - struct bpf_reg_state *reg, *regs = state->regs; + struct bpf_reg_state *reg; bool rw64; if (regno >= MAX_BPF_REG) { @@ -3486,6 +3496,15 @@ static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, return 0; } +static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, + enum reg_arg_type t) +{ + struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; + struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; + + return __check_reg_arg(env, state->regs, regno, t); +} + static void mark_jmp_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) { env->insn_aux_data[idx].jmp_point = true; @@ -3724,6 +3743,8 @@ static void fmt_stack_mask(char *buf, ssize_t buf_sz, u64 stack_mask) } } +static bool calls_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx); + /* For given verifier state backtrack_insn() is called from the last insn to * the first insn. Its purpose is to compute a bitmask of registers and * stack slots that needs precision in the parent verifier state. @@ -3899,16 +3920,13 @@ static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, int subseq_idx, return -EFAULT; return 0; } - } else if ((bpf_helper_call(insn) && - is_callback_calling_function(insn->imm) && - !is_async_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) || - (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && is_callback_calling_kfunc(insn->imm))) { - /* callback-calling helper or kfunc call, which means - * we are exiting from subprog, but unlike the subprog - * call handling above, we shouldn't propagate - * precision of r1-r5 (if any requested), as they are - * not actually arguments passed directly to callback - * subprogs + } else if (is_sync_callback_calling_insn(insn) && idx != subseq_idx - 1) { + /* exit from callback subprog to callback-calling helper or + * kfunc call. Use idx/subseq_idx check to discern it from + * straight line code backtracking. + * Unlike the subprog call handling above, we shouldn't + * propagate precision of r1-r5 (if any requested), as they are + * not actually arguments passed directly to callback subprogs */ if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & ~BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) { verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", bt_reg_mask(bt)); @@ -3943,10 +3961,18 @@ static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, int subseq_idx, } else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) { bool r0_precise; + /* Backtracking to a nested function call, 'idx' is a part of + * the inner frame 'subseq_idx' is a part of the outer frame. + * In case of a regular function call, instructions giving + * precision to registers R1-R5 should have been found already. + * In case of a callback, it is ok to have R1-R5 marked for + * backtracking, as these registers are set by the function + * invoking callback. + */ + if (subseq_idx >= 0 && calls_callback(env, subseq_idx)) + for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) + bt_clear_reg(bt, i); if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) { - /* if backtracing was looking for registers R1-R5 - * they should have been found already. - */ verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", bt_reg_mask(bt)); WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); return -EFAULT; @@ -9350,7 +9376,7 @@ static void clear_caller_saved_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, /* after the call registers r0 - r5 were scratched */ for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) { mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]); - check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); + __check_reg_arg(env, regs, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK); } } @@ -9363,11 +9389,10 @@ static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *caller, struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx); -static int __check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, - int *insn_idx, int subprog, - set_callee_state_fn set_callee_state_cb) +static int setup_func_entry(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog, int callsite, + set_callee_state_fn set_callee_state_cb, + struct bpf_verifier_state *state) { - struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; int err; @@ -9377,54 +9402,72 @@ static int __check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn return -E2BIG; } - caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; if (state->frame[state->curframe + 1]) { verbose(env, "verifier bug. Frame %d already allocated\n", state->curframe + 1); return -EFAULT; } + caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; + callee = kzalloc(sizeof(*callee), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!callee) + return -ENOMEM; + state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = callee; + + /* callee cannot access r0, r6 - r9 for reading and has to write + * into its own stack before reading from it. + * callee can read/write into caller's stack + */ + init_func_state(env, callee, + /* remember the callsite, it will be used by bpf_exit */ + callsite, + state->curframe + 1 /* frameno within this callchain */, + subprog /* subprog number within this prog */); + /* Transfer references to the callee */ + err = copy_reference_state(callee, caller); + err = err ?: set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, callsite); + if (err) + goto err_out; + + /* only increment it after check_reg_arg() finished */ + state->curframe++; + + return 0; + +err_out: + free_func_state(callee); + state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = NULL; + return err; +} + +static int push_callback_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, + int insn_idx, int subprog, + set_callee_state_fn set_callee_state_cb) +{ + struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state, *callback_state; + struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; + int err; + + caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; err = btf_check_subprog_call(env, subprog, caller->regs); if (err == -EFAULT) return err; - if (subprog_is_global(env, subprog)) { - if (err) { - verbose(env, "Caller passes invalid args into func#%d\n", - subprog); - return err; - } else { - if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) - verbose(env, - "Func#%d is global and valid. Skipping.\n", - subprog); - clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); - - /* All global functions return a 64-bit SCALAR_VALUE */ - mark_reg_unknown(env, caller->regs, BPF_REG_0); - caller->regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; - - /* continue with next insn after call */ - return 0; - } - } /* set_callee_state is used for direct subprog calls, but we are * interested in validating only BPF helpers that can call subprogs as * callbacks */ - if (set_callee_state_cb != set_callee_state) { - env->subprog_info[subprog].is_cb = true; - if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && - !is_callback_calling_kfunc(insn->imm)) { - verbose(env, "verifier bug: kfunc %s#%d not marked as callback-calling\n", - func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); - return -EFAULT; - } else if (!bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && - !is_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) { /* helper */ - verbose(env, "verifier bug: helper %s#%d not marked as callback-calling\n", - func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); - return -EFAULT; - } + env->subprog_info[subprog].is_cb = true; + if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && + !is_sync_callback_calling_kfunc(insn->imm)) { + verbose(env, "verifier bug: kfunc %s#%d not marked as callback-calling\n", + func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); + return -EFAULT; + } else if (!bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && + !is_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) { /* helper */ + verbose(env, "verifier bug: helper %s#%d not marked as callback-calling\n", + func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm); + return -EFAULT; } if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) && @@ -9435,53 +9478,83 @@ static int __check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn /* there is no real recursion here. timer callbacks are async */ env->subprog_info[subprog].is_async_cb = true; async_cb = push_async_cb(env, env->subprog_info[subprog].start, - *insn_idx, subprog); + insn_idx, subprog); if (!async_cb) return -EFAULT; callee = async_cb->frame[0]; callee->async_entry_cnt = caller->async_entry_cnt + 1; /* Convert bpf_timer_set_callback() args into timer callback args */ - err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, *insn_idx); + err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, insn_idx); if (err) return err; + return 0; + } + + /* for callback functions enqueue entry to callback and + * proceed with next instruction within current frame. + */ + callback_state = push_stack(env, env->subprog_info[subprog].start, insn_idx, false); + if (!callback_state) + return -ENOMEM; + + err = setup_func_entry(env, subprog, insn_idx, set_callee_state_cb, + callback_state); + if (err) + return err; + + callback_state->callback_unroll_depth++; + callback_state->frame[callback_state->curframe - 1]->callback_depth++; + caller->callback_depth = 0; + return 0; +} + +static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, + int *insn_idx) +{ + struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; + struct bpf_func_state *caller; + int err, subprog, target_insn; + + target_insn = *insn_idx + insn->imm + 1; + subprog = find_subprog(env, target_insn); + if (subprog < 0) { + verbose(env, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", target_insn); + return -EFAULT; + } + + caller = state->frame[state->curframe]; + err = btf_check_subprog_call(env, subprog, caller->regs); + if (err == -EFAULT) + return err; + if (subprog_is_global(env, subprog)) { + if (err) { + verbose(env, "Caller passes invalid args into func#%d\n", subprog); + return err; + } + + if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) + verbose(env, "Func#%d is global and valid. Skipping.\n", subprog); clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); + + /* All global functions return a 64-bit SCALAR_VALUE */ mark_reg_unknown(env, caller->regs, BPF_REG_0); caller->regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG; + /* continue with next insn after call */ return 0; } - callee = kzalloc(sizeof(*callee), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!callee) - return -ENOMEM; - state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = callee; - - /* callee cannot access r0, r6 - r9 for reading and has to write - * into its own stack before reading from it. - * callee can read/write into caller's stack + /* for regular function entry setup new frame and continue + * from that frame. */ - init_func_state(env, callee, - /* remember the callsite, it will be used by bpf_exit */ - *insn_idx /* callsite */, - state->curframe + 1 /* frameno within this callchain */, - subprog /* subprog number within this prog */); - - /* Transfer references to the callee */ - err = copy_reference_state(callee, caller); + err = setup_func_entry(env, subprog, *insn_idx, set_callee_state, state); if (err) - goto err_out; - - err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, *insn_idx); - if (err) - goto err_out; + return err; clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs); - /* only increment it after check_reg_arg() finished */ - state->curframe++; - /* and go analyze first insn of the callee */ *insn_idx = env->subprog_info[subprog].start - 1; @@ -9489,14 +9562,10 @@ static int __check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn verbose(env, "caller:\n"); print_verifier_state(env, caller, true); verbose(env, "callee:\n"); - print_verifier_state(env, callee, true); + print_verifier_state(env, state->frame[state->curframe], true); } - return 0; -err_out: - free_func_state(callee); - state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = NULL; - return err; + return 0; } int map_set_for_each_callback_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, @@ -9540,22 +9609,6 @@ static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, return 0; } -static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, - int *insn_idx) -{ - int subprog, target_insn; - - target_insn = *insn_idx + insn->imm + 1; - subprog = find_subprog(env, target_insn); - if (subprog < 0) { - verbose(env, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", - target_insn); - return -EFAULT; - } - - return __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx, subprog, set_callee_state); -} - static int set_map_elem_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *caller, struct bpf_func_state *callee, @@ -9748,9 +9801,10 @@ static bool in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx) { - struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state; + struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state, *prev_st; struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee; struct bpf_reg_state *r0; + bool in_callback_fn; int err; callee = state->frame[state->curframe]; @@ -9779,6 +9833,11 @@ static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx) verbose_invalid_scalar(env, r0, &range, "callback return", "R0"); return -EINVAL; } + if (!calls_callback(env, callee->callsite)) { + verbose(env, "BUG: in callback at %d, callsite %d !calls_callback\n", + *insn_idx, callee->callsite); + return -EFAULT; + } } else { /* return to the caller whatever r0 had in the callee */ caller->regs[BPF_REG_0] = *r0; @@ -9796,7 +9855,16 @@ static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx) return err; } - *insn_idx = callee->callsite + 1; + /* for callbacks like bpf_loop or bpf_for_each_map_elem go back to callsite, + * there function call logic would reschedule callback visit. If iteration + * converges is_state_visited() would prune that visit eventually. + */ + in_callback_fn = callee->in_callback_fn; + if (in_callback_fn) + *insn_idx = callee->callsite; + else + *insn_idx = callee->callsite + 1; + if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) { verbose(env, "returning from callee:\n"); print_verifier_state(env, callee, true); @@ -9807,6 +9875,24 @@ static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx) * bpf_throw, this will be done by copy_verifier_state for extra frames. */ free_func_state(callee); state->frame[state->curframe--] = NULL; + + /* for callbacks widen imprecise scalars to make programs like below verify: + * + * struct ctx { int i; } + * void cb(int idx, struct ctx *ctx) { ctx->i++; ... } + * ... + * struct ctx = { .i = 0; } + * bpf_loop(100, cb, &ctx, 0); + * + * This is similar to what is done in process_iter_next_call() for open + * coded iterators. + */ + prev_st = in_callback_fn ? find_prev_entry(env, state, *insn_idx) : NULL; + if (prev_st) { + err = widen_imprecise_scalars(env, prev_st, state); + if (err) + return err; + } return 0; } @@ -10209,24 +10295,37 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn } break; case BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem: - err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, - set_map_elem_callback_state); + err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, + set_map_elem_callback_state); break; case BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback: - err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, - set_timer_callback_state); + err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, + set_timer_callback_state); break; case BPF_FUNC_find_vma: - err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, - set_find_vma_callback_state); + err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, + set_find_vma_callback_state); break; case BPF_FUNC_snprintf: err = check_bpf_snprintf_call(env, regs); break; case BPF_FUNC_loop: update_loop_inline_state(env, meta.subprogno); - err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, - set_loop_callback_state); + /* Verifier relies on R1 value to determine if bpf_loop() iteration + * is finished, thus mark it precise. + */ + err = mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_1); + if (err) + return err; + if (cur_func(env)->callback_depth < regs[BPF_REG_1].umax_value) { + err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, + set_loop_callback_state); + } else { + cur_func(env)->callback_depth = 0; + if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2) + verbose(env, "frame%d bpf_loop iteration limit reached\n", + env->cur_state->curframe); + } break; case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_from_mem: if (regs[BPF_REG_1].type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { @@ -10322,8 +10421,8 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn break; } case BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain: - err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, - set_user_ringbuf_callback_state); + err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, + set_user_ringbuf_callback_state); break; } @@ -11211,7 +11310,7 @@ static bool is_bpf_graph_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id) btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl]; } -static bool is_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id) +static bool is_sync_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id) { return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]; } @@ -11963,6 +12062,21 @@ static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, return -EACCES; } + /* Check the arguments */ + err = check_kfunc_args(env, &meta, insn_idx); + if (err < 0) + return err; + + if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) { + err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno, + set_rbtree_add_callback_state); + if (err) { + verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d failed callback verification\n", + func_name, meta.func_id); + return err; + } + } + rcu_lock = is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_lock(&meta); rcu_unlock = is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_unlock(&meta); @@ -11998,10 +12112,6 @@ static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, return -EINVAL; } - /* Check the arguments */ - err = check_kfunc_args(env, &meta, insn_idx); - if (err < 0) - return err; /* In case of release function, we get register number of refcounted * PTR_TO_BTF_ID in bpf_kfunc_arg_meta, do the release now. */ @@ -12035,16 +12145,6 @@ static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, } } - if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) { - err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno, - set_rbtree_add_callback_state); - if (err) { - verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d failed callback verification\n", - func_name, meta.func_id); - return err; - } - } - if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_throw]) { if (!bpf_jit_supports_exceptions()) { verbose(env, "JIT does not support calling kfunc %s#%d\n", @@ -15408,6 +15508,15 @@ static bool is_force_checkpoint(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].force_checkpoint; } +static void mark_calls_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx) +{ + env->insn_aux_data[idx].calls_callback = true; +} + +static bool calls_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) +{ + return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].calls_callback; +} enum { DONE_EXPLORING = 0, @@ -15521,6 +15630,21 @@ static int visit_insn(int t, struct bpf_verifier_env *env) * async state will be pushed for further exploration. */ mark_prune_point(env, t); + /* For functions that invoke callbacks it is not known how many times + * callback would be called. Verifier models callback calling functions + * by repeatedly visiting callback bodies and returning to origin call + * instruction. + * In order to stop such iteration verifier needs to identify when a + * state identical some state from a previous iteration is reached. + * Check below forces creation of checkpoint before callback calling + * instruction to allow search for such identical states. + */ + if (is_sync_callback_calling_insn(insn)) { + mark_calls_callback(env, t); + mark_force_checkpoint(env, t); + mark_prune_point(env, t); + mark_jmp_point(env, t); + } if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) { struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta meta; @@ -16990,10 +17114,16 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx) } goto skip_inf_loop_check; } + if (calls_callback(env, insn_idx)) { + if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, true)) + goto hit; + goto skip_inf_loop_check; + } /* attempt to detect infinite loop to avoid unnecessary doomed work */ if (states_maybe_looping(&sl->state, cur) && states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, false) && - !iter_active_depths_differ(&sl->state, cur)) { + !iter_active_depths_differ(&sl->state, cur) && + sl->state.callback_unroll_depth == cur->callback_unroll_depth) { verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; "); verbose(env, "infinite loop detected at insn %d\n", insn_idx); verbose(env, "cur state:"); diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c index e5c61aa6604ac..5cfa7a6316b63 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ #include "verifier_helper_restricted.skel.h" #include "verifier_helper_value_access.skel.h" #include "verifier_int_ptr.skel.h" +#include "verifier_iterating_callbacks.skel.h" #include "verifier_jeq_infer_not_null.skel.h" #include "verifier_ld_ind.skel.h" #include "verifier_ldsx.skel.h" @@ -139,6 +140,7 @@ void test_verifier_helper_packet_access(void) { RUN(verifier_helper_packet_acces void test_verifier_helper_restricted(void) { RUN(verifier_helper_restricted); } void test_verifier_helper_value_access(void) { RUN(verifier_helper_value_access); } void test_verifier_int_ptr(void) { RUN(verifier_int_ptr); } +void test_verifier_iterating_callbacks(void) { RUN(verifier_iterating_callbacks); } void test_verifier_jeq_infer_not_null(void) { RUN(verifier_jeq_infer_not_null); } void test_verifier_ld_ind(void) { RUN(verifier_ld_ind); } void test_verifier_ldsx(void) { RUN(verifier_ldsx); } diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_loop_bench.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_loop_bench.c index 4ce76eb064c41..d461746fd3c1e 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_loop_bench.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_loop_bench.c @@ -15,13 +15,16 @@ static int empty_callback(__u32 index, void *data) return 0; } +static int outer_loop(__u32 index, void *data) +{ + bpf_loop(nr_loops, empty_callback, NULL, 0); + __sync_add_and_fetch(&hits, nr_loops); + return 0; +} + SEC("fentry/" SYS_PREFIX "sys_getpgid") int benchmark(void *ctx) { - for (int i = 0; i < 1000; i++) { - bpf_loop(nr_loops, empty_callback, NULL, 0); - - __sync_add_and_fetch(&hits, nr_loops); - } + bpf_loop(1000, outer_loop, NULL, 0); return 0; } diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cb_refs.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cb_refs.c index 76d661b20e87d..56c764df81967 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cb_refs.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cb_refs.c @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ int underflow_prog(void *ctx) if (!p) return 0; bpf_for_each_map_elem(&array_map, cb1, &p, 0); + bpf_kfunc_call_test_release(p); return 0; } diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/exceptions_fail.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/exceptions_fail.c index 4c39e920dac22..8c0ef2742208a 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/exceptions_fail.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/exceptions_fail.c @@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ int reject_with_rbtree_add_throw(void *ctx) return 0; bpf_spin_lock(&lock); bpf_rbtree_add(&rbtree, &f->node, rbless); + bpf_spin_unlock(&lock); return 0; } @@ -214,6 +215,7 @@ int reject_with_cb_reference(void *ctx) if (!f) return 0; bpf_loop(5, subprog_cb_ref, NULL, 0); + bpf_obj_drop(f); return 0; } diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/strobemeta.h b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/strobemeta.h index e02cfd3807469..40df2cc26eaf9 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/strobemeta.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/strobemeta.h @@ -24,9 +24,11 @@ struct task_struct {}; #define STACK_TABLE_EPOCH_SHIFT 20 #define STROBE_MAX_STR_LEN 1 #define STROBE_MAX_CFGS 32 +#define READ_MAP_VAR_PAYLOAD_CAP \ + ((1 + STROBE_MAX_MAP_ENTRIES * 2) * STROBE_MAX_STR_LEN) #define STROBE_MAX_PAYLOAD \ (STROBE_MAX_STRS * STROBE_MAX_STR_LEN + \ - STROBE_MAX_MAPS * (1 + STROBE_MAX_MAP_ENTRIES * 2) * STROBE_MAX_STR_LEN) + STROBE_MAX_MAPS * READ_MAP_VAR_PAYLOAD_CAP) struct strobe_value_header { /* @@ -355,7 +357,7 @@ static __always_inline uint64_t read_str_var(struct strobemeta_cfg *cfg, size_t idx, void *tls_base, struct strobe_value_generic *value, struct strobemeta_payload *data, - void *payload) + size_t off) { void *location; uint64_t len; @@ -366,7 +368,7 @@ static __always_inline uint64_t read_str_var(struct strobemeta_cfg *cfg, return 0; bpf_probe_read_user(value, sizeof(struct strobe_value_generic), location); - len = bpf_probe_read_user_str(payload, STROBE_MAX_STR_LEN, value->ptr); + len = bpf_probe_read_user_str(&data->payload[off], STROBE_MAX_STR_LEN, value->ptr); /* * if bpf_probe_read_user_str returns error (<0), due to casting to * unsinged int, it will become big number, so next check is @@ -378,14 +380,14 @@ static __always_inline uint64_t read_str_var(struct strobemeta_cfg *cfg, return 0; data->str_lens[idx] = len; - return len; + return off + len; } -static __always_inline void *read_map_var(struct strobemeta_cfg *cfg, - size_t idx, void *tls_base, - struct strobe_value_generic *value, - struct strobemeta_payload *data, - void *payload) +static __always_inline uint64_t read_map_var(struct strobemeta_cfg *cfg, + size_t idx, void *tls_base, + struct strobe_value_generic *value, + struct strobemeta_payload *data, + size_t off) { struct strobe_map_descr* descr = &data->map_descrs[idx]; struct strobe_map_raw map; @@ -397,11 +399,11 @@ static __always_inline void *read_map_var(struct strobemeta_cfg *cfg, location = calc_location(&cfg->map_locs[idx], tls_base); if (!location) - return payload; + return off; bpf_probe_read_user(value, sizeof(struct strobe_value_generic), location); if (bpf_probe_read_user(&map, sizeof(struct strobe_map_raw), value->ptr)) - return payload; + return off; descr->id = map.id; descr->cnt = map.cnt; @@ -410,10 +412,10 @@ static __always_inline void *read_map_var(struct strobemeta_cfg *cfg, data->req_meta_valid = 1; } - len = bpf_probe_read_user_str(payload, STROBE_MAX_STR_LEN, map.tag); + len = bpf_probe_read_user_str(&data->payload[off], STROBE_MAX_STR_LEN, map.tag); if (len <= STROBE_MAX_STR_LEN) { descr->tag_len = len; - payload += len; + off += len; } #ifdef NO_UNROLL @@ -426,22 +428,22 @@ static __always_inline void *read_map_var(struct strobemeta_cfg *cfg, break; descr->key_lens[i] = 0; - len = bpf_probe_read_user_str(payload, STROBE_MAX_STR_LEN, + len = bpf_probe_read_user_str(&data->payload[off], STROBE_MAX_STR_LEN, map.entries[i].key); if (len <= STROBE_MAX_STR_LEN) { descr->key_lens[i] = len; - payload += len; + off += len; } descr->val_lens[i] = 0; - len = bpf_probe_read_user_str(payload, STROBE_MAX_STR_LEN, + len = bpf_probe_read_user_str(&data->payload[off], STROBE_MAX_STR_LEN, map.entries[i].val); if (len <= STROBE_MAX_STR_LEN) { descr->val_lens[i] = len; - payload += len; + off += len; } } - return payload; + return off; } #ifdef USE_BPF_LOOP @@ -455,14 +457,20 @@ struct read_var_ctx { struct strobemeta_payload *data; void *tls_base; struct strobemeta_cfg *cfg; - void *payload; + size_t payload_off; /* value gets mutated */ struct strobe_value_generic *value; enum read_type type; }; -static int read_var_callback(__u32 index, struct read_var_ctx *ctx) +static int read_var_callback(__u64 index, struct read_var_ctx *ctx) { + /* lose precision info for ctx->payload_off, verifier won't track + * double xor, barrier_var() is needed to force clang keep both xors. + */ + ctx->payload_off ^= index; + barrier_var(ctx->payload_off); + ctx->payload_off ^= index; switch (ctx->type) { case READ_INT_VAR: if (index >= STROBE_MAX_INTS) @@ -472,14 +480,18 @@ static int read_var_callback(__u32 index, struct read_var_ctx *ctx) case READ_MAP_VAR: if (index >= STROBE_MAX_MAPS) return 1; - ctx->payload = read_map_var(ctx->cfg, index, ctx->tls_base, - ctx->value, ctx->data, ctx->payload); + if (ctx->payload_off > sizeof(ctx->data->payload) - READ_MAP_VAR_PAYLOAD_CAP) + return 1; + ctx->payload_off = read_map_var(ctx->cfg, index, ctx->tls_base, + ctx->value, ctx->data, ctx->payload_off); break; case READ_STR_VAR: if (index >= STROBE_MAX_STRS) return 1; - ctx->payload += read_str_var(ctx->cfg, index, ctx->tls_base, - ctx->value, ctx->data, ctx->payload); + if (ctx->payload_off > sizeof(ctx->data->payload) - STROBE_MAX_STR_LEN) + return 1; + ctx->payload_off = read_str_var(ctx->cfg, index, ctx->tls_base, + ctx->value, ctx->data, ctx->payload_off); break; } return 0; @@ -501,7 +513,8 @@ static void *read_strobe_meta(struct task_struct *task, pid_t pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32; struct strobe_value_generic value = {0}; struct strobemeta_cfg *cfg; - void *tls_base, *payload; + size_t payload_off; + void *tls_base; cfg = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&strobemeta_cfgs, &pid); if (!cfg) @@ -509,7 +522,7 @@ static void *read_strobe_meta(struct task_struct *task, data->int_vals_set_mask = 0; data->req_meta_valid = 0; - payload = data->payload; + payload_off = 0; /* * we don't have struct task_struct definition, it should be: * tls_base = (void *)task->thread.fsbase; @@ -522,7 +535,7 @@ static void *read_strobe_meta(struct task_struct *task, .tls_base = tls_base, .value = &value, .data = data, - .payload = payload, + .payload_off = 0, }; int err; @@ -540,6 +553,11 @@ static void *read_strobe_meta(struct task_struct *task, err = bpf_loop(STROBE_MAX_MAPS, read_var_callback, &ctx, 0); if (err != STROBE_MAX_MAPS) return NULL; + + payload_off = ctx.payload_off; + /* this should not really happen, here only to satisfy verifer */ + if (payload_off > sizeof(data->payload)) + payload_off = sizeof(data->payload); #else #ifdef NO_UNROLL #pragma clang loop unroll(disable) @@ -555,7 +573,7 @@ static void *read_strobe_meta(struct task_struct *task, #pragma unroll #endif /* NO_UNROLL */ for (int i = 0; i < STROBE_MAX_STRS; ++i) { - payload += read_str_var(cfg, i, tls_base, &value, data, payload); + payload_off = read_str_var(cfg, i, tls_base, &value, data, payload_off); } #ifdef NO_UNROLL #pragma clang loop unroll(disable) @@ -563,7 +581,7 @@ static void *read_strobe_meta(struct task_struct *task, #pragma unroll #endif /* NO_UNROLL */ for (int i = 0; i < STROBE_MAX_MAPS; ++i) { - payload = read_map_var(cfg, i, tls_base, &value, data, payload); + payload_off = read_map_var(cfg, i, tls_base, &value, data, payload_off); } #endif /* USE_BPF_LOOP */ @@ -571,7 +589,7 @@ static void *read_strobe_meta(struct task_struct *task, * return pointer right after end of payload, so it's possible to * calculate exact amount of useful data that needs to be sent */ - return payload; + return &data->payload[payload_off]; } SEC("raw_tracepoint/kfree_skb") diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_iterating_callbacks.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_iterating_callbacks.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..5905e036e0eac --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_iterating_callbacks.c @@ -0,0 +1,242 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +#include +#include +#include "bpf_misc.h" + +struct { + __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY); + __uint(max_entries, 8); + __type(key, __u32); + __type(value, __u64); +} map SEC(".maps"); + +struct { + __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_USER_RINGBUF); + __uint(max_entries, 8); +} ringbuf SEC(".maps"); + +struct vm_area_struct; +struct bpf_map; + +struct buf_context { + char *buf; +}; + +struct num_context { + __u64 i; + __u64 j; +}; + +__u8 choice_arr[2] = { 0, 1 }; + +static int unsafe_on_2nd_iter_cb(__u32 idx, struct buf_context *ctx) +{ + if (idx == 0) { + ctx->buf = (char *)(0xDEAD); + return 0; + } + + if (bpf_probe_read_user(ctx->buf, 8, (void *)(0xBADC0FFEE))) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + +SEC("?raw_tp") +__failure __msg("R1 type=scalar expected=fp") +int unsafe_on_2nd_iter(void *unused) +{ + char buf[4]; + struct buf_context loop_ctx = { .buf = buf }; + + bpf_loop(100, unsafe_on_2nd_iter_cb, &loop_ctx, 0); + return 0; +} + +static int unsafe_on_zero_iter_cb(__u32 idx, struct num_context *ctx) +{ + ctx->i = 0; + return 0; +} + +SEC("?raw_tp") +__failure __msg("invalid access to map value, value_size=2 off=32 size=1") +int unsafe_on_zero_iter(void *unused) +{ + struct num_context loop_ctx = { .i = 32 }; + + bpf_loop(100, unsafe_on_zero_iter_cb, &loop_ctx, 0); + return choice_arr[loop_ctx.i]; +} + +static int widening_cb(__u32 idx, struct num_context *ctx) +{ + ++ctx->i; + return 0; +} + +SEC("?raw_tp") +__success +int widening(void *unused) +{ + struct num_context loop_ctx = { .i = 0, .j = 1 }; + + bpf_loop(100, widening_cb, &loop_ctx, 0); + /* loop_ctx.j is not changed during callback iteration, + * verifier should not apply widening to it. + */ + return choice_arr[loop_ctx.j]; +} + +static int loop_detection_cb(__u32 idx, struct num_context *ctx) +{ + for (;;) {} + return 0; +} + +SEC("?raw_tp") +__failure __msg("infinite loop detected") +int loop_detection(void *unused) +{ + struct num_context loop_ctx = { .i = 0 }; + + bpf_loop(100, loop_detection_cb, &loop_ctx, 0); + return 0; +} + +static __always_inline __u64 oob_state_machine(struct num_context *ctx) +{ + switch (ctx->i) { + case 0: + ctx->i = 1; + break; + case 1: + ctx->i = 32; + break; + } + return 0; +} + +static __u64 for_each_map_elem_cb(struct bpf_map *map, __u32 *key, __u64 *val, void *data) +{ + return oob_state_machine(data); +} + +SEC("?raw_tp") +__failure __msg("invalid access to map value, value_size=2 off=32 size=1") +int unsafe_for_each_map_elem(void *unused) +{ + struct num_context loop_ctx = { .i = 0 }; + + bpf_for_each_map_elem(&map, for_each_map_elem_cb, &loop_ctx, 0); + return choice_arr[loop_ctx.i]; +} + +static __u64 ringbuf_drain_cb(struct bpf_dynptr *dynptr, void *data) +{ + return oob_state_machine(data); +} + +SEC("?raw_tp") +__failure __msg("invalid access to map value, value_size=2 off=32 size=1") +int unsafe_ringbuf_drain(void *unused) +{ + struct num_context loop_ctx = { .i = 0 }; + + bpf_user_ringbuf_drain(&ringbuf, ringbuf_drain_cb, &loop_ctx, 0); + return choice_arr[loop_ctx.i]; +} + +static __u64 find_vma_cb(struct task_struct *task, struct vm_area_struct *vma, void *data) +{ + return oob_state_machine(data); +} + +SEC("?raw_tp") +__failure __msg("invalid access to map value, value_size=2 off=32 size=1") +int unsafe_find_vma(void *unused) +{ + struct task_struct *task = bpf_get_current_task_btf(); + struct num_context loop_ctx = { .i = 0 }; + + bpf_find_vma(task, 0, find_vma_cb, &loop_ctx, 0); + return choice_arr[loop_ctx.i]; +} + +static int iter_limit_cb(__u32 idx, struct num_context *ctx) +{ + ctx->i++; + return 0; +} + +SEC("?raw_tp") +__success +int bpf_loop_iter_limit_ok(void *unused) +{ + struct num_context ctx = { .i = 0 }; + + bpf_loop(1, iter_limit_cb, &ctx, 0); + return choice_arr[ctx.i]; +} + +SEC("?raw_tp") +__failure __msg("invalid access to map value, value_size=2 off=2 size=1") +int bpf_loop_iter_limit_overflow(void *unused) +{ + struct num_context ctx = { .i = 0 }; + + bpf_loop(2, iter_limit_cb, &ctx, 0); + return choice_arr[ctx.i]; +} + +static int iter_limit_level2a_cb(__u32 idx, struct num_context *ctx) +{ + ctx->i += 100; + return 0; +} + +static int iter_limit_level2b_cb(__u32 idx, struct num_context *ctx) +{ + ctx->i += 10; + return 0; +} + +static int iter_limit_level1_cb(__u32 idx, struct num_context *ctx) +{ + ctx->i += 1; + bpf_loop(1, iter_limit_level2a_cb, ctx, 0); + bpf_loop(1, iter_limit_level2b_cb, ctx, 0); + return 0; +} + +/* Check that path visiting every callback function once had been + * reached by verifier. Variables 'ctx{1,2}i' below serve as flags, + * with each decimal digit corresponding to a callback visit marker. + */ +SEC("socket") +__success __retval(111111) +int bpf_loop_iter_limit_nested(void *unused) +{ + struct num_context ctx1 = { .i = 0 }; + struct num_context ctx2 = { .i = 0 }; + __u64 a, b, c; + + bpf_loop(1, iter_limit_level1_cb, &ctx1, 0); + bpf_loop(1, iter_limit_level1_cb, &ctx2, 0); + a = ctx1.i; + b = ctx2.i; + /* Force 'ctx1.i' and 'ctx2.i' precise. */ + c = choice_arr[(a + b) % 2]; + /* This makes 'c' zero, but neither clang nor verifier know it. */ + c /= 10; + /* Make sure that verifier does not visit 'impossible' states: + * enumerate all possible callback visit masks. + */ + if (a != 0 && a != 1 && a != 11 && a != 101 && a != 111 && + b != 0 && b != 1 && b != 11 && b != 101 && b != 111) + asm volatile ("r0 /= 0;" ::: "r0"); + return 1000 * a + b + c; +} + +char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL"; diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_subprog_precision.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_subprog_precision.c index db6b3143338b6..f61d623b1ce8d 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_subprog_precision.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_subprog_precision.c @@ -119,15 +119,41 @@ __naked int global_subprog_result_precise(void) SEC("?raw_tp") __success __log_level(2) +/* First simulated path does not include callback body, + * r1 and r4 are always precise for bpf_loop() calls. + */ +__msg("9: (85) call bpf_loop#181") +__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 9 first_idx 9 subseq_idx -1") +__msg("mark_precise: frame0: parent state regs=r4 stack=:") +__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 8 first_idx 0 subseq_idx 9") +__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r4 stack= before 8: (b7) r4 = 0") +__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 9 first_idx 9 subseq_idx -1") +__msg("mark_precise: frame0: parent state regs=r1 stack=:") +__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 8 first_idx 0 subseq_idx 9") +__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r1 stack= before 8: (b7) r4 = 0") +__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r1 stack= before 7: (b7) r3 = 0") +__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r1 stack= before 6: (bf) r2 = r8") +__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r1 stack= before 5: (bf) r1 = r6") +__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r6 stack= before 4: (b7) r6 = 3") +/* r6 precision propagation */ __msg("14: (0f) r1 += r6") -__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 14 first_idx 10") +__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 14 first_idx 9") __msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r6 stack= before 13: (bf) r1 = r7") __msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r6 stack= before 12: (27) r6 *= 4") __msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r6 stack= before 11: (25) if r6 > 0x3 goto pc+4") __msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r6 stack= before 10: (bf) r6 = r0") -__msg("mark_precise: frame0: parent state regs=r0 stack=:") -__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 18 first_idx 0") -__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 18: (95) exit") +__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r0 stack= before 9: (85) call bpf_loop") +/* State entering callback body popped from states stack */ +__msg("from 9 to 17: frame1:") +__msg("17: frame1: R1=scalar() R2=0 R10=fp0 cb") +__msg("17: (b7) r0 = 0") +__msg("18: (95) exit") +__msg("returning from callee:") +__msg("to caller at 9:") +__msg("frame 0: propagating r1,r4") +__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 9 first_idx 9 subseq_idx -1") +__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r1,r4 stack= before 18: (95) exit") +__msg("from 18 to 9: safe") __naked int callback_result_precise(void) { asm volatile ( @@ -233,20 +259,36 @@ __naked int parent_callee_saved_reg_precise_global(void) SEC("?raw_tp") __success __log_level(2) +/* First simulated path does not include callback body */ __msg("12: (0f) r1 += r6") -__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 12 first_idx 10") +__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 12 first_idx 9") __msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r6 stack= before 11: (bf) r1 = r7") __msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r6 stack= before 10: (27) r6 *= 4") +__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r6 stack= before 9: (85) call bpf_loop") __msg("mark_precise: frame0: parent state regs=r6 stack=:") -__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 16 first_idx 0") -__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r6 stack= before 16: (95) exit") -__msg("mark_precise: frame1: regs= stack= before 15: (b7) r0 = 0") -__msg("mark_precise: frame1: regs= stack= before 9: (85) call bpf_loop#181") +__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 8 first_idx 0 subseq_idx 9") __msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r6 stack= before 8: (b7) r4 = 0") __msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r6 stack= before 7: (b7) r3 = 0") __msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r6 stack= before 6: (bf) r2 = r8") __msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r6 stack= before 5: (b7) r1 = 1") __msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r6 stack= before 4: (b7) r6 = 3") +/* State entering callback body popped from states stack */ +__msg("from 9 to 15: frame1:") +__msg("15: frame1: R1=scalar() R2=0 R10=fp0 cb") +__msg("15: (b7) r0 = 0") +__msg("16: (95) exit") +__msg("returning from callee:") +__msg("to caller at 9:") +/* r1, r4 are always precise for bpf_loop(), + * r6 was marked before backtracking to callback body. + */ +__msg("frame 0: propagating r1,r4,r6") +__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 9 first_idx 9 subseq_idx -1") +__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r1,r4,r6 stack= before 16: (95) exit") +__msg("mark_precise: frame1: regs= stack= before 15: (b7) r0 = 0") +__msg("mark_precise: frame1: regs= stack= before 9: (85) call bpf_loop") +__msg("mark_precise: frame0: parent state regs= stack=:") +__msg("from 16 to 9: safe") __naked int parent_callee_saved_reg_precise_with_callback(void) { asm volatile ( @@ -373,22 +415,38 @@ __naked int parent_stack_slot_precise_global(void) SEC("?raw_tp") __success __log_level(2) +/* First simulated path does not include callback body */ __msg("14: (0f) r1 += r6") -__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 14 first_idx 11") +__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 14 first_idx 10") __msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r6 stack= before 13: (bf) r1 = r7") __msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r6 stack= before 12: (27) r6 *= 4") __msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r6 stack= before 11: (79) r6 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8)") +__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-8 before 10: (85) call bpf_loop") __msg("mark_precise: frame0: parent state regs= stack=-8:") -__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 18 first_idx 0") -__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-8 before 18: (95) exit") -__msg("mark_precise: frame1: regs= stack= before 17: (b7) r0 = 0") -__msg("mark_precise: frame1: regs= stack= before 10: (85) call bpf_loop#181") +__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 9 first_idx 0 subseq_idx 10") __msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-8 before 9: (b7) r4 = 0") __msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-8 before 8: (b7) r3 = 0") __msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-8 before 7: (bf) r2 = r8") __msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-8 before 6: (bf) r1 = r6") __msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-8 before 5: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r6") __msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r6 stack= before 4: (b7) r6 = 3") +/* State entering callback body popped from states stack */ +__msg("from 10 to 17: frame1:") +__msg("17: frame1: R1=scalar() R2=0 R10=fp0 cb") +__msg("17: (b7) r0 = 0") +__msg("18: (95) exit") +__msg("returning from callee:") +__msg("to caller at 10:") +/* r1, r4 are always precise for bpf_loop(), + * fp-8 was marked before backtracking to callback body. + */ +__msg("frame 0: propagating r1,r4,fp-8") +__msg("mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 10 first_idx 10 subseq_idx -1") +__msg("mark_precise: frame0: regs=r1,r4 stack=-8 before 18: (95) exit") +__msg("mark_precise: frame1: regs= stack= before 17: (b7) r0 = 0") +__msg("mark_precise: frame1: regs= stack= before 10: (85) call bpf_loop#181") +__msg("mark_precise: frame0: parent state regs= stack=:") +__msg("from 18 to 10: safe") __naked int parent_stack_slot_precise_with_callback(void) { asm volatile ( diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/xdp_synproxy_kern.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/xdp_synproxy_kern.c index e959336c7a730..80f620602d50f 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/xdp_synproxy_kern.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/xdp_synproxy_kern.c @@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ #define DEFAULT_TTL 64 #define MAX_ALLOWED_PORTS 8 +#define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff + #define swap(a, b) \ do { typeof(a) __tmp = (a); (a) = (b); (b) = __tmp; } while (0) @@ -183,63 +185,76 @@ static __always_inline __u32 tcp_clock_ms(void) } struct tcpopt_context { - __u8 *ptr; - __u8 *end; + void *data; void *data_end; __be32 *tsecr; __u8 wscale; bool option_timestamp; bool option_sack; + __u32 off; }; -static int tscookie_tcpopt_parse(struct tcpopt_context *ctx) +static __always_inline u8 *next(struct tcpopt_context *ctx, __u32 sz) { - __u8 opcode, opsize; + __u64 off = ctx->off; + __u8 *data; - if (ctx->ptr >= ctx->end) - return 1; - if (ctx->ptr >= ctx->data_end) - return 1; + /* Verifier forbids access to packet when offset exceeds MAX_PACKET_OFF */ + if (off > MAX_PACKET_OFF - sz) + return NULL; - opcode = ctx->ptr[0]; + data = ctx->data + off; + barrier_var(data); + if (data + sz >= ctx->data_end) + return NULL; - if (opcode == TCPOPT_EOL) - return 1; - if (opcode == TCPOPT_NOP) { - ++ctx->ptr; - return 0; - } + ctx->off += sz; + return data; +} - if (ctx->ptr + 1 >= ctx->end) - return 1; - if (ctx->ptr + 1 >= ctx->data_end) +static int tscookie_tcpopt_parse(struct tcpopt_context *ctx) +{ + __u8 *opcode, *opsize, *wscale, *tsecr; + __u32 off = ctx->off; + + opcode = next(ctx, 1); + if (!opcode) return 1; - opsize = ctx->ptr[1]; - if (opsize < 2) + + if (*opcode == TCPOPT_EOL) return 1; + if (*opcode == TCPOPT_NOP) + return 0; - if (ctx->ptr + opsize > ctx->end) + opsize = next(ctx, 1); + if (!opsize || *opsize < 2) return 1; - switch (opcode) { + switch (*opcode) { case TCPOPT_WINDOW: - if (opsize == TCPOLEN_WINDOW && ctx->ptr + TCPOLEN_WINDOW <= ctx->data_end) - ctx->wscale = ctx->ptr[2] < TCP_MAX_WSCALE ? ctx->ptr[2] : TCP_MAX_WSCALE; + wscale = next(ctx, 1); + if (!wscale) + return 1; + if (*opsize == TCPOLEN_WINDOW) + ctx->wscale = *wscale < TCP_MAX_WSCALE ? *wscale : TCP_MAX_WSCALE; break; case TCPOPT_TIMESTAMP: - if (opsize == TCPOLEN_TIMESTAMP && ctx->ptr + TCPOLEN_TIMESTAMP <= ctx->data_end) { + tsecr = next(ctx, 4); + if (!tsecr) + return 1; + if (*opsize == TCPOLEN_TIMESTAMP) { ctx->option_timestamp = true; /* Client's tsval becomes our tsecr. */ - *ctx->tsecr = get_unaligned((__be32 *)(ctx->ptr + 2)); + *ctx->tsecr = get_unaligned((__be32 *)tsecr); } break; case TCPOPT_SACK_PERM: - if (opsize == TCPOLEN_SACK_PERM) + if (*opsize == TCPOLEN_SACK_PERM) ctx->option_sack = true; break; } - ctx->ptr += opsize; + ctx->off = off + *opsize; return 0; } @@ -256,16 +271,21 @@ static int tscookie_tcpopt_parse_batch(__u32 index, void *context) static __always_inline bool tscookie_init(struct tcphdr *tcp_header, __u16 tcp_len, __be32 *tsval, - __be32 *tsecr, void *data_end) + __be32 *tsecr, void *data, void *data_end) { struct tcpopt_context loop_ctx = { - .ptr = (__u8 *)(tcp_header + 1), - .end = (__u8 *)tcp_header + tcp_len, + .data = data, .data_end = data_end, .tsecr = tsecr, .wscale = TS_OPT_WSCALE_MASK, .option_timestamp = false, .option_sack = false, + /* Note: currently verifier would track .off as unbound scalar. + * In case if verifier would at some point get smarter and + * compute bounded value for this var, beware that it might + * hinder bpf_loop() convergence validation. + */ + .off = (__u8 *)(tcp_header + 1) - (__u8 *)data, }; u32 cookie; @@ -635,7 +655,7 @@ static __always_inline int syncookie_handle_syn(struct header_pointers *hdr, cookie = (__u32)value; if (tscookie_init((void *)hdr->tcp, hdr->tcp_len, - &tsopt_buf[0], &tsopt_buf[1], data_end)) + &tsopt_buf[0], &tsopt_buf[1], data, data_end)) tsopt = tsopt_buf; /* Check that there is enough space for a SYNACK. It also covers