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<!DOCTYPE HTML>
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<title>Chariots For Apollo, ch4-2</title>
<meta http-equiv=Content-Type content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
</head>
<BODY BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF">
<p>
<h2>The Team and the Tools </h2>
<p>
Harrison A. Storms, Jr. (widely known as "Stormy"), Vice
President of North American and President of its Space and Information
Systems Division, was a forceful leader in advanced design and
development work and a vigorous decision-maker who got things done. He
had studied aeronautical engineering under Theodore von
Kármán at the California Institute of Technology during
the 1940s. Subsequently, at North American, he had advanced steadily
through the ranks. With the nationally famous test pilot A. Scott
Crossfield, among others, Storms had shepherded the company team through
the first phases of the X-15 and later the XB-70 aircraft programs.<a
href = "#source2"><b>2</b></a><p>
John Paup, who had worked at North American for several years before
joining Sperry Rand, returned to his former employer in mid-1961 to help
Storms bid on the NASA proposals and to become general manager for
Apollo.<a href = "#source3"><b>3</b></a>
Paup, in turn, picked Norman J. Ryker, Jr., as his
chief designer. Ryker, who had joined the company in 1951, had been a
stress analyst on the pioneer Navajo missile. He had also helped prepare
bids for contracts for the Ranger and Surveyor spacecraft. North
American had lost these competitions, but Ryker had remained in advanced
design work.<a href = "#source4"><b>4</b></a><p>
Charles H. Feltz, a company man since 1940, was a fourth major leader of
North American's Apollo development team. He had worked on P-51 and B-25
aircraft during the Second World War and later on the B-45, the F-86,
and the F-100. Feltz had been project leader on the X-15 rocket research
aircraft, coming into close contact with NACA and then NASA leaders with
whom he would work on Apollo. Feltz was considered by his peers to be
one of the best manufacturing managers in the airframe business.<a href
= "#source5"><b>5</b></a>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c088.jpg" width=534 height=407 ALT="NAA officials">
<p>
<cite>A team and a goal: officials of North American Aviation, Inc.,
study a replica of the moon shortly after the announcement that NASA had
selected NAA as prime contractor for the Apollo command and service
modules. From left to right are Harrison A. Storms, president of North
American's Space and Information Systems Division; John W. Paup, program
manager for Apollo; and Charles H. Feltz, Apollo program
engineer.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
In the days before Project Mercury, North American, with General
Electric, had been under contract to the Air Force for
"Man-in-Space-Soonest." When the Air Force lost the manned
space flight mission to NASA, North American had put in a bid for
Mercury. After losing to the McDonnell Aircraft Corporation in 1959,
North American officials in 1961 were not eager to chance another defeat
in a major NASA competition. But Storms and Paup, after combining forces
with Ryker and Feltz, were determined to try for Apollo. When NASA
picked North American on 11 September 1961 to build the S-II second
stage of the advanced Saturn, J. Leland Atwood, President of the
corporation, and Samuel K. Hoffman, President of the firm's Rocketdyne
Division, were reconciled to this role in the program. Storms, Paup, and
Ryker were not; they pressed on to win the spacecraft contract as
well.<a href = "#source6"><b>6</b></a>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c090a.jpg" width=534 height=405 ALT="NAA plant at Downey">
<p>
<cite>The North American Aviation plant at Downey, California, developed
and produced the Apollo command module.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
Storms' team operated from a two-story building in Downey, California.
Design engineers and draftsmen occupied the major portion of the
structure, their desks crowded together in cavernous halls. An adjacent
building housed the manufacturing activities for the space division.
Ninety percent of the property belonged to the federal government, but
long-term leases had made North American, as tenant, virtually the
proprietor. Now, with the Apollo contract, plans were made to recruit
personnel, to buy adjoining property, and to construct more buildings
and facilities. In the meantime, some of the personnel worked out of
house-trailer offices in the parking lots.<p>
The manpower buildup in Storms' division in the first six months of 1962
doubled the size of his organization - from 7,000 to more than 14,000
persons. Although many employees were busy on the Air Force's Hound Dog
missile, among other projects, the newcomers for the most part were
hired to develop the Apollo command and service modules.<a href =
"#source7"><b>7</b></a>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c090b.jpg" width=410 height=588 ALT="Impact Facility at NAA">
<p>
<cite>The impact facility at North American was used to drop-test the CM
on water, sand, gravel, and boulders to check structural integrity and
impact loads.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
One of the first structures built at Downey specifically for Apollo
began to take shape early in 1962. The Impact Test Facility, 46 meters
high, looked like a gigantic playground swing. It was a swing of sorts -
one designed to hold and drop a command module so the Apollo team could
study it and improve structural strengths of the heatshield, honeycomb
shock absorbers, inner and outer shells, afterbody, and astronaut
couches. At one end of the swing was a pool of water, at the other a
sandpile that could be banked or pitted with gravel and boulders. To
return men safely from the moon required a knowledge of the exact limits
they and their machine could endure at the final landing on earth.<a
href = "#source8"><b>8</b></a><p>
As expected, structures, heatshields, and radiation protection were
primary concerns during the first year or so. Unexpectedly, however, the
manufacture of mockup modules, initially considered of less importance,
quickly grew into a major program to supply boilerplate spacecraft
(metal models designed to be used in testing). North American's
structural assembly department had begun tooling up for extensive work
on mockups in January 1962. By the end of the year, this shop employed
305 persons on three shifts, tooling, drilling, welding, and assembling
custom-built units. D. W. Chidley, a 14-year veteran of North American's
prototype manufacturing and head of the department, reported at year's
end that his group had built six test vehicles and two full-scale
mockups, which had been featured in NASA-North American reviews during
the year.<a href = "#source9"><b>9</b></a><p>
To keep key personnel ready for the frequent meetings with NASA and
aware of daily plant operations, Storms, Paup, Ryker, and Feltz held
ten-minute briefings for all plant supervisors at the beginning of each
morning shift. Agendas were carefully controlled; no interruptions were
permitted; and everyone was required to speak for his section. Thus,
until North American's Apollo operation grew too large to make this kind
of communication useful, all the major managers had at least one daily
direct contact with their colleagues and superiors. Some of these
sessions were devoted to plans for selecting and working with the
subcontractors who would develop the subsystems.<a href =
"#source10"><b>10</b></a><p>
Shortly after the NASA-North American contract was signed,
subcontractors for four of the spacecraft systems were picked: (1)
Collins Radio Company for telecommunications; (2) The Garrett
Corporation's AiResearch Manufacturing Company, environmental control;
(3) Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Company, stabilization and attitude
control; and (4) Northrop Corporation's Radioplane (later Ventura
Division), parachutes and earth landing.<p>
North American soon added other subcontractors. In February 1962 the
Lockheed Propulsion Company was selected to design the solid-propellant
motor for the launch escape tower. By the end of March, The Marquardt
Corporation had been chosen for the command and service modules'
reaction control system, Aerojet-General for the service module's main
engine, and Avco Corporation for ablative coatings and the spacecraft
heatshield. In April, Thiokol Chemical Corporation was named to work
with Lockheed on the launch escape system.<a href =
"#source11"><b>11</b></a>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c091a.jpg" width=412 height=435 ALT="Interior of CM mockup">
<p>
<cite>Interior of a partial full-scale mockup of the Apollo command
module. In flight, the center couch would be removed (as shown), giving
better access to the instrument panel and lower equipment bay.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
While NASA was trying to decide on the mode during the first half of
1962, John Paup and his North American engineers were getting restive.
Although repeatedly warned by his own people not to bend tin or cut
metal too soon, Paup insisted that hardware production should get under
way. He did have his model shops turn out a mockup of a lunar excursion
module - which looked like a helicopter cab atop thin spidery legs - and
of a lunar braking module, just in case a direct route to the moon
should be chosen. On the first of June, Paup wrote Houston that
schedules for spacecraft delivery were slipping further and further
behind. How could they build the service module, he asked, if they did
not know what it would be used for?<a href =
"#source12"><b>12</b></a>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c091b.jpg" width=407 height=556 ALT="Astronauts inspect CM Mockup">
<p>
<cite>At left, left to right, astronauts Scott Carpenter, John Glenn,
and Walter Schirra in 1963 inspect a full-scale mock up of the Apollo
CM, designed for three men.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
But there was at least one area where work could start immediately.
Early in the contract, North American and Houston engineers had agreed
on a flight-test program, putting boilerplate command and service
modules through structural tests and checking out the abort escape
system. In mid-1961, while he was still with NASA before joining North
American in 1962, Alan Kehlet had suggested using a fin-stabilized,
clustered-rocket, solid-propellant booster for these tests. The
"Little Joe II" (named after the Project Mercury test vehicle)
would be able to propel a full-sized Apollo reentry spacecraft to
velocities as great as those in the critical portions of the Saturn
trajectory and to altitudes of 60,900 meters. The tests would be a
simple and fairly inexpensive way of determining - in flight - the
full-scale spacecraft configuration concepts, systems performance, and
structural integrity. Tests of the launch escape system at maximum
dynamic pressure would be most important. In May 1962 the Convair
Division of General Dynamics was selected to develop the vehicle.<a href
= "#source13"><b>13</b></a>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c093a.jpg" width=409 height=579 ALT="Officials discussing">
<p>
<cite>General Dynamics' Little Joe II program manager Jack Hurt (holding
book) discusses development and production plans with NASA officials
(left to right) Walter Williams, Robert Piland, and James Elms at the
San Diego plant in May 1963.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
Although launch sites at Wallops Island, Virginia; Eglin Air Force Base,
Florida; and the Cape were considered, the New Mexico desert north of El
Paso, Texas, was picked early in the spring of 1962 as the Little Joe II
test area. The Army's White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) seemed the most
suitable for Little Joe II ballistic flights.<a href =
"#source14"><b>14</b></a>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c093b.gif" width=628 height=433 ALT="Apollo launch vehicles comparison">
<p>
<cite>Selection of Little Joe II completed the Apollo family of launch
vehicles.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c093c.jpg" width=547 height=404 ALT="White Sands Test Facility">
<p>
<cite>A desert area at White Sands Test Facility, New Mexico, was
used for testing the spacecraft propulsion system module.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c093d.jpg" width=409 height=580 ALT="LES Pad Abort Test">
<p>
<cite>A pad abort test at White Sands, left, helped determine that the
launch escape system could propel the Apollo command module away from
danger if a Saturn launch vehicle explosion should threaten.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c093e.jpg" width=579 height=367 ALT="Little Joe II CM recovered">
<p>
<cite>A model of the CM, below, launched by a Little Joe II in 1965, is
recovered after impact on the New Mexico desert.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
NASA engineers expected to conduct three kinds of tests at White Sands:
(1) pad aborts, in which a solid-fueled rocket mounted on a tower
attached to the top of the command module would pull the spacecraft away
as it would have to do if the Saturn threatened to blow up on the launch
pad; (2) maximum-dynamic-pressure ("max q") tests, in which
the rocket would pull the spacecraft away from the launch vehicle if the
booster veered off course shortly after launch; and (3) high-altitude
tests, in which the rocket would haul the spacecraft away from the
launch vehicle if the Saturn were unable to boost its payload to orbital
flight.<a href = "#source15"><b>15</b></a><p>
Other organizations, such as the Ames Research Center, near San
Francisco, had been working on Apollo while waiting for a mode decision.
Quite often after a day's work at Downey, North American engineers flew
to Moffett Field, carrying models for Ames to test in its wind tunnels.
Ames engineers were also dropping test vehicles on a simulated lunar
surface to study landing gear designs and possible structural damage on
impact.<a href = "#source16"><b>16</b></a><p>
Ames had a close relationship with its Navy neighbors at Moffett Field.
Navy flight surgeon Harald A. Smedal, who had been in aviation medicine
for years, was a logical consultant to NASA's research engineers.
Interested in physiological instrumentation as well as pilot performance
during flight, Smedal worked on spacecraft cabin designs, especially on
cockpit layouts that emphasized pilot convenience in spacecraft
control.<a href = "#source17"><b>17</b></a><p>
Another example of Ames' applied research that fed into North American
was the work of test pilots and life scientists in ground-based
simulations of the characteristics of spacesuits, restraint harnesses,
work-rest cycles, and isolation conditions. North American and Ames were
intent on making certain that the cockpit was designed to take full
advantage of the pilots' capabilities in performing and sharing their
duties.<a href = "#source18"><b>18</b></a>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c095a.jpg" width=528 height=417 ALT="Major CM components">
<p>
<cite>The drawing outlines major parts of the command module
structure.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
The Lewis Research Center in Cleveland, Ohio, also took a hand in
getting spacecraft development on a good footing by putting Marquardt's
reaction control jets through a test program. These small motors - used
to turn the spacecraft right or left, up or down, or in a roll maneuver
- were cooled regeneratively (in a process in which the expansion of
part of the hot gas cools the remainder). When tests showed that the
engines would burn up during reentry heating, Houston directed North
American to use Marquardt motors only on the service module (since it
would be jettisoned before reentry) and to make or buy command module
jets similar to the ablative engines developed for Gemini. In August
1962, the command module thruster contract was transferred to North
American's Rocketdyne Division, which produced Gemini's attitude control
and maneuvering engines and reentry control system.<a href =
"#source19"><b>19</b></a>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c095b.jpg" width=581 height=412 ALT="CM assembly">
<p>
<cite>The cabin section (or primary structure) of the CM is assembled at
North American in 1965.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
Even though the Manned Spacecraft Center had gained its independence and
had moved away, the ties between NASA-Langley and NASA-Houston remained
strong, providing another source to draw on for help. Shortly after the
move to Houston, Axel T. Mattson came to Texas as full-time liaison
officer, coordinating the use of Langley's five-meter transonic wind
tunnel in testing and studying the aerodynamic effects of reaction
control jets and escape tower exhaust plumes on the command and service
modules.
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c095e.jpg" width=584 height=416 ALT="Preparing aft heatshields">
<p>
<cite>Technicians prepare aft heatshields to attach to model CMs. These
shields were made of fiberglass for test vehicles that did not require
heat protection; the finished versions were of the same materials as the
central heatshield.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
Langley's wind-tunnel experts also conducted diagnostic tests of heat
transfer, heating loads and rates, and aerodynamic and hydrodynamic
stability on the command module heatshield. The heatshield contractor -
the Avco Corporation's Everett, Massachusetts, division - had proposed
an ablative tile shield, a layered and bonded single-piece construction
similar to that used on Mercury. Then McDonnell had advanced heat
protection technology by developing ablator-filled honeycomb material
for Gemini. When North American and NASA engineers approved this thermal
protection Avco refined the new system to withstand the higher heating
rates of lunar reentry. McDonnell's Gemini heatshield was made of a
Fiberglas honeycomb material; the ablator, developed by Dow-Corning, was
poured into it and allowed to harden. The Apollo ablative heatshield,
however, was bonded to an inner brazed stainless steel honeycomb shield,
and the 400,000 honeycomb cells in its plastic outer shield were filled
by hand using a caulking gun,<a href = "#source20"><b>20</b></a> with an
ablator developed by Avco.
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c095c.jpg" width=511 height=405 ALT="Preparing central heatshields">
<p>
<cite>Technicians work on the central heatshield, the two men on the
sides applying heat-protection ablative material with caulking
guns.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c095d.jpg" width=582 height=417 ALT="Central heatshield emplaced">
<p>
<cite>A completed central heatshield is lowered into place over the
primary structure in May 1966.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
While the heatshield was going through its growing pains, the earth
landing system for the command module was beginning to mature. Apollo's
preliminary plan had included either water or land landing. John W.
Kiker, a landing system specialist in Houston, had studied several
alternatives: a rotating wing (like a helicopter's), a flexible wing
(similar to a paraglider), or traditional parachutes (such as were used
in Mercury). Kiker, working with experts at Langley and Ames, ran the
proposed models through wind-tunnel tests and then asked the Flight
Research Center to put the equipment through free-flight tests at
Edwards Air Force Base.<a href = "#source21"><b>21</b></a>
<p align=center>
<img src = "images/c096.gif" width=581 height=685 ALT="Parachute recovery system">
<p>
<cite>Parachute recovery system.</cite>
<p>
<hr>
<p>
But by the middle of 1962 hopes for a touchdown on land were beginning
to fade. At a meeting in Houston on 10 May engineers of Northrop-Ventura
(the recovery system subcontractor) described their designs for a cluster
of three ring-sail parachutes for the main landing system. North
American liked Northrop's proposal better than the system being tested,
which deployed the parachutes through the heatshield cover on the
conical top of the command module. In the proposed system, the cover
would be jettisoned before the parachutes were released. On 16 May
Houston told North American to go ahead with the development of this
multiple-parachute system and to set the paraglider aside for further
review.<a href = "#source22"><b>22</b></a><p>
At that time, North American was developing a paraglider landing system
for the Gemini spacecraft. In Houston, Max Faget noted that the
contractor was having trouble with the Gemini system and became
skeptical of the paraglider's value for Apollo. In June 1962, he
recommended water
landings for the lunar program. At NASA Headquarters, George Low told
Brainerd Holmes that North American's concentration on parachutes for
Apollo would mean the end of the paraglider for that program. Holmes
wanted to know if it could be put in later, provided the technical
difficulties were solved. Low said this could be done only if the
paraglider were ready within a year.<a href = "#source23"><b>23</b></a>
When NASA and the Navy recovered John Glenn and Scott Carpenter and
their Mercury spacecraft from the water with comparative ease, chances
for a dry landing in Apollo grew slim.<p>
Another key part of the command module that had to keep moving was the
guidance and navigation system. To get started in the right direction,
representatives from North American and MIT decided to meet regularly,
either at Downey or Cambridge, to keep an eye on progress and trade
information. In early 1962, the guidance and navigation system had, of
course, moved very little beyond the embryo stage. Some advances had
been made on the gyroscopes and accelerometers for the inertial
measurement unit (similar to that used to help guide the Polaris
missile), but digital computer development and the space sextant were
not well defined.<a href = "#source24"><b>24</b></a><p>
Manned Spacecraft Center engineers had questioned whether an astronaut
in a pressurized suit could operate a sextant or the other delicate
pieces of navigation equipment. The Apollo contract had specified a
shirt-sleeve environment. For this reason, North American had been told
not to include in its design a hatch that opened by explosives, like
Mercury's. An accidentally blown hatch would cause an instant vacuum and
certain death for a crewman not wearing his pressure suit. But on some
occasions, such as launch, the crew would be in their suits and would
need equipment that could be operated while wearing the bulky gloves and
helmet.<a href = "#source25"><b>25</b></a><p>
In June 1962, several Manned Spacecraft Center and North American
engineers went to MIT to learn how the crew was to operate the guidance
system. One of the talks covered the use of the sextant in determining
navigational position. At that point, the MIT experts were invited to
Houston to try operating the sextant while wearing an inflated suit.
Whether they came was not documented, but in the succeeding months
modifications made the sextant and suit operation more compatible. The
chief result of all these meetings, however, was a new understanding of
the command module's cabin layout, which gave MIT a clearer picture of
how components should fit.<a href = "#source26"><b>26</b></a><p>
Ames Research Center engineers also participated in the meetings (giving
Gilruth another set of specialists to call upon in monitoring MIT's
work). The Ames guidance experts sponsored a session at a
NASA-university conference that dealt with such subjects as midcourse
guidance and navigation techniques and the procedures for reducing the
uncertainties connected with these operations. Ames speakers recommended
making mid-course corrections early in flight to avoid the wider
dispersions and greater fuel use that might result from making
trajectory changes closer to the moon. Studies by Ames on atmospheric
entry guidance - another critical operation - indicated that a man could
indeed steer his spacecraft through the narrow reentry corridor to a
safe landing on the earth.<a href = "#source27"><b>27</b></a><p>
When some components of the command module's guidance and navigation
system were ready for development and fabrication by subcontractors,
NASA Associate Administrator Robert Seamans appointed a Source
Evaluation Board in January 1962, headed by Robert G. Chilton,<a href =
"#explanation1"><b>*</b></a> of MSC, to select industrial supporters for
MIT. NASA chose the AC Spark Plug Division of General Motors to build
the inertial platform, Raytheon to make the digital computer, and the
Kollsman Instrument Corporation to manufacture the optical systems. By
May 1962, most of these contractual arrangements were complete.<a href =
"#source28"><b>28</b></a><p>
NASA's top officials had been concerned about MIT's ability to build a
guidance and navigation system that would take a crew to the moon and
back to the earth. As the system began to take shape, another worry
cropped up. Would the Instrumentation Laboratory be able to manage the
industrial contractors once the design evolved into development? To be
certain that the subcontractors understood the arrangement, Seamans
visited the Wakefield Laboratory of AC Spark Plug in July, where he was
assured that AC and MIT could work together just as they had on the
Titan II inertial guidance system. But the managerial task in the
complex and interlocking systems of the command module, as well as those
of the other vehicles in the Apollo stack, had to be spelled out in
precise and formal guidelines to ensure orderly progress. A system of
"Interface Control Documents" became standard.<p>
There was nothing very mysterious about the Interface Control Documents.
Somewhere along the line, some piece of Apollo's two million functional
parts assembled in one place had to meet and match with a piece put
together in another place. After MIT had designed and supervised the
building of the guidance and navigation system, for example, the
component was sent to North American for installation in the command
module. Size and location of the equipment had to be defined and agreed
upon in advance so it would fit properly. Because of the many, many
companies working on the different parts of the Apollo stack, these
interface documents were essential in laying out just where and how the
parts would come together - systems with spacecraft, spacecraft with
launch vehicles, launch vehicles and spacecraft with launch facilities,
and all these systems and craft with the crew and with launch and
mission control centers.<a href = "#source29"><b>29</b></a><p>
All in all, during 1962 good progress had been made in getting command
module development under way. Contractors were working together, and
cooperation among the NASA field centers had improved. One of the
underlying factors in this advancement had been the establishment of a
formal Apollo spacecraft management office at the Manned Spacecraft
Center.<p>
In January 1962, when Charles Frick became manager of the new Apollo
Spacecraft Project Office, he assumed responsibility "for the
technical direction of North American Aviation and other industrial
contractors assigned work on the Apollo Spacecraft Project." Frick
arrived at Langley Field, Virginia, just in time to meet the 45 persons
that his deputy, Robert Piland, had gathered into the new project office
before they moved to Houston on 1 February. The new organization settled
into the Rich Building, one of the center's 13 rented sites scattered
around the Gulf Freeway.<a href = "#source30"><b>30</b></a> But, even
before Frick's arrival and the establishment of the formal spacecraft
office, the Apollo workers in Gilruth's center had taken on an expanded
responsibility.
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "explanation1"><b>*</b></a> Chilton's board members were
Caldwell C. Johnson, Jr., Charles F. Bingman, Arthur E. Garrison, and
Carl D. Sword of MSC; Richard C. Henry and Earl E. McGinty of NASA
Headquarters; Merrill H. Mead of Ames; and two nonvoting participants,
Ralph Ragan of MIT and James T. Koppenhaver of NASA Headquarters.
<p>
<hr>
<p>
<a name = "source2"><b>2</b>.</a> Harrison A. Storms, Jr., interviews,
Downey, Calif., 6 June 1966, and El Segundo, Calif., 16 July 1970;
Philip Geddes, "How NAA Won Apollo . . . 'management,'"
<cite>Aerospace Management,</cite> 1962, no. 4, pp. 12-16; biographical
sketch of Storms in Shirley Thomas, <cite>Men of Space: Profiles of
Leaders in Space Research, Development. and Exploration</cite> 4
(Philadelphia: Chilton Co., 1962): 206-32. See also Art Seidenbaum,
"Quarterback for the Moon Race," <cite>Saturday Evening
Post,</cite> 5 May 1962, pp. 85-90.<p>
<a name = "source3"><b>3</b>.</a> John W. Paup, interview, Downey, 7
June 1966; Beirne Lay, Jr., <cite>Earthbound Astronauts: The Builders of
Apollo-Saturn</cite> (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1971), pp.
77-81.<p>
<a name = "source4"><b>4</b>.</a> North American, "Norman J. Ryker,
Jr., Vice President, Research, Engineering and Test," news release,
26 March 1970; Ryker, interviews, Downey, 9 June 1966 and 20 July
1970.<p>
<a name = "source5"><b>5</b>.</a> North American, "Charles H.
Feltz, Program Vice President, Space Shuttle Orbiter Program," news
release, 8 July 1970.<p>
<a name = "source6"><b>6</b>.</a> J. Leland Atwood, interview, El
Segundo, 16 July 1970; Samuel K. Hoffman, interview, Canoga Park,
Calif., 17 July 1970.<p>
<a name = "source7"><b>7</b>.</a> Oakley, "Historical
Summary," pp. 6, 7, 43-44.<p>
<a name = "source8"><b>8</b>.</a> North American, "Apollo
Facts," [ca. August 1963]; North American, "Impact Test
Facility," news release NS-16, 3 April 1963; Ryker, "Technical
Status of the Apollo Command and Service Modules," North American
SID 64-698, 3 April 1964, p. 19.<p>
<a name = "source9"><b>9</b>.</a> D. W. Chidley, "1962 Annual
Report on Department 663, Apollo Mockup, Boilerplate Structural Assembly
Department," North American, n.d.<p>
<a name = "source10"><b>10</b>.</a> Jack R. Hahn, interview, Canoga
Park, 15 July 1970.<p>
<a name = "source11"><b>11</b>.</a> "Four Additional Companies
Named to Work on Apollo," MSC Space News Roundup, 27 Dec. 1961;
Earl Blount TWX to Lt. Col. John A. Powers, 12 Feb. 1962; Oakley,
"Historical Summary," pp. 5-6; Sanford Falbaum, interview,
Long Beach, Calif., 15 July 1970.<p>
<a name = "source12"><b>12</b>.</a> Paup to Charles W. Frick, 1 June
1962; R. L. Benner, interview, Downey, 7 June 1966.<p>
<a name = "source13"><b>13</b>.</a> Alan B. Kehlet et al., "A
Preliminary Study of a Fin-stabilized Solid-Fuel Rocket Booster for Use
with the Apollo Spacecraft," NASA Project Apollo working paper No.
1020, 7 June 1961; William W. Petynia, interview, Houston, 9 Dec. 1970;
General Dynamics, Convair Div., "Little Joe II Test Launch Vehicle,
NASA Apollo: Final Report," GDC-66-042, May 1966; NASA, "NASA
Project Apollo Statement of Work, Test Launch Vehicle (Little Joe
II)," 31 March 1962. For a discussion of the origins of the Little
Joe vehicle for Mercury, see Loyd S. Swenson, Jr., James M. Grimwood,
and Charles C. Alexander,<cite> This New Ocean: A History of Project
Mercury,</cite> NASA SP-4201 (Washington, 1966), pp. 121-26.<p>
<a name = "source14"><b>14</b>.</a> Petynia to Mgr., ASPO, MSC,
"Trip report to White Sands Missile Range on May 17 and 18, 1962,
to discuss Little Joe II and pad abort flight configurations and
tests," 21 May 1962; Holmes to Assoc. Admin., NASA, "Apollo
Spacecraft Propulsion Development Facility Site," 13 June 1962,
with enc., "Site Recommendation for Apollo Spacecraft Propulsion
Development Facility," p. 5; Maj. Gen. John G. Shinkle to Robert R.
Gilruth, 4 June 1962; James E. Webb to Robert S. McNamara, 10 Aug. 1962;
Robert P. Young to Webb, "Selection for site to test Apollo service
module," 4 June 1962; idem, note, 7 June 1962; "Agreement for
Construction and Operation of an Apollo Spacecraft Propulsion
Development Facility at the White Sands Missile Range," approved by
Hugh L. Dryden for NASA and Paul R. Ignatius for the Army, 19 Dec.
1962.<p>
<a name = "source15"><b>15</b>.</a> J. Thomas Markley, "Apollo at
White Sands," MSC Fact Sheet 97, 11 Sept. 1962.<p>
<a name = "source16"><b>16</b>.</a> Calvin H. Perrine to Apollo
Spacecraft Project Officer, "Minutes of Meeting at Ames Research
Center on Aerodynamics and Meteorite Impact Studies Applicable to
Apollo," 5 April 1962; Harold Hornby, interview, Ames, 28 June
1971.<p>
<a name = "source17"><b>17</b>.</a> For a sampling of research by Harald
A. Smedal, see Smedal, George R. Holden, and Joseph R. Smith, Jr., to
Dir., Ames, "Ames Airborne Physiological Instrumentation
Package," 11 April 1960; Smedal, Brent Y. Creer, and Rodney C.
Wingrove, <cite>Physiological Effects of Acceleration Observed during a
Centrifuge Study of Pilot Performance,</cite> NASA Technical Note (TN)
D-345 (Langley Field, December 1960); Smedal, Holden, and Smith, Jr.,
<cite>A Flight Evaluation of an Airborne Physiological Instrumentation
System, Including Preliminary Results under Conditions of Varying
Accelerations,</cite> NASA TN D-351 (Langley Field, December 1960);
Holden, Smith, Jr., and Smedal, "Physiological Instrumentation
Systems for Monitoring Pilot Response to Stress at Zero and High
G," <cite>Aerospace Medicine</cite> 33 (1962), no. 4: 420-27.<p>
<a name = "source18"><b>18</b>.</a> Hubert C. Vykukal, Richard P.
Gallant, and Glen W. Stinnett, "An Interchangeable, Mobile
Pilot-Restraint System, Designed for Use in High Sustained Acceleration
Force Fields," <cite>Aerospace Medicine</cite> 33 (1962), no. 3:
279-85; Edwin P. Hartman, <cite>Adventures in Research: A History of
Ames Research Center, 1940–1965,</cite> NASA SP-4302 (Washington, 1970),
pp. 479-80.<p>
<a name = "source19"><b>19</b>.</a> A. B. Kehlet et al., "Notes on
Project Apollo: January 1960–January 1962," 8 Jan. 1962, p. 12;
Jesse F. Goree to Caldwell C. Johnson, "Command Module RCS
Engines," 20 July 1962; Johnson TWX to E. E. Sack and George A.
Lemke, "Command and Service Module Reaction Control System
Engines," 31 July 1962; Holmes to Assoc. Admin., NASA, "Change
in Subcontractors for Apollo Command Module Reaction Control Jets,"
24 July 1962.<p>
<a name = "source20"><b>20</b>.</a> Axel T. Mattson to Charles J.
Donlan, "Report on Activities (April 1–April 5, 1962) regarding
Manned Spacecraft Projects," 5 April 1962; Clyde B. Bothmer,
minutes of OMSF Staff Meeting, 29 June 1962; Falbaum interview; Robert
L. Trimpi, interview, Langley, 21 June 1966; North American, "CSM
Costs/Schedule/Technical Characteristics Study: Final Report," 2,
SID71-35, 30 April 1971, p. II-24; McDonnell Aircraft Corp., External
Relations Div., <cite>Gemini Press Reference Book: Gemini Spacecraft
Number Three</cite> (St. Louis, 1965), p. 5; North American, Public
Relations Dept., <cite>Apollo Spacecraft News Reference</cite> (Downey,
Calif., rev. ed., 1969), p. 47; Johnson Space Center, "Apollo
Program Summary," JSC-09423, April 1975, p. 4-19; NASA,
"Project: Apollo 7," press kit, news release 68-168K, 27 Sept.
1968, p. 25.<p>
<a name = "source21"><b>21</b>.</a> Gilruth to NASA Hq., Attn.:
Silverstein, "Preliminary project development plan for a
controllable parachute-retrorocket landing system for Apollo
spacecraft," 26 June 1961; Gilruth to Langley, Attn.: Office of
Cooperative Projects, "Wind tunnel investigation of Apollo Parawing
deployment problems," n.d. [ca. August 1961]; Jack C. Heberlig to
Johnson, no subj., 28 Aug. 1961.<p>
<a name = "source22"><b>22</b>.</a> North American, "Earth Landing
System, Parachute Subsystem, Proposed Revision," SID 62-482, 8 May
1962; summary of meeting with NAA/S&ID, Northrop-Ventura, and MSC on
landing system-parachute subsystem, 10 May 1962; Johnson to North
American, Attn.: Paup, "Earth Landing System - Apollo
Spacecraft," 16 May 1962; Benner interview.<p>
<a name = "source23"><b>23</b>.</a> Barton C. Hacker and James M.
Grimwood, <cite>On the Shoulders of Titans: A History of Project
Gemini,</cite> NASA SP-4203 (Washington, 1977), pp. 31-296, passim;
Johnson to North American, Attn.: Sack, "Implementation of
recommended actions from Design Review Meeting, June 4 and 5,
1962," 15 June 1962, with enc., minutes of MSC-NAA Spacecraft
Design Review Meeting No. 3; Bothmer, OMSF Staff Meeting, 29 June
1962.<p>
<a name = "source24"><b>24</b>.</a> Johnson TWX to North American,
Attn.: Paup and Markley, 30 Jan. 1962; George P. Burrill III to Assoc.
Dir., MSC, "Visit to Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT),
December 19–29, 1961," 3 Jan. 1962.<p>
<a name = "source25"><b>25</b>.</a> Glenn F. Bailey, "Request for
Proposal No. 302, Feasibility Study for Project Apollo" [13 Sept.
1960], with attchs. A and B and enc., "General Requirements for a
Proposal for a Feasibility Study of an Advanced Manned Spacecraft";
Kehlet et al., "Notes on Project Apollo," p. 8; Johnson enc.,
minutes, Design Review Meeting No. 3; Thomas V. Chambers to Assoc. Dir.,
MSC, "Coordination Meetings with MIT personnel," 27 Nov. 1961;
MSC, ASPO Management Report for 16–23 April 1964.<p>
<a name = "source26"><b>26</b>.</a> MSC, abstract of proceedings,
Guidance and Control System Meeting No. 2, 7 June 1962; Robert D.
Weatherbee engineering memo to MSC, Attn.: Charles C. Lutz,
"Transmittal of NASA-MIT-Apollo Space Suit Assembly Contractor
Meeting dated December 5, 1962, HSER 2585-5," 22 Jan. 1963, with
enc., minutes of spacesuit navigation system optical interface meeting
between NASA, Hamilton Standard, International Latex Corp., and MIT at
Cambridge, Mass., 5 Dec. 1962; Project Apollo Quarterly Status Reports:
no. 2, for period ending 31 Dec. 1962, p. 12, and no. 3, for period
ending 31 March 1963, p. 29.<p>
<a name = "source27"><b>27</b>.</a> H. E. Van Ness to STG, Attn.: Robert
G. Chilton, "Apollo Navigation and Guidance Meetings," 13 Oct.
1961; <cite>Proceedings of the NASA-University Conference on the Science
and Technology of Space Exploration,</cite> Chicago, 1–3 Nov. 1962, NASA
SP-11, 2 vols. (Washington, 1962), papers 27 through 32.<p>
<a name = "source28"><b>28</b>.</a> Robert C. Seamans, Jr., to MSC,
Attn.: Gilruth, "Appointment of Evaluation Board," 31 Jan.
1962; Webb, "Statement Of the Administrator, [NASA], on Selection
of Contractors for Apollo Spacecraft Navigation and Guidance System MIT
Industrial Support," n.d.; NASA, "Contractors Selected for
Negotiations - Apollo Guidance System," news release 62-112, 8 May
1962.<p>
<a name = "source29"><b>29</b>.</a> Seamans to Admin., NASA, "Trip report
to Wakefield Laboratory of A. C. Spark Plug Co., July 16," 25 July
1962; Aaron Cohen, interview, Houston, 14 Jan, 1970.<p>
<a name = "source30"><b>30</b>.</a> MSC, "Establishment of the
Apollo Spacecraft Project Office," Announcement 10, 15 Jan. 1962;
"MSC Personality: C. W. Frick Heads Apollo Project," MSC Space
News Roundup, 7 March 1962. For a description of the decentralized
Manned Spacecraft Center when it first moved to Texas, see NASA-MSC
booklet, "Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, Texas: Interim
Facilities," 1 Aug. 1962.
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