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patches.patch
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patches.patch
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diff -ruwN orig/decidim/electionguard/common.py build/decidim/electionguard/common.py
--- orig/decidim/electionguard/common.py 2020-11-03 10:10:47.000000000 +0100
+++ build/decidim/electionguard/common.py 2020-10-28 15:25:36.000000000 +0100
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
#quorum: int
def build_election(self, election_creation ):
- self.election = ElectionDescription.from_json_object(complete_election_description(election_creation['description']))
+ self.election = ElectionDescription.from_json_object(complete_election_description(election_creation['description']), ElectionDescription)
if not self.election.is_valid():
raise InvalidElectionDescription()
diff -ruwN orig/decidim/electionguard/utils.py build/decidim/electionguard/utils.py
--- orig/decidim/electionguard/utils.py 2020-11-03 10:10:47.000000000 +0100
+++ build/decidim/electionguard/utils.py 2020-11-03 10:28:42.000000000 +0100
@@ -1,46 +1,7 @@
-from base64 import b64encode, b64decode
from electionguard.group import ElementModP, ElementModQ
import electionguard.serializable
-from gmpy2 import mpz
-# -- TEMPORARY MONKEYPATCH JSONS SERIALIZATION --
-old_set_serializers = electionguard.serializable.set_serializers
-old_set_deserializers = electionguard.serializable.set_deserializers
-electionguard.serializable.KEYS_TO_REMOVE += ['nonce'] # Remove nonces when serializing to JSON
-
-
-def set_serializers():
- old_set_serializers()
- electionguard.serializable.set_serializer(serialize_big_number, ElementModP)
- electionguard.serializable.set_serializer(serialize_big_number, ElementModQ)
-
-
-def set_deserializers():
- old_set_serializers()
- electionguard.serializable.set_deserializer(deserialize_big_number, ElementModP)
- electionguard.serializable.set_deserializer(deserialize_big_number, ElementModQ)
-
-
-electionguard.serializable.set_serializers = set_serializers
-electionguard.serializable.set_deserializers = set_deserializers
-# -----------------------------------------------
-
-
-def serialize_big_number(obj , **_):
- number = int(obj.to_int())
- return b64encode(
- number.to_bytes(
- (number.bit_length() + 7) // 8,
- byteorder='big'
- )
- ).decode('utf-8')
-
-
-def deserialize_big_number(obj, cls, **_):
- return cls(mpz(int.from_bytes(b64decode(obj), byteorder='big')))
-
-
-def serialize(obj, include_private = False):
+def serialize(obj, include_private: bool = False):
return electionguard.serializable.write_json_object(obj, not include_private)
@@ -49,7 +10,7 @@
def deserialize_key(obj):
- return deserialize_big_number(obj, ElementModP)
+ return electionguard.serializable.read_json_object(obj, ElementModP)
class InvalidElectionDescription(Exception):
@@ -67,24 +28,28 @@
def complete_election_description(election_description ) :
- complete_description = {
- **election_description,
+ complete_description = dict(election_description)
+ complete_description.update({
'contact_information': {
'address_line': [],
- 'name': 'Organization name',
+ '_name': 'Organization name',
'email': [{'annotation': 'contact', 'value': '[email protected]'}],
'phone': []
},
'election_scope_id': 'test-election',
- 'type': 'special',
+ '_type': {
+ '_name': 'special'
+ },
'geopolitical_units': [
{
'object_id': 'a-place',
- 'name': 'A place',
- 'type': 'county',
+ '_name': 'A place',
+ '_type': {
+ '_name': 'county',
+ },
'contact_information': {
'address_line': [],
- 'name': 'Organization name',
+ '_name': 'Organization name',
'email': [{'annotation': 'contact', 'value': '[email protected]'}]
},
'phone': []
@@ -97,7 +62,7 @@
'geopolitical_unit_ids': ['a-place']
}
]
- }
+ })
for contest in complete_description['contests']:
contest['electoral_district_id'] = 'a-place'
diff -ruwN orig/decidim/electionguard/voter.py build/decidim/electionguard/voter.py
--- orig/decidim/electionguard/voter.py 2020-11-03 10:10:47.000000000 +0100
+++ build/decidim/electionguard/voter.py 2020-11-02 16:30:32.000000000 +0100
@@ -5,7 +5,9 @@
from typing import List
from decidim.electionguard.common import Context, ElectionStep, Wrapper
from decidim.electionguard.utils import MissingJointKey, serialize, deserialize_key
+import BigInteger as bigInt
+mpz = bigInt
class VoterContext(Context):
has_joint_key = False
@@ -24,7 +26,6 @@
def process_message(self, message_type , message , context ):
joint_key = deserialize_key(message['joint_election_key'])
-
context.election_builder.set_public_key(get_optional(joint_key))
context.election_metadata, context.election_context = get_optional(context.election_builder.build())
context.has_joint_key = True
@@ -50,20 +51,12 @@
for selection in contest.ballot_selections
]
- contests.append(PlaintextBallotContest(contest.object_id, selections))
+ contests.append(PlaintextBallotContest(object_id = contest.object_id, ballot_selections = selections))
- plaintext_ballot = PlaintextBallot(self.ballot_id, ballot_style, contests)
+ plaintext_ballot = PlaintextBallot(object_id = self.ballot_id, ballot_style = ballot_style, contests = contests)
# TODO: store the audit information somewhere
- # return serialize(encrypt_ballot(
- # plaintext_ballot,
- # self.context.election_metadata,
- # self.context.election_context,
- # ElementModQ(0),
- # None,
- # True
- # ))
return encrypt_ballot(
plaintext_ballot,
self.context.election_metadata,
diff -ruwN orig/distutils.py build/distutils.py
--- orig/distutils.py 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ build/distutils.py 2020-10-28 15:25:36.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+class Util:
+ def strtobool(str):
+ return int(str) == 1
+
+util = Util()
\ No newline at end of file
diff -ruwN orig/electionguard/ballot.py build/electionguard/ballot.py
--- orig/electionguard/ballot.py 2020-11-03 10:10:47.000000000 +0100
+++ build/electionguard/ballot.py 2020-11-02 16:55:52.000000000 +0100
@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
from dataclasses import dataclass, field, replace
from datetime import datetime
-from distutils import util
from enum import Enum
-from typing import Any, List, Optional, Protocol, runtime_checkable, Sequence
from electionguard.chaum_pedersen import (
ConstantChaumPedersenProof,
@@ -15,9 +13,12 @@
from electionguard.group import add_q, ElementModP, ElementModQ, ZERO_MOD_Q
from electionguard.hash import CryptoHashCheckable, hash_elems
from electionguard.logs import log_warning
+from electionguard.nonces import Nonces
+from electionguard.proof import Proof
from electionguard.tracker import get_rotating_tracker_hash, tracker_hash_to_words
from electionguard.utils import to_ticks, flatmap_optional
+__pragma__ ('kwargs')
def _list_eq(
list1 , list2
@@ -63,7 +64,11 @@
discarded when encrypting.
"""
- #vote: str
+ _types = [
+ ["vote", str],
+ ["is_placeholder_selection", bool],
+ ["extended_data", ExtendedData]
+ ]
is_placeholder_selection = field(default=False)
"""Determines if this is a placeholder selection"""
@@ -101,17 +106,21 @@
:return: an integer 0 or 1 for valid data, or 0 if the data is malformed
"""
- as_bool = False
- try:
- as_bool = util.strtobool(self.vote.lower())
- except ValueError:
+ vote_lower = str(self.vote).lower()
+ as_int = {
+ "y": 1, "yes": 1, "true": 1, "on": 1, "1": 1,
+ "n": 0, "no": 0, "f": 0, "false": 0, "off": 0, "0": 0
+ }.get(vote_lower)
+
+ if as_int is None:
log_warning(
- f"to_int could not convert plaintext: {self.vote.lower()} to bool"
+ f"to_int could not convert plaintext: {vote_lower} to bool"
)
+ as_int = 0
# TODO: ISSUE #33: If the boolean coercion above fails, support integer votes
# greater than 1 for cases such as cumulative voting
- as_int = int(as_bool)
+ # as_int = int(as_bool)
return as_int
def __eq__(self, other ) :
@@ -127,8 +136,7 @@
return not self.__eq__(other)
-@runtime_checkable
-class CiphertextSelection(Protocol):
+class CiphertextSelection:
"""
Encrypted selection
"""
@@ -170,14 +178,21 @@
By keeping the `proof` the nonce is not required fotor verify the encrypted selection.
"""
- #description_hash: ElementModQ
- """The SelectionDescription hash"""
-
- #ciphertext: ElGamalCiphertext
- """The encrypted representation of the vote field"""
-
- #crypto_hash: ElementModQ
- """The hash of the encrypted values"""
+ _types = [
+ ["description_hash", ElementModQ],
+ # """The SelectionDescription hash"""
+
+ ["ciphertext", ElGamalCiphertext],
+ # """The encrypted representation of the vote field"""
+
+ ["crypto_hash", ElementModQ],
+ # """The hash of the encrypted values"""
+
+ ["is_placeholder_selection", bool],
+ ["nonce", Nonces],
+ ["proof", Proof],
+ ["extended_data", ExtendedData]
+ ]
is_placeholder_selection = field(default=False)
"""Determines if this is a placeholder selection"""
@@ -216,7 +231,7 @@
return False
recalculated_crypto_hash = self.crypto_hash_with(seed_hash)
- if self.crypto_hash != recalculated_crypto_hash:
+ if self.crypto_hash.__ne__(recalculated_crypto_hash):
log_warning(
f"mismatching crypto hash: {self.object_id} expected({str(recalculated_crypto_hash)}), actual({str(self.crypto_hash)})"
)
@@ -317,6 +332,10 @@
while complete contests are passed into ElectionGuard when running encryption on an existing dataset.
"""
+ _types = [
+ ["ballot_selections", [PlaintextBallotSelection]]
+ ]
+
ballot_selections = field(
default_factory=lambda: []
)
@@ -349,6 +368,7 @@
number_elected = 0
votes = 0
+
# Verify the selections are well-formed
for selection in self.ballot_selections:
selection_count = selection.to_int()
@@ -394,14 +414,19 @@
then it is required in order to regenerate the proof.
"""
- #description_hash: ElementModQ
- """Hash from contestDescription"""
+ _types = [
+ ["description_hash", ElementModQ],
+ #"""Hash from contestDescription"""
- #ballot_selections: List[CiphertextBallotSelection]
- """Collection of ballot selections"""
+ ["ballot_selections", [CiphertextBallotSelection]],
+ #"""Collection of ballot selections"""
- #crypto_hash: ElementModQ
- """Hash of the encrypted values"""
+ ["crypto_hash", ElementModQ],
+ #"""Hash of the encrypted values"""
+
+ ["nonce", Nonces],
+ ["proof", Proof]
+ ]
nonce = None
"""The nonce used to generate the encryption. Sensitive & should be treated as a secret"""
@@ -471,6 +496,7 @@
Specifically, the seed hash in this context is the hash of the ContestDescription,
or whatever `ElementModQ` was used to populate the `description_hash` field.
"""
+
if seed_hash != self.description_hash:
log_warning(
f"mismatching contest hash: {self.object_id} expected({str(seed_hash)}), actual({str(self.description_hash)})"
@@ -478,7 +504,7 @@
return False
recalculated_crypto_hash = self.crypto_hash_with(seed_hash)
- if self.crypto_hash != recalculated_crypto_hash:
+ if self.crypto_hash.__ne__(recalculated_crypto_hash):
log_warning(
f"mismatching crypto hash: {self.object_id} expected({str(recalculated_crypto_hash)}), actual({str(self.crypto_hash)})"
)
@@ -490,6 +516,8 @@
log_warning(f"no proof exists for: {self.object_id}")
return False
+
+
# Verify the sum of the selections matches the proof
elgamal_accumulation = self.elgamal_accumulate()
return self.proof.is_valid(
@@ -588,11 +616,13 @@
:field object_id: A unique Ballot ID that is relevant to the external system
"""
- #ballot_style: str
- """The `object_id` of the `BallotStyle` in the `Election` Manifest"""
+ _types = [
+ ["ballot_style", str],
+ # """The `object_id` of the `BallotStyle` in the `Election` Manifest"""
- #contests: List[PlaintextBallotContest]
- """The list of contests for this ballot"""
+ ["contests", [PlaintextBallotContest]]
+ # """The list of contests for this ballot"""
+ ]
def is_valid(self, expected_ballot_style_id ) :
"""
@@ -632,29 +662,31 @@
:field object_id: A unique Ballot ID that is relevant to the external system
"""
- #ballot_style: str
- """The `object_id` of the `BallotStyle` in the `Election` Manifest"""
+ _types = [
+ ["ballot_style", str],
+ #"""The `object_id` of the `BallotStyle` in the `Election` Manifest"""
- #description_hash: ElementModQ
- """Hash of the election metadata"""
+ ["description_hash", ElementModQ],
+ #"""Hash of the election metadata"""
- #previous_tracking_hash: ElementModQ
- """Previous tracking hash or seed hash"""
+ ["previous_tracking_hash", ElementModQ],
+ #"""Previous tracking hash or seed hash"""
- #contests: List[CiphertextBallotContest]
- """List of contests for this ballot"""
+ ["contests", [CiphertextBallotContest]],
+ #"""List of contests for this ballot"""
- #tracking_hash: Optional[ElementModQ]
- """Unique ballot tracking hash for this ballot"""
+ ["tracking_hash", [ElementModQ]],
+ #"""Unique ballot tracking hash for this ballot"""
- #timestamp: int
- """Timestamp at which the ballot encryption is generated in tick"""
+ ["timestamp", int],
+ #"""Timestamp at which the ballot encryption is generated in tick"""
- #crypto_hash: ElementModQ
- """The hash of the encrypted ballot representation"""
+ ["crypto_hash", ElementModQ],
+ #"""The hash of the encrypted ballot representation"""
- #nonce: Optional[ElementModQ]
- """The nonce used to encrypt this ballot. Sensitive & should be treated as a secret"""
+ ["nonce", [ElementModQ]]
+ #"""The nonce used to encrypt this ballot. Sensitive & should be treated as a secret"""
+ ]
def __eq__(self, other ) :
return (
@@ -747,7 +779,7 @@
return False
recalculated_crypto_hash = self.crypto_hash_with(seed_hash)
- if self.crypto_hash != recalculated_crypto_hash:
+ if self.crypto_hash.__ne__(recalculated_crypto_hash):
log_warning(
f"mismatching crypto hash: {self.object_id} expected({str(recalculated_crypto_hash)}), actual({str(self.crypto_hash)})"
)
@@ -812,7 +844,7 @@
def __eq__(self, other ) :
return (
isinstance(other, CiphertextAcceptedBallot)
- and super.__eq__(self, other)
+ and super().__eq__(self, other)
and self.state == other.state
)
diff -ruwN orig/electionguard/chaum_pedersen.py build/electionguard/chaum_pedersen.py
--- orig/electionguard/chaum_pedersen.py 2020-11-03 10:10:47.000000000 +0100
+++ build/electionguard/chaum_pedersen.py 2020-11-03 09:50:06.000000000 +0100
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
from electionguard.nonces import Nonces
from electionguard.proof import Proof, ProofUsage
+__pragma__ ('kwargs')
+
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class DisjunctiveChaumPedersenProof(Proof):
@@ -47,8 +49,16 @@
usage = ProofUsage.SelectionValue
"""a description of how to use this proof"""
- def __post_init__(self) :
- super().__init__()
+ def __init__(self, proof_zero_pad, proof_zero_data, proof_one_pad, proof_one_data, proof_zero_challenge, proof_one_challenge, challenge, proof_zero_response, proof_one_response) :
+ self.proof_zero_pad = proof_zero_pad
+ self.proof_zero_data = proof_zero_data
+ self.proof_one_pad = proof_one_pad
+ self.proof_one_data = proof_one_data
+ self.proof_zero_challenge = proof_zero_challenge
+ self.proof_one_challenge = proof_one_challenge
+ self.challenge = challenge
+ self.proof_zero_response = proof_zero_response
+ self.proof_one_response = proof_one_response
def is_valid(
self, message , k , q
@@ -62,7 +72,7 @@
:return: True if everything is consistent. False otherwise.
"""
- (alpha, beta) = message
+ (alpha, beta) = message.tuple()
a0 = self.proof_zero_pad
b0 = self.proof_zero_data
a1 = self.proof_one_pad
@@ -82,13 +92,13 @@
in_bounds_c1 = c1.is_in_bounds()
in_bounds_v0 = v0.is_in_bounds()
in_bounds_v1 = v1.is_in_bounds()
- consistent_c = add_q(c0, c1) == c == hash_elems(q, alpha, beta, a0, b0, a1, b1)
- consistent_gv0 = g_pow_p(v0) == mult_p(a0, pow_p(alpha, c0))
- consistent_gv1 = g_pow_p(v1) == mult_p(a1, pow_p(alpha, c1))
- consistent_kv0 = pow_p(k, v0) == mult_p(b0, pow_p(beta, c0))
- consistent_gc1kv1 = mult_p(g_pow_p(c1), pow_p(k, v1)) == mult_p(
+ consistent_c = add_q(c0, c1).__eq__(c) and c.__eq__(hash_elems(q, alpha, beta, a0, b0, a1, b1))
+ consistent_gv0 = g_pow_p(v0).__eq__(mult_p(a0, pow_p(alpha, c0)))
+ consistent_gv1 = g_pow_p(v1).__eq__(mult_p(a1, pow_p(alpha, c1)))
+ consistent_kv0 = pow_p(k, v0).__eq__(mult_p(b0, pow_p(beta, c0)))
+ consistent_gc1kv1 = mult_p(g_pow_p(c1), pow_p(k, v1)).__eq__(mult_p(
b1, pow_p(beta, c1)
- )
+ ))
success = (
in_bounds_alpha
@@ -153,8 +163,11 @@
usage = ProofUsage.SecretValue
"""a description of how to use this proof"""
- def __post_init__(self) :
- super().__init__()
+ def __init__(self, pad, data, challenge, response) :
+ self.pad = pad
+ self.data = data
+ self.challenge = challenge
+ self.response = response
def is_valid(
self,
@@ -178,7 +191,7 @@
:param q: The extended base hash of the election
:return: True if everything is consistent. False otherwise.
"""
- (alpha, beta) = message
+ (alpha, beta) = message.tuple()
a = self.pad
b = self.data
c = self.challenge
@@ -193,14 +206,14 @@
in_bounds_v = v.is_in_bounds()
in_bounds_q = q.is_in_bounds()
- same_c = c == hash_elems(q, alpha, beta, a, b, m)
+ same_c = c.__eq__(hash_elems(q, alpha, beta, a, b, m))
consistent_gv = (
in_bounds_v
and in_bounds_a
and in_bounds_c
and in_bounds_v
# The equation 𝑔^𝑣𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖𝐾^𝑐𝑖
- and g_pow_p(v) == mult_p(a, pow_p(k, c))
+ and g_pow_p(v).__eq__(mult_p(a, pow_p(k, c)))
)
# The equation 𝐴^𝑣𝑖 = 𝑏𝑖𝑀𝑖^𝑐𝑖 mod 𝑝
@@ -209,7 +222,7 @@
and in_bounds_b
and in_bounds_c
and in_bounds_v
- and pow_p(alpha, v) == mult_p(b, pow_p(m, c))
+ and pow_p(alpha, v).__eq__(mult_p(b, pow_p(m, c)))
)
success = (
@@ -272,8 +285,12 @@
usage = ProofUsage.SelectionLimit
"""a description of how to use this proof"""
- def __post_init__(self) :
- super().__init__()
+ def __init__(self, pad, data, challenge, response, constant) :
+ self.pad = pad
+ self.data = data
+ self.challenge = challenge
+ self.response = response
+ self.constant = constant
def is_valid(
self, message , k , q
@@ -288,7 +305,7 @@
:return: True if everything is consistent. False otherwise.
"""
- (alpha, beta) = message
+ (alpha, beta) = message.tuple()
a = self.pad
b = self.data
c = self.challenge
@@ -311,20 +328,20 @@
# this is an arbitrary constant check to verify that decryption will be performant
# in some use cases this value may need to be increased
sane_constant = 0 <= constant < 1_000_000_000
- same_c = c == hash_elems(q, alpha, beta, a, b)
+ same_c = c.__eq__(hash_elems(q, alpha, beta, a, b))
consistent_gv = (
in_bounds_v
and in_bounds_a
and in_bounds_alpha
and in_bounds_c
# The equation 𝑔^𝑉 = 𝑎𝐴^𝐶 mod 𝑝
- and g_pow_p(v) == mult_p(a, pow_p(alpha, c))
+ and g_pow_p(v).__eq__(mult_p(a, pow_p(alpha, c)))
)
# The equation 𝑔^𝐿𝐾^𝑣 = 𝑏𝐵^𝐶 mod 𝑝
consistent_kv = in_bounds_constant and mult_p(
g_pow_p(mult_p(c, constant_q)), pow_p(k, v)
- ) == mult_p(b, pow_p(beta, c))
+ ).__eq__(mult_p(b, pow_p(beta, c)))
success = (
in_bounds_alpha
@@ -385,7 +402,6 @@
:param seed: Used to generate other random values here
:param plaintext: Zero or one
"""
-
assert (
0 <= plaintext <= 1
), "make_disjunctive_chaum_pedersen only supports plaintexts of 0 or 1"
@@ -412,10 +428,10 @@
usually the election extended base hash (𝑄')
:param seed: Used to generate other random values here
"""
- (alpha, beta) = message
+ (alpha, beta) = message.tuple()
# Pick three random numbers in Q.
- c1, v1, u0 = Nonces(seed, "disjoint-chaum-pedersen-proof")[0:3]
+ c1, v1, u0 = Nonces(seed, "disjoint-chaum-pedersen-proof").get_slice(0, 3)
# Compute the NIZKP
a0 = g_pow_p(u0)
@@ -447,10 +463,10 @@
usually the election extended base hash (𝑄')
:param seed: Used to generate other random values here
"""
- (alpha, beta) = message
+ (alpha, beta) = message.tuple()
# Pick three random numbers in Q.
- c0, v0, u1 = Nonces(seed, "disjoint-chaum-pedersen-proof")[0:3]
+ c0, v0, u1 = Nonces(seed, "disjoint-chaum-pedersen-proof").get_slice(0, 3)
# Compute the NIZKP
q_minus_c0 = negate_q(c0)
@@ -483,10 +499,10 @@
:param hash_header: A value used when generating the challenge,
usually the election extended base hash (𝑄')
"""
- (alpha, beta) = message
+ (alpha, beta) = message.tuple()
# Pick one random number in Q.
- u = Nonces(seed, "constant-chaum-pedersen-proof")[0]
+ u = Nonces(seed, "constant-chaum-pedersen-proof").get(0)
a = g_pow_p(u) # 𝑔^𝑢𝑖 mod 𝑝
b = pow_p(alpha, u) # 𝐴^𝑢𝑖 mod 𝑝
c = hash_elems(hash_header, alpha, beta, a, b, m) # sha256(𝑄', A, B, a𝑖, b𝑖, 𝑀𝑖)
@@ -514,10 +530,10 @@
:param hash_header: A value used when generating the challenge,
usually the election extended base hash (𝑄')
"""
- (alpha, beta) = message
+ (alpha, beta) = message.tuple()
# Pick one random number in Q.
- u = Nonces(seed, "constant-chaum-pedersen-proof")[0]
+ u = Nonces(seed, "constant-chaum-pedersen-proof").get(0)
a = g_pow_p(u) # 𝑔^𝑢𝑖 mod 𝑝
b = pow_p(k, u) # 𝐴^𝑢𝑖 mod 𝑝
c = hash_elems(hash_header, alpha, beta, a, b) # sha256(𝑄', A, B, a, b)
diff -ruwN orig/electionguard/dlog.py build/electionguard/dlog.py
--- orig/electionguard/dlog.py 2020-11-03 10:10:47.000000000 +0100
+++ build/electionguard/dlog.py 2020-10-28 15:25:51.000000000 +0100
@@ -1,8 +1,5 @@
# support for computing discrete logs, with a cache so they're never recomputed
-import asyncio
-from typing import Dict, Optional
-
from electionguard.group import G, ElementModP, ONE_MOD_P, mult_p, int_to_p_unchecked
__dlog_cache = {ONE_MOD_P: 0}
@@ -30,20 +27,14 @@
if e in __dlog_cache:
return __dlog_cache[e]
else:
- return asyncio.run(__discrete_log_internal(e))
+ return __discrete_log_internal(e)
async def __discrete_log_internal(e ) :
global __dlog_cache
global __dlog_max_elem
global __dlog_max_exp
- global __dlog_lock
-
- if __dlog_lock is None:
- # Initialize the lock on on first function call per process
- __dlog_lock = asyncio.Lock()
- async with __dlog_lock:
g = int_to_p_unchecked(G)
while e != __dlog_max_elem:
__dlog_max_exp = __dlog_max_exp + 1
diff -ruwN orig/electionguard/election.py build/electionguard/election.py
--- orig/electionguard/election.py 2020-11-03 10:10:47.000000000 +0100
+++ build/electionguard/election.py 2020-10-30 10:15:50.000000000 +0100
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
from dataclasses import dataclass, field, InitVar
from datetime import datetime
from enum import Enum, unique
-from typing import cast, List, Optional, Set, Any
from electionguard.ballot import _list_eq
from electionguard.election_object_base import ElectionObjectBase
@@ -11,6 +10,7 @@
from electionguard.serializable import Serializable
from electionguard.utils import get_optional, to_ticks
+__pragma__ ('kwargs')
@unique
class ElectionType(Enum):
@@ -129,6 +129,9 @@
Data entity used to represent multi-national text. Use when text on a ballot contains multi-national text.
See: https://developers.google.com/elections-data/reference/internationalized-text
"""
+ _types = [
+ ["text", [Language]]
+ ]
text = field(default_factory=lambda: [])
@@ -145,17 +148,23 @@
For defining contact information about objects such as persons, boards of authorities, and organizations.
See: https://developers.google.com/elections-data/reference/contact-information
"""
+ _types = [
+ ["address_line", [str]],
+ ["email", [AnnotatedString]],
+ ["phone", [AnnotatedString]],
+ ["_name", str]
+ ]
address_line = field(default=None)
email = field(default=None)
phone = field(default=None)
- name = field(default=None)
+ _name = field(default=None)
def crypto_hash(self) :
"""
A hash representation of the object
"""
- return hash_elems(self.name, self.address_line, self.email, self.phone)
+ return hash_elems(self._name, self.address_line, self.email, self.phone)
@dataclass(eq=True, unsafe_hash=True)
@@ -166,8 +175,12 @@
See: https://developers.google.com/elections-data/reference/gp-unit
"""
- #name: str
- #type: ReportingUnitType
+ _types = [
+ ["_name", str],
+ ["_type", ReportingUnitType],
+ ["contact_information", ContactInformation]
+ ]
+
contact_information = field(default=None)
def crypto_hash(self) :
@@ -175,7 +188,7 @@
A hash representation of the object
"""
return hash_elems(
- self.object_id, self.name, str(self.type.name), self.contact_information
+ self.object_id, self._name, str(self._type._name), self.contact_information
)
@@ -185,6 +198,12 @@
A BallotStyle works as a key to uniquely specify a set of contests. See also `ContestDescription`.
"""
+ _types = [
+ ["geopolitical_unit_ids", [str]],
+ ["party_ids", "Optional"],
+ ["image_uri", str]
+ ]
+
geopolitical_unit_ids = field(default=None)
party_ids = field(default=None)
image_uri = field(default=None)
@@ -205,6 +224,13 @@
See: https://developers.google.com/elections-data/reference/party
"""
+ _types = [
+ ["ballot_name", InternationalizedText],
+ ["abbreviation", str],
+ ["color", str],
+ ["logo_uri", str]
+ ]
+
ballot_name = field(default=InternationalizedText())
abbreviation = field(default=None)
color = field(default=None)
@@ -241,6 +267,13 @@
selections for the contest. See the wiki, readme's, and tests in this repo for more info
"""
+ _types = [
+ ["ballot_name", InternationalizedText],
+ ["party_id", str],
+ ["image_uri", str],
+ ["is_write_in", bool],
+ ]
+
ballot_name = field(default=InternationalizedText())
party_id = field(default=None)
image_uri = field(default=None)
@@ -276,8 +309,11 @@
however that information is not captured by default when encrypting a specific ballot.
"""
- #candidate_id: str
- #sequence_order: int
+ _types = [
+ ["candidate_id", str],
+ ["sequence_order", int]
+ ]
+
"""
Used for ordering selections in a contest to ensure various encryption primitives are deterministic.
The sequence order must be unique and should be representative of how the contests are represnted
@@ -305,28 +341,33 @@
however that information is not captured by default when encrypting a specific ballot.
"""
- #electoral_district_id: str
- #sequence_order: int
- """
- Used for ordering contests in a ballot to ensure various encryption primitives are deterministic.
- The sequence order must be unique and should be representative of how the contests are represnted
- on a "master" ballot in an external system. The sequence order is not required to be in the order
- in which they are displayed to a voter. Any acceptable range of integer values may be provided.
- """
+ _types = [
+ ["electoral_district_id", str],
+ ["sequence_order", int],
+
+ # Used for ordering contests in a ballot to ensure various encryption primitives are deterministic.
+ # The sequence order must be unique and should be representative of how the contests are represnted
+ # on a "master" ballot in an external system. The sequence order is not required to be in the order
+ # in which they are displayed to a voter. Any acceptable range of integer values may be provided.
- #vote_variation: VoteVariationType
+ ["vote_variation", VoteVariationType],
# Number of candidates that are elected in the contest ("n" of n-of-m).
# Note: a referendum is considered a specific case of 1-of-m in ElectionGuard
- #number_elected: int
+ ["number_elected", int],
# Maximum number of votes/write-ins per voter in this contest. Used in cumulative voting
# to indicate how many total votes a voter can spread around. In n-of-m elections, this will
# be None.
- #votes_allowed: Optional[int]
+ ["votes_allowed", "Optional"], # TODO: not the correct type
# Name of the contest, not necessarily as it appears on the ballot.
- #name: str
+ ["_name", str],
+
+ ["ballot_selections", [SelectionDescription]],
+ ["ballot_title", InternationalizedText],
+ ["ballot_subtitle", InternationalizedText]
+ ]
# For associating a ballot selection for the contest, i.e., a candidate, a ballot measure.
ballot_selections = field(default_factory=lambda: [])
@@ -345,7 +386,7 @@
and self.votes_allowed == other.votes_allowed
and self.number_elected == other.number_elected
and self.votes_allowed == other.votes_allowed
- and self.name == other.name
+ and self._name == other._name
and _list_eq(self.ballot_selections, other.ballot_selections)
and self.ballot_title == other.ballot_title
and self.ballot_subtitle == other.ballot_subtitle
@@ -363,10 +404,10 @@
self.object_id,
self.sequence_order,
self.electoral_district_id,
- str(self.vote_variation.name),
+ str(self.vote_variation._name),
self.ballot_title,
self.ballot_subtitle,
- self.name,
+ self._name,
self.number_elected,
self.votes_allowed,
self.ballot_selections,
@@ -531,23 +572,28 @@
See: https://developers.google.com/elections-data/reference/election
"""
- #election_scope_id: str
- #type: ElectionType
- #start_date: datetime
- #end_date: datetime
- #geopolitical_units: List[GeopoliticalUnit]
- #parties: List[Party]
- #candidates: List[Candidate]
- #contests: List[ContestDescription]
- #ballot_styles: List[BallotStyle]
- name = field(default=None)
+ _types = [
+ ["election_scope_id", str],
+ ["_type", ElectionType],
+ ["start_date", datetime],
+ ["end_date", datetime],
+ ["geopolitical_units", [GeopoliticalUnit]],
+ ["parties", [Party]],
+ ["candidates", [Candidate]],
+ ["contests", [ContestDescription]],
+ ["ballot_styles", [BallotStyle]],
+ ["_name", InternationalizedText],
+ ["contact_information", ContactInformation]
+ ]
+
+ _name = field(default=None)
contact_information = field(default=None)
def __eq__(self, other ) :
return (
isinstance(other, ElectionDescription)
and self.election_scope_id == other.election_scope_id
- and self.type == other.type
+ and self._type == other._type
and self.start_date == other.start_date
and self.end_date == other.end_date
and _list_eq(self.geopolitical_units, other.geopolitical_units)
@@ -555,7 +601,7 @@
and _list_eq(self.candidates, other.candidates)
and _list_eq(self.contests, other.contests)
and _list_eq(self.ballot_styles, other.ballot_styles)
- and self.name == other.name
+ and self._name == other._name
and self.contact_information == other.contact_information
)
@@ -563,13 +609,12 @@
"""
Returns a hash of the metadata components of the election
"""
-
return hash_elems(
self.election_scope_id,
- str(self.type.name),
+ str(self._type._name),
to_ticks(self.start_date),
to_ticks(self.end_date),
- self.name,
+ self._name,
self.contact_information,
self.geopolitical_units,
self.parties,
@@ -739,13 +784,12 @@
description_hash = field(init=False)
- def __post_init__(self, description ) :
- object.__setattr__(self, "description_hash", description.crypto_hash())
- object.__setattr__(self, "geopolitical_units", description.geopolitical_units)
- object.__setattr__(self, "ballot_styles", description.ballot_styles)
- object.__setattr__(
- self, "contests", self._generate_contests_with_placeholders(description)
- )
+ def __init__(self, description ) :
+ # TO-DO: why the post_init and the __setattr__ thing?
+ self.description_hash = description.crypto_hash()
+ self.geopolitical_units = description.geopolitical_units
+ self.ballot_styles = description.ballot_styles
+ self.contests = self._generate_contests_with_placeholders(description)
def contest_for(
self, contest_id
@@ -844,26 +888,25 @@
`make_ciphertext_election_context` instead.
"""
- #number_of_guardians: int
- """
- The number of guardians necessary to generate the public key
- """
- #quorum: int
- """
- The quorum of guardians necessary to decrypt an election. Must be less than `number_of_guardians`
- """
+ _types = [
+ ["number_of_guardians", int],
+ #The number of guardians necessary to generate the public key
+
+ ["quorum", int],
+ #The quorum of guardians necessary to decrypt an election. Must be less than `number_of_guardians`
# the `joint public key (K)` in the [ElectionGuard Spec](https://github.com/microsoft/electionguard/wiki)
- #elgamal_public_key: ElementModP