Potential Denial-of-Service (DoS) in Timelock pause Function

[howlbot-integration]

Lines of code

https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-10-kleidi/blob/ab89bcb443249e1524496b694ddb19e298dca799/src/Timelock.sol#L687-L698

Vulnerability details

Proof of Concept

The current implementation of the pause function attempts to cancel all live proposals within a single transaction:

function pause() public override {
    super.pause();

    bytes32[] memory proposals = _liveProposals.values();
    for (uint256 i = 0; i < proposals.length; i++) {
        bytes32 id = proposals[i];
        delete timestamps[id];
        assert(_liveProposals.remove(id));
        emit Cancelled(id);
    }
}

This implementation is vulnerable to a DoS attack in the following scenario:

1. An attacker creates numerous small proposals, inflating the _liveProposals set.
2. The number of proposals becomes so large that the gas required to process all of them in the pause function exceeds the block gas limit.
   As a result, it becomes impossible to pause the contract, potentially leaving it in a vulnerable state during emergencies

Recommended Mitigation Steps

Separate the pausing mechanism from the proposal cancellation process

Assessed type

DoS

[c4-judge]

GalloDaSballo marked the issue as partial-75