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Nitpicking over the threat model and "breaking Pond" #185

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sycamoreone opened this issue May 23, 2015 · 0 comments

sycamoreone commented May 23, 2015

The Technical documentation states that

Pond assumes the existence of an overlay network that prevents a network attacker from learning which servers a user is connecting to. [...]
Since a global, passive attacker can deanonymise Tor, that attacker is capable of violating this assumption and breaking Pond.

This is unfortunately true but not actually a "break of Pond" according to the threat model, which allows that

A GPA can learn who is using Pond and where their home servers are located.

A GPA can learn when messages are sent to a non-home server and which server that is.

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