diff --git a/content/sccp/sccp-103.md b/content/sccp/sccp-103.md index aacf2764c..d23489be3 100644 --- a/content/sccp/sccp-103.md +++ b/content/sccp/sccp-103.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Setting the minting fee at 2% will effectively raise the cost of minting new sUS -The primary motivation is to control the supply of synths in expectation of ramping up the cap of the wrappr and a significant reduction on `mintFeeRate`. Increasing minting fee on ETH backed loans will allow us to implement [SCCP-99](https://sips.synthetix.io/SCCP/sccp-99) and allow participants to continue to open up new short positions without opening up a gap that allows arbitragers to front-run the wrapper paramater update. +The primary motivation is to control the supply of synths in expectation of ramping up the cap of the wrappr and a significant reduction on `mintFeeRate`. Increasing minting fee on ETH backed loans will allow us to implement [SCCP-99](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-99) and allow participants to continue to open up new short positions without opening up a gap that allows arbitragers to front-run the wrapper paramater update. That said, the minting fee on ETH backed loans will be reduced back to the original fee of 10 bp, once wrappr is fully deployed. ## Copyright diff --git a/content/sccp/sccp-128.md b/content/sccp/sccp-128.md index 5aa6f2560..0073467e0 100644 --- a/content/sccp/sccp-128.md +++ b/content/sccp/sccp-128.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Given the state of the peg, this sccp proposes to decrease the target collateral -The peg continues to be pressured as can be seen [here](https://www.curve.fi/trade/susdv2/SUSD-USDC/4h), this is mostly due to the reasons mentioned in [SCCP-127](https://sips.synthetix.io/SCCP/sccp-127). As can be seen on [stats](https://stats.synthetix.io/), the active c-ratio is 310%, the sUSD APY is above 10% and the SNX Staking APY at 40%, this means that a large proportion of minters are foregoing claiming all together. +The peg continues to be pressured as can be seen [here](https://www.curve.fi/trade/susdv2/SUSD-USDC/4h), this is mostly due to the reasons mentioned in [SCCP-127](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-127). As can be seen on [stats](https://stats.synthetix.io/), the active c-ratio is 310%, the sUSD APY is above 10% and the SNX Staking APY at 40%, this means that a large proportion of minters are foregoing claiming all together. This SCCP proposes to provide minters with some relief, by allowing them to acquire synths more cheaply and have them need to burn less sUSD in order to get their accounts in order. ## Copyright diff --git a/content/sccp/sccp-33.md b/content/sccp/sccp-33.md index 7fc5849c2..7b056726d 100644 --- a/content/sccp/sccp-33.md +++ b/content/sccp/sccp-33.md @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ This is the template for SCCPs. If no bids have been placed yet the market creator should be able to undo the market and take back the sUSD he put into it. -Superceded by [SIP-71](../SIPS/sip-71.md). +Superceded by [SIP-71](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-71/). ## Abstract diff --git a/content/sccp/sccp-5.md b/content/sccp/sccp-5.md index 639f41647..943468511 100644 --- a/content/sccp/sccp-5.md +++ b/content/sccp/sccp-5.md @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ type: Governance -The [sETH arb pool](0xA6B5E74466eDc95D0b6e65c5CBFcA0a676d893a4) has been drained very quickly over the last few weeks. There are several reasons for this, the first is that some of the front-running bots are using it as a way of clearing out excess sETH profits they are holding. On the face of it this might seem like a less than ideal situation. But the reality is that the arb pool is absorbing excess supply directly that would otherwise be absorbed into the sETH pool itself impacting the peg. By increasing the supply to the arb contract we can more quickly absorb this excess supply of sETH and tighten the peg, in combination with proposal 1 to change the window where users can be undercollateralised without being penalised this should exert upward pressure on the peg. +The sETH arb pool, 0xA6B5E74466eDc95D0b6e65c5CBFcA0a676d893a4, has been drained very quickly over the last few weeks. There are several reasons for this, the first is that some of the front-running bots are using it as a way of clearing out excess sETH profits they are holding. On the face of it this might seem like a less than ideal situation. But the reality is that the arb pool is absorbing excess supply directly that would otherwise be absorbed into the sETH pool itself impacting the peg. By increasing the supply to the arb contract we can more quickly absorb this excess supply of sETH and tighten the peg, in combination with proposal 1 to change the window where users can be undercollateralised without being penalised this should exert upward pressure on the peg. ## Abstract diff --git a/content/sccp/sccp-55.md b/content/sccp/sccp-55.md index 09173bd80..1ac2babf0 100644 --- a/content/sccp/sccp-55.md +++ b/content/sccp/sccp-55.md @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ This SCCP proposes changing the debt snapshot stale time to 12 hours. -Following on from [SCCP-52](sccp-52.md), the pDAO will call [`SystemSettings.setDebtSnapshotStaleTime(43800)`](https://etherscan.io/address/0x703D37fb776A4C905e28f7Ff23C73102ce36E08B#writeContract). +Following on from [SCCP-52](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-52/), the pDAO will call [`SystemSettings.setDebtSnapshotStaleTime(43800)`](https://etherscan.io/address/0x703D37fb776A4C905e28f7Ff23C73102ce36E08B#writeContract). Note that the argument corresponds to 12 hours and 10 minutes, allows the keeper bot 10 minutes of leeway to mine transactions while maintaining a 12 hour snapshot frequency. The keeper bot will still take snapshots earlier than 12 hours if the deviation exceeds its configured diff --git a/content/sccp/sccp-57.md b/content/sccp/sccp-57.md index 0e83fb0c6..a03ee42a6 100644 --- a/content/sccp/sccp-57.md +++ b/content/sccp/sccp-57.md @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ The changes proposed are listed below: The monitoring of Chainlink oracles shows that it would be sufficient to mitigate frontrunning opportunities with a fee reclamation window of 3 minutes. The Chainlink team has worked to ensure that price deviations are updated within the reclamation window. -The current fee reclamation window was set to 5 minutes in [SCCP-43](.sccp-43.md) to monitor the Chainlink oracles and was intended at the time to eventually reduce the window back to 3 minutes as soon as possible. +The current fee reclamation window was set to 5 minutes in [SCCP-43](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-43/) to monitor the Chainlink oracles and was intended at the time to eventually reduce the window back to 3 minutes as soon as possible. A lower fee reclamation window improves the UX for traders trading on Synthetix exchange and other synth exchange products on L1. diff --git a/content/sccp/sccp-84.md b/content/sccp/sccp-84.md index c248dd226..39f38ec83 100644 --- a/content/sccp/sccp-84.md +++ b/content/sccp/sccp-84.md @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ The fee can be decrease to 40 bp without exposing inefficiencies in the oracle p The fee were originally levied this high in order to counter a front-running gap. However with the price-adjustment waiting period increase to 6 minutes, the fees can be lowered safely without exposing minters to the risk of front-running. However, incoming data will be reviewed, and action will be taken by the council if front-running pockets were found. -Note that this sccp supercedes [sccp-80](https://sips.synthetix.io/SCCP/sccp-80) on the iETH rate. +Note that this sccp supercedes [sccp-80](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-80) on the iETH rate. ## Copyright diff --git a/content/sccp/sccp-87.md b/content/sccp/sccp-87.md index d106de5a9..c54288f44 100644 --- a/content/sccp/sccp-87.md +++ b/content/sccp/sccp-87.md @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ type: Governance -The current cap was configured to sUSD 30 million in [SCCP-85](https://sips.synthetix.io/SCCP/sccp-85) of which sUSD 28 million is currently utilized in shorts and borrows, so there is not much room for new users to take loans or shorts. +The current cap was configured to sUSD 30 million in [SCCP-85](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-85) of which sUSD 28 million is currently utilized in shorts and borrows, so there is not much room for new users to take loans or shorts. ## Abstract diff --git a/content/sccp/sccp-88.md b/content/sccp/sccp-88.md index 7c10cd3de..1d8433cf0 100644 --- a/content/sccp/sccp-88.md +++ b/content/sccp/sccp-88.md @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ type: Governance -The current cap was configured to sUSD 40 million in [SCCP-87](https://sips.synthetix.io/SCCP/sccp-87) of which sUSD 39 million is currently utilized in shorts and borrows, so there is not much room for new users to take loans or shorts. +The current cap was configured to sUSD 40 million in [SCCP-87](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-87) of which sUSD 39 million is currently utilized in shorts and borrows, so there is not much room for new users to take loans or shorts. ## Abstract diff --git a/content/sccp/sccp-91.md b/content/sccp/sccp-91.md index c0751b182..757e8fca8 100644 --- a/content/sccp/sccp-91.md +++ b/content/sccp/sccp-91.md @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ type: Governance -The current `maxDebt` was configured to be sUSD 50 million in [SCCP-88](https://sips.synthetix.io/SCCP/sccp-88) but has long been surpassed, this sccp proposed to increase it to sUSD 65 million given the increased demand for shorts, following the recent temporary increase in snx rewards. +The current `maxDebt` was configured to be sUSD 50 million in [SCCP-88](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-88) but has long been surpassed, this sccp proposed to increase it to sUSD 65 million given the increased demand for shorts, following the recent temporary increase in snx rewards. ## Abstract @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ Due to the recent increase in snx rewards paid on sETH shorts, total debt had in | sETH | 27 | | **Total** | **54** | -Rewards on sETH shorts now amount to 24k SNX per week, due to the transition from sDAO funding to inflationary supply funding as per [SCCP-89](https://sips.synthetix.io/SCCP/sccp-89). With the current cap being reached, users are not able to open shorts on sBTC or sETH, resulting in the APY on shorts surging to 100%, while it was 50% pre-reward boost. Therefore this SCCP suggests to increase `maxDebt` to sUSD 65 million and to revise it gradually lower in future if excess capacity isn't fully utilized, as rewards are decreased back down. +Rewards on sETH shorts now amount to 24k SNX per week, due to the transition from sDAO funding to inflationary supply funding as per [SCCP-89](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-89). With the current cap being reached, users are not able to open shorts on sBTC or sETH, resulting in the APY on shorts surging to 100%, while it was 50% pre-reward boost. Therefore this SCCP suggests to increase `maxDebt` to sUSD 65 million and to revise it gradually lower in future if excess capacity isn't fully utilized, as rewards are decreased back down. ## Copyright diff --git a/content/sccp/sccp-94.md b/content/sccp/sccp-94.md index 7de9aa917..462990519 100644 --- a/content/sccp/sccp-94.md +++ b/content/sccp/sccp-94.md @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ type: Governance -The current `maxDebt` was configured to be sUSD 65 million in [SCCP-91](https://sips.synthetix.io/SCCP/sccp-91) but has been surpassed, this sccp proposed to increase it to sUSD 75 million given the increased demand for shorts. +The current `maxDebt` was configured to be sUSD 65 million in [SCCP-91](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-91) but has been surpassed, this sccp proposed to increase it to sUSD 75 million given the increased demand for shorts. ## Abstract diff --git a/content/sccp/sccp-95.md b/content/sccp/sccp-95.md index 063e42fd8..26776d348 100644 --- a/content/sccp/sccp-95.md +++ b/content/sccp/sccp-95.md @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ type: Governance -The current `maxDebt` was configured to be sUSD 75 million in [SCCP-94](https://sips.synthetix.io/SCCP/sccp-94) but has almost been reached, this sccp proposes to increase it to sUSD 90 million given the increased demand for shorts. +The current `maxDebt` was configured to be sUSD 75 million in [SCCP-94](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-94) but has almost been reached, this sccp proposes to increase it to sUSD 90 million given the increased demand for shorts. ## Abstract diff --git a/content/sccp/sccp-99.md b/content/sccp/sccp-99.md index b8d993ce0..16a0151da 100644 --- a/content/sccp/sccp-99.md +++ b/content/sccp/sccp-99.md @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ type: Governance -The current `maxDebt` was configured to be sUSD 90 million in [SCCP-95](https://sips.synthetix.io/SCCP/sccp-95) has been reached, this sccp proposes to increase it to sUSD 110 million given the increased demand for shorts. +The current `maxDebt` was configured to be sUSD 90 million in [SCCP-95](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-95) has been reached, this sccp proposes to increase it to sUSD 110 million given the increased demand for shorts. ## Abstract diff --git a/content/sips/sip-142.md b/content/sips/sip-142.md index 4360ced3b..69641ccb3 100644 --- a/content/sips/sip-142.md +++ b/content/sips/sip-142.md @@ -12,13 +12,13 @@ type: Governance ## Simple Summary -Deprecate the [skinny Ethercollateral](./sip-35.md) and [EtherCollateral sUSD](./sip-85.md) loans and remove them from the Synthetix system. +Deprecate the [skinny Ethercollateral](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-35/) and [EtherCollateral sUSD](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-85/) loans and remove them from the Synthetix system. ## Abstract The EtherCollateral loans were scheduled to be deprecated once Multi-collateral loans system has been fully deployed. The current functions of the skinny ether collateral and Ethercollateral sUSD loans can be both done via the Multi-collateral loans and also the Ether Wrapper contracts. -After the one month notice period ending **00:00 UTC on June 25th, 2021**, the pDAO would enable liquidations on the Ethercollateral loans as per [SCCP 112](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccps/sccp-112) which allows any unclosed loans to be liquidated. Outstanding loans can be repaid by repaying the sUSD or sETH borrowed and the ETH collateral redeemed. +After the one month notice period ending **00:00 UTC on June 25th, 2021**, the pDAO would enable liquidations on the Ethercollateral loans as per [SCCP 112](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-112) which allows any unclosed loans to be liquidated. Outstanding loans can be repaid by repaying the sUSD or sETH borrowed and the ETH collateral redeemed. The EtherCollateral contracts can then be deprecated and removed from the Synthetix protocol by detaching these contracts from the protocol. @@ -106,4 +106,4 @@ N/A ## Copyright -Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). \ No newline at end of file +Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). diff --git a/content/sips/sip-166.md b/content/sips/sip-166.md index 9034a5fbd..9075c1ce0 100644 --- a/content/sips/sip-166.md +++ b/content/sips/sip-166.md @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ In order to support the rebalancing of `sCEX` and introduction of new non-exchan -[SCCP-124](../SCCP/sccp-124.md) proposed the rebalancing of the `sCEX` index with two new centralized finance tokens - `NEXO` and `CEL` - and a rename into `sCEFI` which more correctly depicts the index. A rename in this instance is not valid due to the 150k of open interest currently held in the sCEX synth, as those holders did not buy into a `sCEFI` token. In order to correctly handle this rebalance, we either needed to a) keep `sCEX` around and create a new `sCEFI` token or b) deprecate `sCEX` and create the new `sCEFI` synth allowing them to trade into it. Thus the council opted for option b, and once `sCEX` is deprecated in [SIP-169](./sip-169.md) this SIP can proceed. +[SCCP-124](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-124/) proposed the rebalancing of the `sCEX` index with two new centralized finance tokens - `NEXO` and `CEL` - and a rename into `sCEFI` which more correctly depicts the index. A rename in this instance is not valid due to the 150k of open interest currently held in the sCEX synth, as those holders did not buy into a `sCEFI` token. In order to correctly handle this rebalance, we either needed to a) keep `sCEX` around and create a new `sCEFI` token or b) deprecate `sCEX` and create the new `sCEFI` synth allowing them to trade into it. Thus the council opted for option b, and once `sCEX` is deprecated in [SIP-169](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-169/) this SIP can proceed. ## Specification @@ -60,4 +60,4 @@ N/A ## Copyright -Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). \ No newline at end of file +Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). diff --git a/content/sips/sip-202.md b/content/sips/sip-202.md index 43109d3bd..10d4fba65 100644 --- a/content/sips/sip-202.md +++ b/content/sips/sip-202.md @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ Each epoch the staking ratio for the previous epoch will be measured at the befo #### Staking and 7 days debt burn lock -To ensure that the staking ratio is accurate when the staking ratio snapshot is taken each week and that the ratio is not gamed, [SCCP-164](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccps/sccp-164/) proposes to increase the burn lock to 7 days from the current 24 hours. Also with the increase in weekly SNX rewards, there are concerns that snapshotting of the fee periods for the rewards will be an issue again. The proposal to increase the burn lock to 7 days will increase the incentives and alignment of stakers to support the system for a minimum of 7 days after the mint. +To ensure that the staking ratio is accurate when the staking ratio snapshot is taken each week and that the ratio is not gamed, [SCCP-164](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-164/) proposes to increase the burn lock to 7 days from the current 24 hours. Also with the increase in weekly SNX rewards, there are concerns that snapshotting of the fee periods for the rewards will be an issue again. The proposal to increase the burn lock to 7 days will increase the incentives and alignment of stakers to support the system for a minimum of 7 days after the mint. ### Rationale diff --git a/content/sips/sip-212.md b/content/sips/sip-212.md index f6ee37a40..adf13af24 100644 --- a/content/sips/sip-212.md +++ b/content/sips/sip-212.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Listing commodity synths on Optimism will benefit the Synthetix "ecosystem" by a The need for commodity synths was expressed clearly by various community members in the Synthetix discord channel #new-synth-additions. Adding commodities makes sense given their "safe haven" nature and popularity among traders during market turmoil. -Commodity synths were phased out during the Wezen release [https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-169/](SIP-169)) on L1 with the intent to re-add these synths later on Optimism. Front running risks and high trading fees were important reasons for phasing out commodity synths on Ethereum mainnet; however these issues have been mitigated sufficiently on Optimism. +Commodity synths were phased out during the Wezen release [https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-169/](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-169/) on L1 with the intent to re-add these synths later on Optimism. Front running risks and high trading fees were important reasons for phasing out commodity synths on Ethereum mainnet; however these issues have been mitigated sufficiently on Optimism. **Depth and volume** The market depth and volume for silver (eg. XAG) and gold (eg. XAU) reasonably pose no risk with regards to price manipulation given the market's size. diff --git a/content/sips/sip-317.md b/content/sips/sip-317.md index f4ec4effc..bf0264876 100644 --- a/content/sips/sip-317.md +++ b/content/sips/sip-317.md @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ Each market that allows this type of order can configure an array of _settlement #### Wrapping -Markets which are able to [provide collateral directly to Synthetix](../sip-308) can issue synths of equivalent value after applying fees. Users can set a "minimum amount received" to protect against slippage. A fixed fee (positive or negative) can be set seperately for wrapping and unwrapping. +Markets which are able to [provide collateral directly to Synthetix](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-308) can issue synths of equivalent value after applying fees. Users can set a "minimum amount received" to protect against slippage. A fixed fee (positive or negative) can be set seperately for wrapping and unwrapping. #### Utilization Rate Fee diff --git a/content/sips/sip-322.md b/content/sips/sip-322.md index a5c47a519..e4b4ce0f3 100644 --- a/content/sips/sip-322.md +++ b/content/sips/sip-322.md @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ created: 2023-05-08 -This SIP proposes adding various view functions to the [spot market implementation ](../sip-317) and a minor alteration to eventing functionality in the oracle manager. +This SIP proposes adding various view functions to the [spot market implementation](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-317) and a minor alteration to eventing functionality in the oracle manager. ## Motivation diff --git a/content/sips/sip-329.md b/content/sips/sip-329.md index ff3f9b5be..ec23381f9 100644 --- a/content/sips/sip-329.md +++ b/content/sips/sip-329.md @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Pyth’s [On-Demand Updates](https://docs.pyth.network/pythnet-price-feeds/on-de This proposal would add functionality such that client applications for protocols that are integrated with the oracle manager are able to anticipate the need for fresh price data and automatically queue price update calls at the top of a multicall before the desired transaction. -Note that a similar pattern could be used to implement [cross-chain pool synthesis](../sip-312) if a decentralized oracle network were able to provide a similar service to read data from arbitrary functions on other chains at specified timestamps (rather than prices). +Note that a similar pattern could be used to implement [cross-chain pool synthesis](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-312) if a decentralized oracle network were able to provide a similar service to read data from arbitrary functions on other chains at specified timestamps (rather than prices). ## Specification diff --git a/content/sips/sip-392.md b/content/sips/sip-392.md index e244eb853..1ebcd67fd 100644 --- a/content/sips/sip-392.md +++ b/content/sips/sip-392.md @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Add USDe as a supported collateral type for Arbitrum V3 deployment with issuance Ethena imports basis yield from centralized exchanges by holding ETH and LST's with offsetting short positions in ETH perpetual futures market, with the bulk of the yield distributed to sUSDe holders (currently earning ~30%+ APR so far this year). Yield bearing collateral can drastically improve the capital efficiency of providing liquidity to markets on Synthetix V3 and sUSDe presents an attractive option to fulfill this need. USDe holders do not receive any of the yield, but do receive points via a sats campaign. This entitles users to receive ENA tokens. It is important that Synthetix supports both programs so users are given optionality while we can increase capital efficiency of providing liquidity to markets on Synthetix Perps and scale the LP collateral. -A discussion on the various risk factors and considerations associated with Ethena and USDe can be found [here]([url](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/morpho-spark-dai-vault-update-1-april-2024/24006#performance-and-pool-selection-1)). +A discussion on the various risk factors and considerations associated with Ethena and USDe can be found [here](https://forum.makerdao.com/t/morpho-spark-dai-vault-update-1-april-2024/24006#performance-and-pool-selection-1). ### Technical Specification diff --git a/content/sips/sip-398.md b/content/sips/sip-398.md index 782b3feca..9c10b9947 100644 --- a/content/sips/sip-398.md +++ b/content/sips/sip-398.md @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ Chainlink Data Streams offer a number of unique benefits and advantages for the - **Ultra-low-latency:** Data Streams provides market-leading latency price updates, reducing the lag from exchange prices to oracle prices and mitigating the risk of front running. - **Functionality:** In addition to the mid-price, Data Streams also provides [liquidity-weighted bid/ask quote prices](https://blog.chain.link/liquidity-indicators/) calculated and published at the same time as the benchmark price. This can be used to provide a more realistic trading experience to users, while further protecting the protocol from frontrunning. -Live data from Chainlink Data Streams can be seen on [data.chain.link/streams](data.chain.link/streams), while the documentation can be read at [docs.chain.link/data-streams/architecture](docs.chain.link/data-streams/architecture). +Live data from Chainlink Data Streams can be seen on [data.chain.link/streams](https://data.chain.link/streams), while the documentation can be read at [docs.chain.link/data-streams/architecture](https://docs.chain.link/data-streams/architecture). ### Liquidity Weighted Bid and Ask prices During high volatility, spreads on order books can become very wide. Quoting mid prices during these times exposes protocols and LPs as they are quoting a price that users on spot exchanges cannot realistically receive or hedge. Chainlink Data Streams uniquely offers not just a mid price, but also Liquidity-Weighted Bid and Ask (LWBA) prices. These three prices collectively offer a pricing spread that provides protocols with information about the activity in the market derived from the current state of the order books. diff --git a/content/sips/sip-408.md b/content/sips/sip-408.md index eac257d2e..5fa662bcb 100644 --- a/content/sips/sip-408.md +++ b/content/sips/sip-408.md @@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ The SIP aims to improve the governance structure of the Synthetix protocol by in ## Motivation To make Synthetix governance more robust, there must be a mechanism for SNX token holders to vote on proposals (i.e. Referendums). There are two important scenarios where a referendum can be effective and improve the robustness of Synthetix Governance: ---1. The Spartan Council can refer proposals of the utmost significance to the ultimate Synthetix stakeholder, the SNX token holder. ---2. Proposals that may conflict with or not be aligned with the perspectives or motivations of the Spartan Council can be proposed via a referendum. +1. The Spartan Council can refer proposals of the utmost significance to the ultimate Synthetix stakeholder, the SNX token holder. +2. Proposals that may conflict with or not be aligned with the perspectives or motivations of the Spartan Council can be proposed via a referendum. ## Specification A SNX token holder referendum can be proposed by any community member. For an SR to be merged and included on the SIP website, proof of a soft quorum (i.e. 10m SNX - configurable by SCCP) must be provided to a SIP editor. This prevents spam referendums and ensures community discussion is focused on impactful and supported change. diff --git a/content/sips/sip-71.md b/content/sips/sip-71.md index 2976af189..71c482458 100644 --- a/content/sips/sip-71.md +++ b/content/sips/sip-71.md @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ This SIP proposes several enhancements to binary option markets intended to furt The binary option market manager and factory will be replaced, and existing markets migrated over to the new manager. This SIP seeks to accomplish the following: * Remove the pool fee charge for market creators -* Allow market creators to cancel a market if no bids have been placed on it yet (supercedes [SCCP-33](../SCCP/sccp-33.md)) +* Allow market creators to cancel a market if no bids have been placed on it yet (supercedes [SCCP-33](../sccp/sccp-33.md)) * Allow market creators to disable bid withdrawals at market creation * Emit bid events for the initial capital at market creation * Fix a bug that prevents creators from exercising their options before expiry under certain circumstances @@ -97,4 +97,4 @@ On existing markets, although most users will be unaffected, market creators sho ## Copyright -Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). \ No newline at end of file +Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). diff --git a/content/sips/sip-75.md b/content/sips/sip-75.md index 286b3b8f5..b4a9b992f 100644 --- a/content/sips/sip-75.md +++ b/content/sips/sip-75.md @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ type: Governance ## Simple Summary -The current version of the iSynths (inverse price Synths) have price limits to protect the network, when these price limits are hit the Synth is frozen. [SIP-61](./sip-61/md) covers the roadmap for Keeper Synths. Phase 1 of the system will be allowing a public function to freeze iSynths. +The current version of the iSynths (inverse price Synths) have price limits to protect the network, when these price limits are hit the Synth is frozen. [SIP-61](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-61/) covers the roadmap for Keeper Synths. Phase 1 of the system will be allowing a public function to freeze iSynths. ## Abstract @@ -104,4 +104,4 @@ Given iETH on `ExchangeRates` is below the upper limit and above the lower limit ## Copyright -Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). \ No newline at end of file +Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). diff --git a/content/sips/sip-96.md b/content/sips/sip-96.md index ee7eea794..8b40a7e8d 100644 --- a/content/sips/sip-96.md +++ b/content/sips/sip-96.md @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ When a blockchain undergoes a hard fork, there could be two different versions o To protect traders and SNX stakers against this uncertainty, this framework proposes to suspend the affected Synths 72 hours before the hard fork event. -In the case of contentious hard forks where there are two competing forks, a SIP could be proposed, for example in the case of the recent [BCH fork](.sip-95.md), to the community and stakers to delist the synths and then re-examine relisting the synths once the dominant fork and price feeds are established. +In the case of contentious hard forks where there are two competing forks, a SIP could be proposed, for example in the case of the recent [BCH fork](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-95.md), to the community and stakers to delist the synths and then re-examine relisting the synths once the dominant fork and price feeds are established. ## Rationale @@ -57,4 +57,4 @@ The uncertainity a hard fork introduces requires the protocol to suspend the exc ## Copyright -Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). \ No newline at end of file +Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). diff --git a/content/sips/sip-98.md b/content/sips/sip-98.md index b188586c0..dba976fcf 100644 --- a/content/sips/sip-98.md +++ b/content/sips/sip-98.md @@ -48,8 +48,8 @@ https://github.com/Synthetixio/synthetix/blob/v2.34.0/test/contracts/Exchanger.s -While implementing this SIP, sBTC and iBTC, sETH and iETH trading fees were also reduced back to 30bps, as they had been increased as per [SCCP-65](https://sips.synthetix.io/SCCP/sccp-65) and [SCCP-62](https://sips.synthetix.io/SCCP/sccp-62) to combat frontrunning that was observed utilising swing trades between short and long synths. +While implementing this SIP, sBTC and iBTC, sETH and iETH trading fees were also reduced back to 30bps, as they had been increased as per [SCCP-65](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-65) and [SCCP-62](https://sips.synthetix.io/sccp/sccp-62) to combat frontrunning that was observed utilising swing trades between short and long synths. ## Copyright -Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). \ No newline at end of file +Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). diff --git a/content/stps/stp-2.md b/content/stps/stp-2.md index 903661117..84e78666b 100644 --- a/content/stps/stp-2.md +++ b/content/stps/stp-2.md @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ The responsibilities of the working group will be as follows: 1. **Data sources and APIs** Managing the subgraph and APIs that are upstream of any data analytics artefacts. This data layer must be available and up to date after each protocol upgrade. It will become the source of truth for any analytics artefacts (Synthetix live dashboards, third party platforms, and direct data consumption) in turn ensuring information about Synthetix corroborates across the internet. 2. **Official Synthetix artefacts** - Creating and maintaining Synthetix branded data analytics artefacts (like live dashboards and key metrics displayed on [synthetix.io](https://synthetix.io/dashboard)) as has previously been done by CCs and community members. + Creating and maintaining Synthetix branded data analytics artefacts (like live dashboards and key metrics displayed on [synthetix.io](https://synthetix.io/)) as has previously been done by CCs and community members. 3. **Third party analytics** It will be the responsibility of the working group to coordinate with any third-party analytics providers that currently report on Synthetix (e.g. Token Terminal), or that should report on Synthetix but do not (e.g. CoinGecko [derivatives exchanges](https://twitter.com/kaiynne/status/1653784645006155781?s=20)). The working group should ensure these third parties are provided any data or endpoints needed to display accurate information about Synthetix.